OPINION: Putin’s Stakes in Syria Couldn’t be Higher

Until recently, Russian policy in Syria has been relatively successful - especially compared with the setbacks US policy experienced in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, though, the Russian position in Syria seems unexpectedly vulnerable - and this could negatively affect Moscow’s influence throughout the Middle East.

The “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2011 toppled Arab dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. But the Assad regime in Syria was able to survive thanks to the military assistance provided by Russia and armed support from Iran and Hezbollah.

When the Assad regime once again seemed likely to fall in 2015, Putin dispatched the Russian air force and other units to help Damascus and its Iranian and Hezbollah supporters take back territory lost to Assad’s various opponents.

Putin’s strong support for the Syrian regime also helped bolster Russia’s image throughout the Middle East. Even Arab leaders who had been at odds with Assad and backed some of his opponents expressed admiration for how Putin supported his ally Assad so strongly while the US hadn’t supported its Arab allies - especially Egypt’s Mubarak - and let them fall. US withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, the growth of Iranian influence in Iraq, and the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan only further undermined the image of the US as a less reliable ally than Russia.

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When Russian expectations that its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine would quickly succeed and a long war there ensued instead, many thought that Russian influence in Syria would decline due to a perceived need to redeploy Russian forces from there to Ukraine. But while some redeployment of Russian forces from Syria to Ukraine did take place, both the Assad regime and Russia’s presence in Syria largely remained in place.

Now, though, the situation has changed. Russia relied heavily on Iran and Hezbollah to help bolster the Assad regime. But with Israeli forces having dealt severe setbacks to Hezbollah’s main locations in Lebanon and to Iran, they are not in as strong a position to help Assad - whose own forces have proved unable to stop Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces from seizing Aleppo and Hama.

It is not yet clear whether Assad’s opponents will make further dramatic advances that threaten the Assad regime’s survival or whether another stalemate will ensue even though the rebels may control more of Syria than they have up to now. What doesn’t seem likely, though, is that Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah are able to help the Assad regime retake this lost territory - and Assad’s weakened forces seem unable to do so themselves.

Ironically, some of the Arab governments that had supported Assad’s opponents over a decade ago have now normalized relations with him. All of them also have good relations with Russia. But Putin’s inability to prevent Assad from experiencing major losses recently makes Putin far less reliable as an ally. If Putin can’t save Assad from his opponents, what can he do for other Arab governments against theirs? When it comes to the crunch, is Putin no more reliable an ally than the US was to Mubarak or the Kabul government?

For Putin, what happens in Syria does not only affect Russian influence there, but potentially throughout the entire Middle East. Putin’s options, though, seem limited.

The demands of Russia’s war in Ukraine make it unlikely that Putin can send many Russian forces of whatever sort to Syria. Nor can it rely on Hezbollah now, due to its need to focus on protecting what’s left of its home base in Lebanon. Maybe Iran could send more of its own Islamic Revolutionary Guards (or less reliable Shi’a militias from Iraq and elsewhere), but this could result in Iran gaining the upper hand over Russia for influence with the Assad regime - which would anger not just the Israelis but Arab governments who saw Russia’s presence in Syria as serving to limit Iranian influence.

Perhaps the best that Putin can hope for is to make a deal with Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to halt his Syrian allies’ advance and agree to a new spheres-of-influence division of Syria that gives more to Turkey but allows Putin to retain his naval and air bases and keep Assad in power.

This assumes both that Erdogan has control over the Syrian opposition he supports and that Erdoğan won’t seek further gains later if the opportunity arises - just as Putin did in the past. Or maybe after Donald Trump is inaugurated, there will be some sort of agreement to end active conflict in Ukraine that allows Putin to send additional Russian forces to Syria. Even so, Syria might turn into the quagmire for Russia that Barack Obama predicted it would become but up to now has not.

Whatever happens, Syria may no longer be the great strategic success for Putin that it seemed to be for so many years. Instead, it may prove to be increasingly costly for the Kremlin to keep Assad in power, but even costlier for it to let him fall.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

Mark N. Katz is a professor emeritus at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government, a global fellow at the Wilson Center, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.