Russia Has a Problem: Training and Equipping Mobilized Reservists

The Russian Federation will need at least three to four months to prepare its personnel for combat after the announced partial mobilization on September 21. 

Moreover, Moscow will have a problem equipping recruits considering the depletion of their reserves, according to the  former head of the press service of the General Staff, Colonel Vladyslav Seleznev, on RBC-Ukraine.

“To call up, provide and train personnel after the announcement of partial mobilization, Russians will need at least three to four months. But the main question is how the very fact of mobilization will be perceived inside Russia. After all, now we will have to go to war without financial payments, which can increase tension, especially in socially disadvantaged regions,” Seleznev believes.

In addition, sanctions against Russia prevent the replenishment of its military reserves. The colonel believes that all the problems the covert mobilization faces will manifest themselves on a larger scale during the official mobilization.

In reality, the Russian command has been using covert mobilization and recruitment of contract soldiers for more than half a year. According to intelligence the invaders replenished their personnel in several ways: with the help of the program of the combat army reserve of the country, volunteer battalions, and the private military company (PMC) Wagner, a network of mercenaries, or a de facto private army of Putin.

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However, Vadym Skibitsky notes, the main problem of such recruitment is the lack of officers.

The enemy collected the Third Army Corps for about three months, starting in May. Due to the lack of reserves, the Russian General Staff wanted to create four such corps – one for each military district, but, according to the coordinator of the information resistance group, after overestimating their capabilities, the Russians decided to form at most one such Corps.

“As a result, it is still understaffed. It should have a staff of 15.5 thousand people, but in reality, it has about 10-12 thousand,” the expert explained.

Therefore, a partial mobilization was announced. This includes Russians with military accounting specialties and experience, who are in reserve and served in the armed forces of the Russian Federation. The goal is to gather 300 thousand reservists. According to Skibitsky, all this is necessary for Moscow to ensure the deployment of additional units, create the required reserves and wage war to deplete Ukraine.

However, representatives of Ukraine’s General Staff note that it will take at least three to four months for Russians to call up, provide and train personnel after the announcement of partial mobilization. Yet, another problem in Moscow is the reaction of the Russians because now they will have to go to war without financial payments, ehile due to sanctions and the depletion of its own reserves, Russia is forced to look for weapons and equipment in Asian countries.

After the Ukrainian offensive in the Kharkiv region, the head of the  Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Ramzan Kadyrov, proposed to train and staff at least one thousand volunteers from each of 85 areas.

The Ukrainian leadership reacted calmly to the appeal of Russian President Vladimir Putin on the topic of so-called referendums in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine. According to Ukraine’s ministry of defense, virtually nothing has changed. Moreover, the Ministry believes that this can only be done by military means in the near future.

In addition, Ukraine’s Western partners publicly gave a negative assessment of Russia’s actions. French President Emmanuel Macron, who sometimes hasn’t reacted to activities Russian Federation activities, expressed disagreement.

Ukrainian intelligence notes the announcement of illegal referendums in the Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions in a relatively short time is an attempt to show the Russian domestic electorate an achievement of at least some results of their so-called special military operation.