Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense of Ukraine again finds itself in hot water after its head, Rustem Umerov, dismissed another deputy Friday and skipped on renewing a contract with the Defense Procurement Agency – an independent agency set up to buy weapons on Ukraine’s behalf to mitigate corruption risks.
Over the past two years, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense has repeatedly come under the public eye for corruption scandals involving buying supplies at inflated prices – from eggs to winter coats.
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Meanwhile, the Public Anti-Corruption Council has been working under the Ministry for years, striving to shine light on the Ministry’s activities and achieving some notable successes in combating corruption.
Why does the Ministry remain at the center of scandals? How have elections to the Public Council, which recently commenced its work, affected the Ministry’s operations? And what is the nature of the conflict between Umerov and Defense Procurement Agency head Maryna Bezrukova?
Kyiv Post discusses these issues with Tetiana Nikolaenko, a member of the Anti-Corruption Council, re-elected last week.
- Tell us about this Public Council: what it does, and why it’s important. This Council provides Ukrainian society with an opportunity to monitor the Ministry of Defense’s work during the war. After all the recent scandals—like eggs priced at 17 hryvnias or issues with weapon procurement—it gives society a tool to influence the Ministry and demonstrate that corruption is unacceptable.
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Are there similar councils in the United States or Europe? There are no direct analogs. When we visited France last May and met with representatives of their Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they were very surprised that public oversight of the Defense Department even exists. They don’t have anything similar. Interestingly, we are going to Brussels next week, where this topic is gaining attention. Europeans are eager to create similar bodies—independent expertise to evaluate their ministers. European ministries are also interested in our work because they heavily subsidize our economy and want to ensure transparency and efficiency. Moreover, projects supporting specific initiatives often draw significant interest.
- By exposing corruption, doesn’t this sometimes lead Western figures to label Ukraine as highly corrupt? Yet it’s your exposure that prevents further corruption. Corruption exists everywhere, including France. After our conference—where we highlighted our successes in fighting corruption over the past year—the French commented that we talk too openly about these issues. They often keep quiet about similar problems. Due to donor projects, Ukraine is under greater scrutiny than some European countries. For example, take the Czech initiative under President Petr Pavel. They faced a corruption scandal last fall involving the purchase of shells for Ukraine.
- You mean when certain figures in the Czech Republic tried to profit from purchasing shells for Ukraine? Exactly. When I read about that, I laughed because the Ministry of Defense was dealing with issues Ukraine addressed a year earlier. When the Czechs took over tasks that we had already implemented, they encountered the same risks we faced. With proper mechanisms for collaboration, we could have shared our experience, warned them of potential pitfalls, and advised where to focus attention.
- So what can the Public Council do? Do you have any authority beyond publicity? Publicity is everything for us. We don’t have official authority. We can’t be compared to the public council of NABU, which has powers defined by law and participates in disciplinary commission meetings with significant influence. For us, it’s all about advocacy. We present recommendations or escalate issues into scandals, depending on the Ministry’s response. The level of communication with Minister Reznikov was much better than with Minister Umerov. For instance, Reznikov attended council meetings with his deputies and introduced his team. Although the scandal with eggs priced at 17 hryvnias wasn’t pleasant for him, Reznikov respected the will of the 40,000 people represented by the council at that time. Now, this figure exceeds 100,000. In contrast, neither Umerov nor his deputies have attended any council meetings.
-To what extent are the Ukrainian authorities really subject to corruption and problems? I will say this: corruption in these institutions didn’t develop over years but over decades. Some companies have occupied this market for decades, creating entrenched systems. For example, before introducing Prozorro (an online trading monitoring system to prevent corruption), they could manipulate this field however they wanted. With the introduction of Prozorro, they had to suppress their appetites to some extent and reduce abuses. Additional safeguards also emerged. However, during the war, when the Ministry returned to direct procurement, it reopened doors—and gates—to new corruption schemes because there were many entrenched actors. This wasn’t always at the management level but often at the mid-level. It was possible, for example, to “overlook” items in a company’s asset catalog where eggs were inexplicably priced at 17 hryvnias apiece (about USD 0.5).
-Really? Do you believe that Reznikov didn’t know about this? I’m convinced Minister Reznikov didn’t know. The people handling these transactions knew exactly what “mistake” they were making. I think it’s entirely fair that the head of the department ended up behind bars, along with the deputy minister. These individuals, given their functional responsibilities, clearly understood what they were doing. At lower levels, some also understood how “mistakes” could be exploited. For example, they might manipulate specifications for items like berets or tactical headphones, creating monopolistic conditions for specific companies to supply the Ministry of Defense. If an outsider tried to compete, they wouldn’t understand the system and would spend years just figuring out where the obstacles were buried.
-But Reznikov also resigned after the scandal with eggs priced at 17 hryvnias. Yes, because he defended it stubbornly and unconvincingly. This was his political responsibility. We can argue that certain political forces leveraged this scandal to remove him, but he still had to bear political accountability.
-What happened between Umerov and Bezrukova? Why is everything so dramatic? Minister Umerov is accused of chaos and is trying to eliminate the head of the Defense Procurement Agency, Bezrukova… The accusations of chaos against Umerov, rather than corruption, are linked to Alexey Reznikov. In 2022, Reznikov initiated the creation of two agencies for the procurement of weapons and ammunition. This removed procurement responsibilities from the minister and transferred them to these agencies. Fortunately, professional buyers were appointed to these agencies. As a result, corruption levels have decreased. For example, abuse related to non-lethal purchases has also decreased because these items are now being procured through Prozorro. This primarily concerns food and clothing.
-Tell us about food abuse. How did it happen? The issue was that only intermediaries, not direct producers, were allowed to bid for food supplies. The supply catalog included over 400 items. We tried to divide these into separate groups—cereals, meat products, dairy products—because no single producer can provide everything from water to sturgeon. It was challenging, but we managed to return these purchases to Prozorro. Now, they’re monitored online, and we’ve introduced an electronic catalog, which simplifies control for the state logistics operator. Prices have dropped, which is a positive development. However, intermediary companies don’t want to give up their margins, so they try to compensate by lowering the quality of goods. Currently, the struggle revolves around this issue.
-So, what happened with the agencies and the minister? These two agencies became a kind of political lightning rod for the Ministry because the Ministry itself no longer handled procurement. Over time, Maryna Bezrukova, the head of the Defense Procurement Agency, began asserting herself and stopped following the Ministry’s recommendations. She started acting as an independent purchasing unit and voiced her own opinions on whether certain quantities or items were necessary. This assertiveness didn’t sit well with the minister.
-And that’s why they started fighting her? It’s significant that, so far, the Ministry has not had any public confrontation with Bezrukova. First, there was the idea of creating an agency specifically for purchasing drones. Then came the dramatic idea of merging the Defense Procurement Agency with the state rear operator, combining them under the state rear operator’s structure. This was strange because the state rear operator is a smaller organization in terms of staff. We spoke out and told the Ministry that they were misleading people by claiming this was a recommendation from NATO. That wasn’t true. NATO never recommended merging agencies during the war. Instead, NATO suggested creating a centralized agency after martial law ended, which would handle procurement for all law enforcement agencies.
-Arsen Zhumadilov, head of the state rear operator responsible for purchasing non-weapons and non-military goods (such as food), will now, in line with the minister’s will, take over Bezrukova’s post… The Ministry has had varying relationships with the agencies and operators. Its relationship with the state rear operator has been the best.
-Tell us about the corruption scandals in the Ministry of Defense that you, and society as a whole, managed to prevent. For example, there was the scandal involving the purchase of “winter” jackets. There was suspicion that, although labeled as “winter,” they weren’t suitable for the season at all. Fortunately, due to societal pressure, the Ministry of Defense allowed us access to the warehouses where the jackets were stored. We removed some jackets and even sent them for inspection. Luckily, there were jackets that hadn’t yet been seized by the SBU, and we obtained them from Sharapov, the deputy minister. Upon examination, we found they didn’t meet the standards of a proper winter jacket. I even made a video where I demonstrated how the jacket tore apart in my hands—it was visibly of poor quality. How could something like that perform in combat? We proved their poor quality, and this helped minimize the threats of future direct contracts.
However, there remains room for manipulation, such as when the logistics command urgently requests procurement within a month. In such cases, a single supplier is often the only viable option—this opens a window for hidden corruption.
Another significant point is that we’ve managed to participate in meetings where decisions are made about the technical specifications for various items, such as tactical headphones, walkie-talkies, and so on. This allows us to monitor how specifications are written, ensuring they don’t create issues with tenders or invite corruption.
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