Kyiv Post’s Warsaw Insider spoke this week with Gabrielius Landsbergis, the former outspoken and pro-Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania from 2020 to October 2024, when his party lost in the legislative elections. He touched on the differences in the approach to Russia between Central-Eastern European countries and their Western European counterparts, his experiences over the past years, and where we stand now in the context of the war in Ukraine and whether further rotten compromises are looming.

This is the first conversation with Gabrielius Landsbergis since he stepped down as Lithuania’s top diplomat a few days ago.

Michał Kujawski: Lithuanian athlete Kornelija Dudaitė was disqualified from the World Fitness Championships for wearing a “Make Russia Small Again” shirt. At the same event, Russian athletes were supposed to compete as neutrals but still had “Russia” written on their clothing. The organizers did not raise any objections to their behavior. Are attitudes shifting, with Russia ceasing to be a pariah and solidarity with Ukraine diminishing?

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Gabrielius Landsbergis: During all the years I spent serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, building a wall of condemnation against Russia within the world of diplomacy – and then holding that wall – was not an easy process. You are always facing those who want to dismantle it and argue that dialogue with Russia must continue. Some wanted this for pragmatic reasons, others out of sheer idiocy. They fail to understand the threat Russia poses to our societies and the future security architecture. We are now at a point where some are trying to tear down the wall we built. Voices are emerging saying that we will need to reconsider sanctions, reconsider Russia, and bring Russia back to the table to discuss the future of Europe. Of course, sports and culture are the first elements of the wall we built that may collapse. It’s the easiest place to start. As for the event you’re asking about, I would call it extreme hypocrisy.

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MK: In 2022, you used the term “Westsplaining” in the context of international relations, but also in relations between Central-Eastern European countries and Western Europe. Lithuania, the other Baltic states, Ukraine, and Poland have a better understanding of the Russian threat and offer a different perspective. Where are we now? Have Western countries been listening, and do they continue to listen at the end of 2024?

GL: It usually came from the fact that every time I raised the topic of the Russian threat and how we should be dealing with Russia, I would hear comments from our Western friends, spoken in a condescending tone, that this was due to our history. They claimed that we had experienced such a traumatic history that we were not able to look at Russia objectively. They insisted that everything we said was rooted in history, in our very traumatic childhood. It’s even funny when it turns out that we were the only ones who were right about Russia and the current situation we are in.

The period in which we were acknowledged was a very short one. I remember Ursula von der Leyen, who, in her 2022 annual State of the Union Address, said: “We should have listened to the voices inside our Union – in Poland, in the Baltics, and all across Central and Eastern Europe. They have been telling us for years that Putin would not stop.”

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Many people in Lithuania believed that something had changed, that this was the beginning of a new era. Now we see a different approach. What we saw back then, unfortunately, was only a short, temporary shift. From the very beginning, we have been saying that if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, it will continue its policies. We see its activities in Moldova, we see its actions in Georgia. We see its shadow activities in Lithuania and Poland – this is essentially war, but in different forms.

And again, if I were to answer the question of whether they have been listening to us, I would respond – I don’t think so.

MK: Could you provide examples?

GL: I can give an example of one narrative that wasn’t picked up. We tried very hard to push it forward, and it sounded like this: “We have to help Ukraine with whatever it takes” to achieve victory. I would like to emphasize that this was the narrative we proposed: “Whatever the victory takes.” The Western narrative, the counter-narrative, was “as long as it takes.”

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It may seem at first glance that the difference between them is minimal, and those who are far from politics might not even notice it. Both narratives support Ukraine, both are moving in the same direction. The one we proposed states that we don’t want this war to last forever. We want Ukraine’s victory, safe Baltics, and a safe region as quickly as possible. We also know that we have the tools to make this happen.

The Western approach boils down to a drip-feed for Ukraine, which means limited support that allows only survival. We can keep drip-feeding Ukraine as long as it’s alive. If Ukraine manages to hold on for the next 10 years with minimal support, one could help in such a limited way and stand with Ukraine for a very, very long time.

Peace talks at a time when Ukraine is not in a strong position mean, in one way or another, Ukrainian capitulation

MK: We both agree with the fact that Ukraine needs our support, especially now. How do you assess the current situation and the preparations for peace talks which may start in 2025?

GL: I’m sure that Ukraine is being pushed enormously to accept what some politicians are proposing. My position is very simple: peace talks at a time when Ukraine is not in a strong position mean, in one way or another, Ukrainian capitulation. If Ukraine does not receive the assistance now that will strengthen its position, if it does not receive strong security guarantees for the future, we will have Minsk-3. Call it what we want, it could be Berlin-1 or Washington-1. It really doesn’t matter. It will be a continuation of what we have seen so far, meaning the failed policy of 2015. Nothing will change, and it would be really bad.

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However, there is a chance that European or American politicians will not endorse something that will cause the mistakes of the past to be repeated in the future.

MK: On this topic, the upcoming changes in the US administration cannot be overlooked. What are your expectations for Trump’s presidency in the context of Ukraine, Russia, and the region?

GL: The mandate President Trump received from the American people is very strong. It allows him, together with Congress and the Senate, to come up with measures that will not only put Ukraine in the strongest possible position but could also re-establish the United States as a global defender of freedom. The game is about the global position of the United States, as well as their reputation and the trust placed in them. This is what is at stake, and President Trump is aware of it. It is up to him to decide whether he sees value in this. For the USA, it is of tremendous value.

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MK: Between Lithuania and Poland, as well as the other countries in the region, there were quite a few disputes before the invasion. Now, it seems that these issues have taken a back seat. Has the Russian threat brought the countries of the region closer together?

GL: Yes, I see that the situation has brought our countries closer together. As for Poland, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I worked with two ministers from two different governments and competing political parties. The main topic of all our discussions was geopolitics. We talked about how to make our region safer and how to strengthen both Poland and Lithuania. These were the primary themes of our conversations.

However, I would also like to emphasize that the issues that existed between our countries in the past are important and must be discussed and resolved. I see no problem in having them on our agenda. I am pleased that, on our Lithuanian side, we have taken decisive steps, and the rights of ethnic minorities in my country are now better protected. Society is more inclusive. This is not solely a result of the threat coming from Putin but a sign of the maturity of our countries.

MK: The geographical position of Lithuania and the other Baltic states is challenging. I wonder what the public mood in Lithuania is like. Is there a sense of threat?

GL: I think it is. I would call it a “heightened threat normality.” If you ask people on the street whether they fear a threat from Russia, most will answer affirmatively. If you ask, “Does it affect your daily life?” most people would say, “No, not at this point.” Look at Ukrainians who didn’t emigrate but stayed in Ukraine and, despite the war, continue to work, raise children, and pay taxes. Imagine their sense of threat and the stress they must endure. That could truly be described as an extreme sense of danger. In our case, it is lower, and we have gotten used to it.

MK: While serving as the head of Lithuanian diplomacy, you wrote a diary that is about to be published soon. On your website, you say, “You can find out what was going on behind the headlines, and what I couldn’t say on camera.” Can you share something with our readers – something that happened behind the scenes?

GL: It has been a privilege to witness, for four years, probably the most monumental events that have most affected my country, Ukraine, and our region. It would be a sin not to describe what I have seen – the negotiations, connections, preparations for various events, and the positioning of my country. It is fascinating how a small country like Lithuania navigates the diplomatic world. Many live under the illusion that small countries like mine should quietly allow themselves to be pawns in the games of great powers. When you reclaim power for yourself, you create diplomacy and active communication. This is how you return to the table and discuss what truly matters. I hope this diary will help show that.

MK: Lithuania has a new government. Kestutis Budrys is the new foreign minister. What can we expect from this government from both a Ukrainian and an international perspective?

GL: I know Kestutis well. He’s a true patriot of Lithuania. I’m sure about that, it’s undeniable. He’s professional and his position is clear. It’s usual that every new government must prove itself in action, also in the continuation of a value-based policy. I hope nothing changes and Lithuania will continue on the path it has already chosen. Lithuanian diplomacy is in good hands. The only thing the minister has to prove is that he will work as hard as I did.

MK: And finally, what are your plans for the future? NAFO officer, perhaps?

GL: (laughing): One of the plans you already mentioned – I will continue working on my book. This is my main focus at the moment, but I will certainly remain active in the future as an advocate for causes I believe are crucial right now. These include continuing to support Ukraine, democratic processes in Moldova and Georgia, and supporting Taiwan. All these issues require a clear voice and advocacy, regardless of where you are.

As a minister, I had certain tools at my disposal, but I can also continue this work using other options as a free person, no longer as a politician. I certainly won’t disappear, but I will use my freedom to speak about some things even more loudly.

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