Combatting Russia’s Shahed Blitz and What Trump’s Administration Should Do

Russia continues to flood Ukrainian skies with Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV-drones). In the first article on this subject we considered how Russia managed to ramp up production and the steps it was taking to decisively modernize its drones in earlier parts of this material, which you can read here.

Now, we focus on the means and methods Ukraine is using to combat the torrent of UAVs it faces based on interviews with aviation and technical experts and members of Kyiv’s air defense units. We also explore how increased international pressure could help diminish production of Shahed drones and Russia’s strike capabilities.

Daily miracles of the anti-drone struggle

Despite the huge increase in the number of Shahed drones attacking Ukraine its anti-aircraft gunners continue to bring down as many as 90 percent of those they face. How is this possible?

Experts tell us that some UAVs are merely “decoys” and some don’t even have warheads.

“It's just a motor, a small propeller, and some foam and sticks. But the radar still sees it as a target. It’s used to unmask air defense assets or delay the efforts of mobile fire groups,” a Ukrainian air defense officers tells us.

Recently, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) published photos of some of the devices that have been encountered.

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A second factor contributing to success is the increase in the number of mobile fire groups. According to Kyiv-based anti-aircraft gunners who continue to shoot down Shaheds in the Kyiv region, the lower altitudes at which they fly make them more vulnerable to machine gun fire.

“Yes, a missile, for example, is used when you want to hit it with 100% certainty. With a machine gun, you can fire an entire belt of ammunition, but the lower the altitude of the UAV, the lower the consumption of bullets, and the faster you shoot it down,”one of the anti-aircraft gunners explains.

Shaheds are also vulnerable to electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures which experts say can interfere with the operation of all nearby electronic devices. Kyiv residents have begun to notice how, during drone attacks, that the geolocation and automatic time functions on their mobile phones goes awry - sometimes the show their location as being in Belarus, China, or even the Arctic Ocean and the time displays on their phones can differ by several hours from Kyiv time.

Oleh Katkov, an analyst at Defense Express Group told us: “The mechanism of action is simple - a field of electronic interference is created over a certain area, which disrupts and jams the Shahed’s satellite navigation signal so the Shahed can’t find its target.

“It flies past but once it leaves the EW field, realizes its target is behind, turns around, and re-enters the interference zone, where it gets lost again. This can cause it to fly in circles until it runs out of fuel or is shot down.

“That’s why these drones can be airborne for so long. It’s important to understand that under the influence of electronic warfare, the Shahed, having lost its target, no longer ‘self-corrects,’ making it highly vulnerable to wind, causing it to deviate significantly – as much as 5 kilometers [3 miles] in every 100 kilometers [62.5 5miles]. This makes it especially dangerous for random civilian objects in its path.”

Sometimes, the EW effect causes the Shaheds to turn around and fly north, toward Belarus or Russia. A Shahed disrupted in this way recently turned around and struck a high-rise building in Belgorod, Russia.

“This happens because, without a signal, they fly on a magnetic course, meaning they follow the compass,” Katkov explains.

Some Shaheds simply fall after EW impacts them. These are not designated as being “shot down,” but as “locally lost.” In some instances the number of “locally lost” Shaheds reaches nearly 50 percent of the attack.

Military sources say that, whereas previously each downed drone was followed up and their locations recorded and photographed but now, due to the heavy load on anti-aircraft gunners, there is no time to search for each of the dozens of Shaheds that are downed each day. Those designated as “locally lost” are frequently found by fishermen, ramblers or mushroom pickers.

Retaining countermeasure capabilities

Ukraine has dramatically increased the number of mobile fire groups to cover Kyiv and other towns and cities. Despite some criticism of their suitability, these units have proven effective, according to anti-aircraft gunners themselves. On Nov 11, President Zelensky issued an order to increase their numbers at a meeting of the military command.

Another way to combat the threat is by expanding the number and type of EW systems. Thes are increasingly actively deployed along with automated initiation and target engagement capabilities. The military believes EW is currently the most effective method to counter drones.

“Electronic warfare systems are already effective in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kyiv. However, they rely on disrupting the drone’s GLONASS [Russian GPS system] and inertial navigation systems. One of my friends in the unit recently downed two Shaheds in a neighboring region using this system. But we need to understand that it is impossible to fully blanket all of Ukraine with EW fields,” an anti-aircraft gunner of 1129th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment defending Kyiv explained.

But perhaps the most crucial step is to target the heart of Shahed production.

“We need to hit the Yelabuga plant. We need long-range missile weapons and the authorization to use them against targets in the Russian Federation. The Russians can scale up Shahed production as much as they want, so we cannot just keep fighting the consequences - we must attack the causes,” Valery Romanenko, an aviation expert and senior researcher at the National Aviation University says.

He continues: “Since the Shahed contains many components from China, Taiwan, and even the US, the Trump administration could take a more determined stance on sanctions. This would cripple the production of attack drones.

"First, we need to target the Chinese companies supplying engines to Russia with sanctions. This has been effective in the past, and Chinese companies will cease working with Russia. The Russians will struggle to find a replacement for a long time. The guidance system comes from the US It would be enough to audit companies that purchase these systems and track where they resell them. This would severely limit Russian capabilities, and most importantly, it doesn’t require anything overly complex from the new administration,” Romanenko adds.

What is the Future of Shahed?

According to Colonel Kostiantyn Horbachov, who has spent ten years studying and operating UAVs, the Shahed will only grow more powerful and controllable.

“They are already establishing satellite communications for Shaheds. For example, we’ve even encountered drones using Starlink systems. This means Shaheds will no longer follow predetermined flight paths but will be guided by online operators. The war is evolving, and each year, it becomes increasingly different from the last. We must be prepared to meet these new challenges,” Horbachov concludes.