OPINION: Which War Is It? Friends and Real Friends, Count the Booms

I took a couple of weeks off for the holidays but the war sure didn’t. There have been all manner of interesting developments, so many that I’ll hold off on the latest tech jumps and Kursk, where things are happening but all in all the situation seems roughly stable. Instead, I’ll kick off with really one of the objectively least important subjects, which is defying logic (but not experience) by dominating the airwaves and telephone screens as the only “Really Big” Ukraine story these days: Trump and the “peace talks.”

Maybe There’s Another Russo-Ukraine War That We Don’t Know About?

All the hue and cry these days about how the Trump administration is going to, I don’t know, purse its eyebrows, wave a magic wand, yank a magic rabbit like Bullwinkle, something, but in any case impose peace and end the Russo-Ukraine War, from where I sit, is just mystifying.

I can’t explain it. It looks to me like the incoming administration has all these brilliant plans to win a Nobel Peace-prize ending the Russo-Ukraine War, but the problem is, the strategy seems to be “That’s what we want so that’s what will happen.” I’m glad to be corrected but I’m not seeing a lot of logic or evidence to back up the incoming administration’s faith.

I’m sure all of you have noted, as a possible indicator, the people telling us it will be easy actually think maybe it won’t – that the incoming administration already has been moving goal posts a good deal more than one would expect from skilled negotiators executing a cogent and coherent national security strategy.

Other Topics of Interest

Kharkiv Front Line: Ukraine’s UAVs Eliminate 20 Russian Troops, T-80 Tank, and More

Russian forces reduced attacks in the Kharkiv sector “because they’re now concentrating on other areas… and cannot operate effectively in the Kharkiv region,” said an AFU official.

To recapitulate, first it was 24 hours before Trump came into office, then it was “within 24 hours” – when exactly not fully clear. Recently it became “Hopefully by Easter,” and the longest forecast I know of is along the lines of “Six months, if we can manage it.”

We all know that the Trump administration negotiator, Keith Kellog, first, was going to go on a fact-finding tour in Ukraine and other places before the inauguration, then right after the inauguration, and now it’s “as soon as we can.”

The other thing that really is dumbfounding me, is that it seems like the incoming White House keeps talking about imposing American will on the rest of the world, and being “strong” – when in the Russo-Ukraine War I see pretty limited American leverage.

Exactly how are the Americans going to impose terms on the Russians OR the Ukrainians?

On the Ukrainian side, see below. There is lots of evidence the Ukrainians believe they have a sustainable war effort and that it is working.

On the Russian side, first, for Putin to make concessions he has to be informed of a situation difficult enough for Russia that concessions are worth considering, and pretty much everyone in and outside Russia is convinced accurate information from the front never reaches the top level of the Kremlin.

Second, from the Russian perspective, they are still gaining ground (see further below) and the more they gain the stronger their negotiating position.

Deutschland Hilft!

Again, it may just be me being uncharitable, but it appears to me the incoming administration is blithely ignoring the fact that the Europeans are moving to protect their own interests and that absolutely doesn’t mean they are planning to just execute when the Trump team tells them what to do.

I know the Republican rhetoric is that the Europeans are doing nothing on Ukraine and the Americans are doing everything, but, unfortunately for the sustainability of that narrative, that’s not true. As I and other have reported repeatedly, actually the US has delivered Ukraine about half of its weapons and about 30-35% of its financing. The bigger partner is Europe and over time that delta has been widening. The creed about relative US/European support to Ukraine advanced by the incoming US leadership is fraudulent, it dissimulates, it is a calumny to European taxpayers and Ukrainian fighting men and women.

In Europe, which is driven not by internal US politics, but by its own narratives, it’s useful to look at mainstream European media.

The major states in NATO outside the US are preparing pretty energetically to support Ukraine if/when the Trump administration flakes out. They are of course unhappy the US appears to have rejected more than two centuries of American foreign policy of opposing dictators and oppressors in Europe. But in any case, from London to Stockholm to Paris to Warsaw to Prague and Vilnius, they are committing money, they are arming, and they already have shifted management of Western support to Ukraine from Pentagon-led to NATO-led.

Germany is I think the best example of European support to Ukraine. Let’s remember the Germans are about to have elections and reshuffle their government, and that their economy, although still Germany, isn’t in great shape. They have a rising populist right party the majority doesn’t want to have anything to do with and the American market is pretty important to them.

Yet, Germany in three years has reversed it stance on Ukraine pretty much 180 degrees and it really looks like they intend to stay on that track.

Here’s a partial (!) list of the military aid Berlin sent Ukraine last month (some of this is not confirmed but I think very likely): three IRIS-T anti-aircraft missile systems (image), two Patriot-104 anti-aircraft missile launchers, two Gephard AAA systems, 15 Leopard I tanks, about 100 military automobiles/trucks of various types, about 50 armored military automobiles/trucks of various types, about 100 UAVs of various types, 52,000 x 155mm shells, 15,000 x 120mm rounds, 10–20 refurbished M-84 tanks, 10–20 refurbished M-80 infantry fighting vehicles.

In value and overall firepower, on average, that is more than comparable to most months of US military support to Ukraine.

For the first half of 2025, Germany seems on track to hand over to the AFU: 22 Leopard 1A5 MBTs, 25 Marder 1A3 IFVs, 16–20 self-propelled howitzers, 250,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, another IRIS-T system, two MIM-104 Patriot launchers (I’m not clear is these are the same ones as in December), seven Gephard AAA systems and two Skynex AAA systems, hundreds of UAVs various types, 3,500 HF-1 loitering munition (this looks to be a German Lancet developed much in the same way that German engineers improved the American Bazooka into the Panzerschreck, but I can’t prove it, image), and six Westland Sea King Mk41 helicopters.

The key point is that Germany is only one country interested in sustaining Ukrainian fighting capacity, even if the incoming White House thinks supporting Ukraine isn’t in America’s best interest.

Denmark, Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, Norway, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states all have substantial defense production capacity. By and large, they have responsible governments, and they seem to be leaning towards filling in a gap if the Americans cut and run on Ukraine.

That being the case, reference the previous section, exactly how much leverage will General Kellog have on Zelensky, if Donald Trump decides the way to “win” at the negotiations is to threaten to cut off all US aid to Ukraine?

Equally, reference both the previous section and the next one, exactly how much leverage will General Kellog have on Putin, if Donald J. Trump says Washington will make Ukraine unbeatable if Putin doesn’t dance to Trump’s tune?

The Russians can see, like everyone else that over the past three years, US 155mm shell manufacturing has roughly tripled in capacity, meanwhile (just) Rheinmetall’s capacity to produce the same shells has increased more than ten times.

The reality is that the US is an important but not decisive factor in the outcome of the war. The problem for the Trump administration and its supporters, is they seem to be telling each other that America can do whatever it wants and dictate the future. Their internal narratives really don’t accept challenges to those assumptions.

This is why, I think, we have seen the Trump team shift the “Peace in Ukraine” goalposts about every other week since the elections.

The Battle of Kurakhove and Pavel Gubarev

Again, from the Vladimir Putin point of view, Russia is slowly winning. The latest DeepState report formally declared the Donbas town Kurakhove in Russian hands, although joint forces Khortitsiya is still saying defenses in the area are viable, and the Ukrainian forward line is now in and around the (ruined) power transmission station to the east of the city (image).

I haven’t seen any reports about panicked Ukrainian troops or piles of lost Ukrainian equipment, so that is some evidence that the “phased withdrawal/bleed the Russians but save Ukrainian troops” tactics General Syrsky has been talking about are being employed, and maybe even successfully. But (more) lost ground is lost ground and (another) captured town is a captured town. Anyone familiar with the way military reporting works will know that by the time that news got to Putin’s desk, the big boss was told it was a resounding victory and a vindication of Russian tactics and strategy.

We can debate about whether continued Russian advances are the outcome of a Ukrainian choice to preserve force and yield ground if necessary, or if it’s a doctrine the Russians have come to rationally and that they are continuing to use it because they know it works. But what is clear is that the Russians have created a system that is prohibitively costly, but so far the Russian army hasn’t cracked and the system is getting results. Kurakhove was a fairly textbook example of the doctrine.

First push forces in range to hit Ukrainian rear areas with drones and when closer with artillery, then attack by pushing forces to either side of the main supply line to the town you want to capture, and put that supply route under fire. Target civilian infrastructure like power, water, and heating to distract Ukrainian authorities from taking action to slow down Russian attacks, to help civilians.

Where strong Ukrainian defenses are located, pound the area with glider bombs day after day. It doesn’t matter if the glider bombs are sometimes inaccurate because misses increase the number of civilians that will need help and assistance from Ukrainian authorities.

When it’s time for assault, send throwaway troops first to get footholds close to Ukrainian positions, then follow up with skilled infantry to clear positions house-to-house. Accept losses. Assault units that are wiped out gaining ground are a plus, because a wiped out unit requires no casualty collection or treatment of wounded. And at the top of the Russian military pyramid, I don’t see how that can look like anything but “Russia is winning, Ukraine is losing, let’s keep doing this.”

Everyone recognizes — including Putin — that this is sustainable exactly as long as the military can figure out ways to maintain discipline while taking very heavy casualties. How heavy is heavy?

That question led me this morning to a video posted by one Pavel Gubarev (image) who, in the 2014-16 period, was one of the rabid pro-Russia separatists living in Donbas and who became a leader of local forces attempting to take control of the region from the Ukrainian government, with a lot of help from Russia. He ran afoul of occupation authority leadership in Donetsk and got kicked out of local government, but in 2022 joined up to fight with Russia and at the same time, positioned himself as a volunteer-patriot, always ready to tell the hard truth to the people in charge. This morning it was heavy Russian casualties and inept Russian leadership. Remember, this is a guy that hates Ukraine and wants Russia to wipe Ukraine and Ukrainians off the map.

Gubarev went public with pretty much the same thing the Ukrainian military has been saying for some time. Russian casualties are around 700,000, of whom, 200,000 are dead, Russian tactics are grossly wasteful of manpower and those tactics aren’t changing, Russian unit leaderships are so hollowed out from casualties their chains of command are simply incompetent, daily Russian casualties are in the hundreds, the loss rates are not sustainable, and the Russian army is flat incapable of major offensive operations and is unlikely to regain that capacity for years. He warns that if the war continues the way it is going right now, something will crack and it probably will be soldier morale.

Which is, obviously, what the Ukrainians are striving and hoping for. I doubt very much General Kellog has even the faintest idea of what it means if a Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) regional player stands up and says the modern Russian army is on the path to 1917. However, the facts remain that even on the Russian side, some see this to be the case, and that the Ukrainians gained a bit more evidence that their strategy is working.

And the Bombardment Campaign IOW Blam! Blam! Blam!

For the record, I am outside Ukraine for the next week and a bit but still watching the news. Probably the most striking (get it?) thing for me is the degree to which the Ukrainian bombardment campaign of Russia isn’t even noticed. Which could be — just saying it’s possible — another gap in the Ukraine situational awareness of Smart and Extremely Well-Connected People in DC.

You read the news, it’s pretty obvious, pretty much from the start of this year the Ukrainians have been pounding the you-know-what out of the Russians.

This is mostly long-range drones, some HIMARS, a few missiles and its all over west Russia. Not pinpricks. Here’s a statistic from this morning:

Overnight, Russia launched per Ukrainian counts 74 long-range drones at Ukraine. The Ukrainians say about half were shot down and almost all of the rest were decoyed or jammed. I’m seeing very little evidence the Russian night raid did anything substantial.

Same night, the Ukrainians launched 85 drones, plus there were some missiles mixed in as well. Reports say the Ukrainians hit Russia’s Voronezh, Kursk, Tambov (!) and Belgorod regions, but the main targets were in Crimea and south Kherson region. Information was still coming in as I was writing this, but, it looks like a Russian headquarters in Berdiansk was trashed possibly by SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles, something in a typical location for air defense got bashed on Crimea’s western shore, and oil-refining infrastructure was set alight in Novorossisk. Explosions also were reported near Sevastopol, Kerch, in Russia’s Taman region, and Port Kavkaz opposite the Kerch Strait Bridge.

There are of course observers out there that like the paradigm that Russia is big and undefeatable. Me, I’m inclined towards underdogs. Last night, really looks to me like the Ukrainians are winning. I think I can safely say that at least some of the Ukrainians involved in the bombardment campaign are a good deal more upbeat than that.

(BTW yes, this set of air raids was preceded by a jump in NATO reconnaissance activity over east Romania and over the western Black Sea, and no, at least according to open sources, no US aircraft took part in those flights. I even saw a Luxembourg-registered AWACS at one point.)

What is more, last night wasn’t a one-off. Since the start of the year, quick overview, not in any particular order, the Ukrainians also have:

(1) Used drones to pretty much incinerate a big Russian fuel storage and refinery near Engels-2 airfield in Saratov region. This is where the Russian bombers fly from and I read that some of the reservoirs held the special aviation fuel without which these big Russian planes can’t fly. But for sure, 80% of fuel storage at the site is gone and the fire was still going strong four days later. (image)

2) A big drone strike (at least 40 aircraft) set a big fire in Petersburg. Local officials said it was a paint factory, Ukrainian news sources said it was military production, maybe explosives.

(3) Probably HIMARS trashed a Russian army command post in Svitlodarsk

(4) Probably Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles blasted a theater-level command post in Kursk region. Maybe even six, which is a lot. Some reports say the bunker was underground but unfortunately for the officers inside, Storm Shadow/Scalp are designed to punch deep underground before blowing up. Some reports said a big North Korean general was one of the dead. This was on Dec. 30.

(5) HIMARS strike hits a Russian infantry brigade command post, Kursk region, in coordination with a mini-counteroffensive the Ukrainians were running.

(6) SBU drones hit the big sea port by Petersburg, probably targeting gas condensate containers. One tank was damaged badly and three more lightly.

(7) Ukrainian navy and special operations teams destroyed three Russian air defense systems scattered around the Crimea peninsula and in Kherson region, targeting shorter-range Pantsir air defense systems. In at least one case, the Ukrainians used FPV drones launched from a robot boat, which was probably the second time in the history of war a sea drone launched an FPV drone like an aircraft carrier to make an air raid attack. This was on Jan. 6.

(8) Ukrainian Neptune missiles backed by drones flying as, I don’t know what to call it — escort? reinforcements? misdirection aircraft? — hit a Russian drone warehouse and possible assembly facility in Rostov region. Big explosions, lots of fires, panicked local social media and, of course, a goodly portion of official statements that nothing was hit and that authorities have the situation under control. This was on Jan. 10.

I am having trouble seeing it – how is Ukraine on the ropes and unable fight any more? Because to me, based on what we’ve seen for the past three years, it looks like the Ukrainians have just passed parity with Russia on the long-range bombardment front, they are now the stronger side, and that, by any reasonable calculation, that advantage can only be expected to grow stronger with time.

Tech Marches On

Russian sources are reporting that over the past ten days, the Russian air force has lost three Mi-8 helicopters with all crew, and in at least one case (possibly two) the loss was because the Ukrainians were running robot boats near Crimea, as per SOP the Russians launched Mi-8s with door gunners to blow up the robot boats, but unfortunately for the Russian airmen, some Ukrainian had figured out how to mount R-70 air-to-air missiles on a British-made robot boat. So, instead of encountering defenseless robot boats the Russian helicopter gunners could unload on, the robot boats shot back and knocked a pair of manned helicopters out of the sky. I didn’t fully believe it when HUR claimed they did it, but now the kills are confirmed from the Russian side.

So again, President-elect Trump may see Ukraine as a LOSER country which must make big concessions so it can survive. But I think the Ukrainians, particularly the ones involved in attacking Russia, see the situation differently.

Come to think of it I recently interviewed people in one of the logistics chains getting FPV drones to the front, they certainly see the situation differently.

I’ll end with a link to a video of how quickly things are advancing on the tactical drone front. Some Ukrainian has figured out how to rig a drone with what looks to me to be a pair of large-gauge shotguns, and has used this new weapon to shoot down defenseless Russian attack drones and slightly less defenseless Russian soldiers.

Reprinted from Kyiv Post’s Special Military Correspondent Stefan Korshak’s blog. You can find the original here.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.