A little more than three years ago, in late March 2014, Ukraine requested that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe carry out impartial and objective monitoring of the security situation in the country.
Ukraine was in a fever: Russia was already establishing its official occupation authorities in the recently annexed Ukrainian territory Crimea, and Russian special forces teams were organizing pro-Russian revolts in the country’s east. To monitor and facilitate dialogue, the OSCE deployed an unarmed civilian monitoring mission in Ukraine.
Three years on, that mission – the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission – is still present in Ukraine, although it has never been given the opportunity to monitor a lasting cease-fire and withdrawal of heavy weapons, as it is mandated to do under the Minsk peace accords, because neither side has fully stuck to the commitments they first made in September 2014.
Almost 500 kilometers of contact line still bisect Ukraine’s once-thriving industrial heartland, with hundreds of thousands of civilians caught in between the hammer and anvil of war. The latest attempt by the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk to impose a cease-fire starting from April 1, the twelfth since the summer of 2014, has failed again – and both sides blame each other for shelling and continuing attacks.
But Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Alexander Hug, a former Swiss army officer with experience of working in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Middle East and Kosovo, says that the sides can stop fighting if they choose to do so.
“The situation now is volatile,” Hug told the Kyiv Post during an interview on 7 April. “It is static in many places, but very fluid directly at the contact line, very dangerous for civilians, including our monitors, and there’s the potential for a flare-up of fighting.”
On 5 April, just five days after the recommitment to cease firing, the OSCE SMM monitors recorded more than 2,000 violations all along the contact line, he said.
“You can draw your own conclusions,” Hug said.
Stalemate
In Donbas, the OSCE monitors see at least five hot spots where the most of the fighting happens: areas east and north-east of Mariupol, a triangle between the destroyed Donetsk Airport, Avdiyivka and Yasynuvata, areas west and north of Horlivka, an area located southeast and east of Svitlodarsk, and the area located between Popasna, Pervomaisk and Troitske in Luhansk Oblast.
There, heavy weapons, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and heavy artillery, are often spotted within the security zone on both sides of the front line, in violation of the Minsk agreements.
Approximately 95 percent of the hostilities and destruction takes place in these areas, where fighting virtually almost never stops, as the sides are too close to each other and show little will to pull their weapons back, Hug said. Since the bloody battle for Debaltseve in February 2015, the contact line has changed little, but in many places both sides have moved closer to each other, which fuels the fighting, he said.
“For instance, in the area of the Donetsk filtration station, which is located between Yasynuvata and Avdiyivka, the positions are just 200 meters away from each other, even tens of meters away at some points. They can see each other, can shout at each other, they see (each other’s) flags.”
The other main problem in preventing the bloodshed is the presence of heavy weapons just behind the front lines. Under the Minsk agreements, both sides are obliged to pull all heavy weapons back at least 15 kilometers from the contact line, creating a 30-kilometer security zone between them, thus preventing fresh exchanges of shelling. Larger caliber weapons must be withdrawn even further back.
“Instead, our UAVs record armored weaponry and artillery units within the security zone on both sides of the contact line, deployed for combat engagements,” Hug said. “Just over the last week, the monitors documented at least 200 heavy weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.”
Of the over 140 civilian casualties confirmed by the OSCE SMM in the first months of 2017, more than 80 percent were caused by shrapnel from heavy weapons, Hug said.
“By moving and keeping all the heavy weapons beyond agreed withdrawal lines and by establishing a distance of at least two kilometers between the positions, the suffering of the civilian population could be considerably reduced.”
There is evidence that a true and stable ceasefire is not impossible – the OSCE SMM monitors have seen rare days with no fighting at all, and both sides seem to have an effective command and control over their forces and armed formations, Hug said. What is needed is clear mutual political will to stop the bloodshed by starting to increase the distance between the side’s positions and to withdraw heavy weapons.
“There is evidence that if these two measures are taken, the cease-fire really works,” Hug said. “For instance, in Luhansk region, the Siverskyi Donets river creates a natural distance between the positions. And the whole of this contact line is quiet – we see almost no violations, no fighting.”
Nevertheless, the mission sees a “total absence of trust between the sides,” according to Hug.
“And I understand the reason why both sides do not trust each other. Several times, our host country Ukraine has claimed that if it implements its part of the deal, it’s been immediately abused or misused by the other side – and the other side claims the same.”
Difficult job
Since the first days of the conflict, the sight of the OSCE SMM’s white and blue armored jeeps patrolling the conflict zone has become a familiar one for those living in towns or villages near the contact line.
“When we’re far from the contact line, in Antratsyt or Boikivske (formerly Telmanove), civilians not affiliated with armed forces and formations welcome us, with no problems,” said Hug. “But near the hot spots areas the civilians, who have been living under shelling for three years, for three winters, are highly frustrated. We are often the only representatives of the international community they see.”
Often such visits start with expressions of such frustration. However, after ten minutes, the locals usually show their appreciation for SMM work, Hug said.
But seeing the civilians’ suffering and not being able to stop it makes SMM monitors’ job very difficult, he said.
“People look into my eyes and ask me directly: ‘Alexander, when will you stop it?’ And I have to tell them that I can’t stop it, as we are not the ones who are fighting. The decision to stop firing and put the finger away from the trigger can be taken by those who control these units. The OSCE can only document whether they do it or not. It’s quite a difficult job – you know what needs to be done, you encounter frustration, but you can only document what you see.”
“My colleagues can’t feed those people, repair gas lines or fix houses. They go there with a piece of paper and write down what we see – and report it, so then the United Nations or the International Committee of the Red Cross or others can help those suffering there. The SMM’s information on the needs and challenges of Ukrainians on both sides of the contact line is a major source of information for those who can deliver help. Furthermore, the SMM also facilitates access for these agencies where this is requested and is necessary.”
As most of the international humanitarian organizations are not allowed to work in areas not controlled by the government, the OSCE SMM monitors are often the only ones to shed light on what is going in places where people are in dire need of food, or even fresh water.
In some places where there is heavy fighting, people often have no electricity, no water or gas supplies for months, and the people do not even clearly realize what is going on beyond their villages, isolated as they are by the fighting, Hug said.
People living in Kruta Balka, a village near the contact line, located to the east of Avdiyivka, have to walk several kilometers to Yasynuvata – crossing the positions and minefields – just to charge their mobile phones, Hug says, giving one example.
“Early this year, I went to the village of Dolomitne near Novoluhanske, and a woman approached me to ask for some bread and salt. When the situation is this serious, everything possible must be done immediately to stop hostilities and help the people.”
Constant monitoring
Hug stressed that presence of the OSCE SMM monitors on the ground has a deterrence effect, but it will not stop the conflict until the root causes – the presence of heavy weapons and the proximity of forces – are addressed.
But still, many soldiers and civilians complain that as soon as the white-and-blue cars leave the area for their bases after dusk, all hell breaks loose again.
“Neither of the sides provides us with security guarantees, and the security of our monitors is important,” Hug said. “You know that our monitors have come under fire; in particular we have faced many such incidents in recent weeks. We get absolutely no concessions.”
Besides, in recent months OSCE monitors have with increasing frequency been denied access to certain areas both in government-controlled areas and areas not controlled by the government, and are sometimes even attacked, threatened or intimidated – in particular by the Russian-backed forces. The organization recently reported at least five cases of OSCE SMM patrols being fired on or of their equipment being destroyed in order to prevent them from monitoring.
“The more intense fighting is, the more weapons are there, the more restrictions are imposed on us,” Hug said.
“There can be only one reason – they don’t want us to see what is going on, as we are a messenger of uncomfortable truths – all that was seen will be publicly reported. Our reports to some extent are the certificates of compliance with the (Minsk) agreements.”
Since 2014, the OSCE has been trying to establish forward patrol bases in many key cities in non-government-controlled areas, including Novoazovsk, Boikivske (formerlyTelmanove), Amvrosiyivka, Antratsyt, Krasnodon.
“It would put us on the railroad that goes from Amvrosiyivka, or on the main road going from Rostov to Antratsyt. And we are not there – not because we don’t want to be– we are just not allowed to go there.”
“And why are we not allowed? For the same and the only reason – to prevent the SMM from documenting the situation in areas where access is being denied or interfered with.”
