Defining Victory: Ukraine’s Path to Sovereignty and Strategic Clarity

Victory is more than just a matter of military strategy – it’s about defining a clear and coherent goal for the future. Kyiv Post discusses what victory can mean with Dr. Daniel Szeligowski from the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), a Polish state advisory and analytical institution.

Michał Kujawski: You prepared an extensive report on defining Ukrainian victory. What is the focus of defining it?

Daniel Szeligowski: We are facing a conceptual void when it comes to defining our goal in Ukraine. It’s very simple – if we don’t present what our goal is, others will define it for us. This can be seen in the context of the Trump administration – neither Europe nor Ukraine filled this void by the end of last year. We are in a situation where the Trump administration set the goal for us – it’s the freezing of the conflict at any cost. Ukraine would bear the consequences.

First, we need to convince the Trump administration to align its goals, at least partially, with those of Europe. On the other hand, Europe is facing an increasing problem with mobilization at the political level. It’s not entirely clear what we’re aiming for.

Since the beginning of the war, no one has prepared a theory of victory. For this reason, all Western aid was based on the “as long as it takes” approach, which turned out to be unsustainable in the long term. We need to develop a coherent concept that will allow for a three-way American-Ukrainian-European consensus.

MK: So instead of “as long as it takes,” it should be “as much as it takes”?

DS: That’s more of a question of strategy – how to reach the final point. First, within the theory of victory, we need to develop a point we are aiming for. Once we set the goal for how we want to end this war, we can discuss strategy, tools for pressure, compromises, and so on.

MK: So, what do you propose in your report?

DS: In my opinion, the ultimate goal is the preservation of Ukrainian sovereignty. That is the priority.

MK: Russia’s goal is to break it.

DS: I position this goal in contrast to Russia’s objective. Their goal is to destroy Ukrainian statehood and politically subjugate Ukraine, not to seize additional territory, which is an instrument, not the goal itself.

MK: There’s a lot of talk about Russia’s territorial claims against Ukraine, starting with Crimea, but this is not actually a war over territory. Acknowledging territorial claims, however, is opening a Pandora’s box – we discussed this last summer (the two parts of the conversation can be read here and here)

DS: I agree. That’s why, in the report, I parameterize Ukrainian victory – there are political, economic, social parameters, and international recognition in the informational sphere. However, a key aspect of Ukrainian sovereignty is ensuring that all key decisions regarding the country’s development are made in Kyiv, not in Moscow. Furthermore, there can be no question of any international recognition of Russian territorial gains in Ukraine. The Non-recognition policy is crucial. Third, even if Ukraine’s NATO membership is currently impossible due to a lack of consensus, and primarily the lack of agreement from the US, it absolutely does not mean Ukraine’s neutrality or withdrawal from the open-door policy to NATO and the EU. The ability to choose is a key attribute of sovereignty.

MK: Since we talked in the summer, a lot has changed. Most of all, Trump became the president of the US, and we are now witnessing the buildup to an American-Russian reset and peace talks. Where do we stand?

DS: I think there’s a lot of noise and not much result. It’s clear that Trump wants to freeze the conflict, but we don’t see any willingness from Russia to make concessions. The attempt by the Americans to grant Putin prestige, to change their approach, their language, and persuade Russia to be flexible has failed.

MK: Putin has already regained his prestige. This is evident from the US voting against the UN resolution condemning aggression, the withdrawal of the US from some mechanisms for prosecuting Russian crimes in Ukraine, or the proposal for a hockey match. Observers are holding their breath on average twice a week.

DS: Two things are important: US-Russian bilateral relations and American-Ukrainian relations. The US fawning over Russia, all the politeness between them and Putin, is one thing, but selling out Ukraine and leaving it behind is another. These are not two sides of the same coin. The fact that the US administration is tempting the Russians and trying to draw them into their game is one thing, but fortunately, they do not intend to abandon Ukraine in the process.

MK: Many people accuse the Americans of wanting to abandon Ukraine and focus on their other interests. What leads you to this conclusion?

DS: They [the US] want to end the war in Ukraine, even at the cost of Ukrainian concessions, but that is not the same as abandoning Ukraine. This can be seen in Trump’s recent conversation with Putin, where all the proposals to halt military aid and share intelligence were rejected by the US. The fact that the US and Russian leaders agree only on temporarily halting the shelling of energy infrastructure means that Trump does not agree with Putin on all those Russian claims.

MK: Does the proposed ceasefire regarding energy infrastructure benefit Ukraine or Russia more? It looks like Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries are painful for them.

DS: It has both pros and cons for both sides; it is definitely not a Russian concession. This was a subject of negotiations as early as last summer, before the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region. It’s a return to what both sides discussed before Trump became president.

MK: The operation in the Kursk region showed that Ukraine is capable of surprising. Are we expecting something spectacular to improve the negotiating position?

DS: If the talks continue to yield no results, then absolutely. Ukraine will have no other choice but to continue exerting pressure on Russia. We can expect anything.

MK: When Trump won the election, there were voices in Ukraine suggesting that the country should play to his ego. It was seen as an opportunity where he would take Ukraine personally and, at the same time, avoid the embarrassment of Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. It turns out that the language of force is used more often against Kyiv than Moscow. Is there a chance for a change in the American stance?

DS: There is still a chance to influence the position of the Trump administration. The key is the theory of victory – Trump must be convinced that by engaging in the Ukrainian issue, he can gain political profit. It’s possible to present this as his personal success. We can look at his attempts to freeze the war – he hasn’t specified how that would happen. I’m convinced that he knows where he wants to go, but doesn’t know how to get there. There is still an opportunity to adjust the trajectory of Trump’s administration so that it becomes more favorable for Europe and Ukraine.

MK: Will Ukraine and Europe’s ally be Trump bouncing off the wall in the Kremlin?

DS: Not only. It will also be all the European allies who can put something on the table that convinces Trump it’s worth investing in, and that it’s not an investment in a lost cause.

MK: If the war is to end, we need to reach a point where each side can declare its victory. How far are we from such a point?

DS: First of all, I wouldn’t put too much weight on what Russia says. However the war ends, Putin will declare success anyway, even in the case of a full withdrawal from Ukraine. He has full control over the media narrative.

For Ukraine and the international community that supports it, the theory of victory is crucial. No political leader wants to be associated with defeat. That’s why we need a shared theory of victory – political leaders need to be able to invest their political capital, gain public support, and then provide Ukraine with military and economic support so that it can win. Without a clear end goal, we’ll be facing a situation where it’s increasingly difficult to reach a consensus.

MK: Let’s imagine the war ending or the conflict being frozen – however we define it. Is there any indication that Russia will change its goals, which it publicly announced in 2007 and has been consistently pursuing?

DS: I don’t think they will change their goals, but I do consider the scenario in which Russia won’t have the physical capacity to achieve them. That’s what we should aim for – preventing Russia from conquering Ukraine.

MK: When Trump talks about ending the war, is it a true end to the war, or is it just a rhetorical figure?

DS: Ending the war doesn’t end the conflict. Using Putin’s absurd language, it doesn’t eliminate the root causes of the conflict, which is the inability of the Russian political elite to accept Ukraine’s sovereignty, which, by simple contrast, is our key goal.

MK: What scenarios are realistically possible on the axis where one side is full sovereignty and the other is a destabilized state?

DS: We have a whole range of scenarios here, starting from stabilization and ending with vassalization and Russian protection. Most of the scenarios are unfavorable – it’s hard to imagine regaining the 1991 borders and a situation in which Ukraine emerges from the war stronger. In each scenario, Ukraine is weaker than it was. By extension, Poland will also be weaker.

MK: In each one, Ukraine comes out weaker? In 2014, it was much weaker than it is now – it didn’t have the army it has today.

DS: Yes, but we’re comparing it to 2022. After the war, Ukraine will be weaker politically, economically, and will be dependent on foreign aid. Ukraine will also have lost territory. Ukraine’s allies are tired, and there’s a growing belief that the war must end as quickly as possible, at any cost.

On the other side, we have Russia with a war economy and a strong military. In my opinion, we’re facing bad scenarios, though some are just bad, and others are catastrophic. The best of the bad scenarios is freezing the conflict at Russia’s expense, not Ukraine’s. Ukraine comes out of it fully sovereign but with violated territorial integrity. The international community will of course not recognize this, and Ukrainian diplomacy will work hard to build durable statehood and the potential to regain occupied territories when a window of opportunity arises.

MK: What will be the most important for Ukraine itself? International support, or perhaps high social morale and the prevailing belief in victory?

DS: There are several key factors that will be important. Social moods will certainly matter – whether society will perceive the end of the war as a success or a failure. This is a matter of perception, which can be shaped by Ukrainian political elites, but also by the international community, as well as Russia and China through influencing the information space. Continued international support in political and economic terms will also be crucial, mainly for the reconstruction and modernization of the country.

An incredibly important factor will be creating an effective system of deterrence against Russia, so that Ukrainian society can feel secure.

The fourth aspect is whether Ukraine will be included in the Western, transatlantic system, even if not formally, but above all practically, or whether Ukraine will be allowed to remain in a gray security zone between the West and Russia.

MK: How will Ukraine’s statehood and future be influenced by joining Western systems? Regardless of whether it’s a part of defense structures stretching from Finland to Turkey, formal membership in institutions such as the EU, or very close but informal cooperation?

DS: It will involve fulfilling the political and economic commitments these structures have made towards Ukraine. It will also serve as a brake on the populist tendencies of Ukrainian politicians and their pursuit of personal interests at the cost of destabilizing the country. It will also be important for foreign capital and potential investment in Ukraine.

MK: And for the Ukrainians themselves, who mentally, when entering this war, chose the Western direction? In fact, Western politicians, after 2022, almost directly stated during their visits to Kyiv that Ukraine “is already a member state of the EU and NATO.” I think it’s easy to feel betrayed by the West, which would certainly be used by Russia.

DS: Whether Ukrainians will see the terms on which the war ends as a victory or a defeat will be absolutely crucial. Just as important will be whether Ukrainians feel part of the West, and whether there will be a sense of security or the threat of another Russian aggression. There will never be one unified view on these matters within society. It’s an individual political feeling. What’s important is which one dominates. 

The report “Defining Ukraine’s Victory” by Daniel Szeligowski can be read here.