Harshest Winter Yet: Will Ukraine Withstand New Russian Attacks on Its Energy Sector?

During the winter of 2022-2023, almost 1,000 missiles targeted Ukraine’s energy facilities – only a handful were intercepted by Ukrainian air defenses.

But due to Russia’s relatively limited strikes on Ukraine’s energy sector, Ukraine survived last winter better than the previous one. During last winter, with their missile supply and production capabilities being inferior compared to a year prior, Moscow targeted military facilities more than energy facilities.

Throughout 2023-2024, Ukrainian engineers also repaired damaged energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, Kyiv countered Moscow, striking energy and oil facilities in the European parts of Russia with drones, where Russia had limited ability to prevent these attacks due to communication issues.

Since Russia has not abandoned its war goals, namely to destroy Ukraine as a state and carry out what Ukraine considers to be a genocide of its people in occupied territories – Ukrainian power engineers anticipate that Russia may attempt large-scale strikes on Ukraine’s energy system yet again this winter, leading to a humanitarian catastrophe amidst an unforgiving winter.

The outlook is made even more pessimistic since, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky, Western allies have not provided the assistance promised for 2024.

Ukraine’s biggest supporter, the US, failed to deliver 90% of what it stated it would deliver this year, while Russia’s allies – namely Iran and North Korea – have been delivering on promises to increase weapons supplies to Moscow.

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Amidst the pessimistic outlook, Kyiv Post examined Ukraine’s efforts to restore its energy capacity and the likelihood of withstanding Russian strikes this winter.

Destruction and restoration

The current war has marked a seemingly never-ending cycle of destruction and subsequent restoration of Ukraine’s energy system.

“This will be one of the most challenging winters,” said Oleksiy Brecht, director of Ukraine’s transmission system operator Ukrenergo, at the Energo-Day event in Kyiv a week ago.

The situation is clear cut – Ukraine’s energy sector is still recovering from Russia’s missile strikes over the last two years, and further attacks are anticipated as cold weather approaches.

Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had a robust energy sector, supported by four nuclear power plants (NPPs), numerous thermal power plants (TPPs), and a strong renewable energy infrastructure of hydroelectric, wind, and solar plants, with a total capacity of over 50 gigawatts (GW).

But since the 2022 invasion started, Ukraine has lost its largest nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia, once capable of providing 6 GW of electricity. The Akhtyrska, Kremenchuk, and Shchastya Uglegorska TPPs were destroyed, alongside some TPPs that were occupied by Russian troops. The Kakhovska hydropower plant (HPP) and many wind and solar farms in the south were also shut down and subsequently destroyed.

Russia then targeted Ukraine’s energy sector, with an aim to cripple the system, creating a humanitarian crisis in the heart of Europe. Altogether, around 300 energy facilities – nuclear or otherwise – were damaged by Russia during the first winter after the 2022 invasion.

After this wave of attacks, the Ukrainian energy sector began to recover slowly but managed to restore a substantial part of its capacity. By summer 2023, DTEK had 19 power units under repair, all of which resumed operations by November.

Thanks to quick repairs and assistance from abroad, including Soviet-type generators from former communist states, Ukraine was able to restore its capacity to approximately 18 GW to sustain its needs last winter, along with some imported power from Europe, though how many GW was restored at the time remains unclear.

Then came the summer of 2024, when these repairs were “reset” by Russian attacks on the energy system in March and April 2024, which disabled major TPPs such as Ladyzhynska, Burshtynska, Trypilska, Zmiyivska – and several smaller plants, such as the Combined Heat and Power Plant Number Five (CHP-5), which supplied heat and electricity to Kharkiv and the surrounding region. Major hydroelectric facilities, including the Dnipro Hydroelectric Station, were also struck. Later, the Kyiv Hydroelectric Station and smaller plants across the country sustained damage.

Strikes continued throughout the summer of 2024, with significant attacks on June 1, July 8, and Aug. 26. The latter attack, though “record-breaking” in size, proved less effective, as only 25 out of 127 missiles reached their targets. However, critical infrastructure in the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Odesa regions was damaged nonetheless.

As a result, Ukraine lost over 9 GW of generation capacity – almost half of its remaining output. More importantly, the targeted capacities were those used to balance supply and demand, especially during fluctuations in daily and seasonal consumption.

“During the heating season, consumption rises by 30%,” energy analyst Henadiy Ryabtsev explained.

The precise extent of the recovery from this loss is unclear, as no company, including Ukrenergo, discloses detailed figures to prevent Moscow from gauging Ukraine’s restored capacity or location.

“Contrary to public expectations, protecting such facilities is almost impossible. Securing a medium-sized thermal plant from missile strikes would require billions and a sarcophagus stronger than Chornobyl’s – and even then, it might not withstand repeated strikes,” said a manager of one TPP.

However, sources told Kyiv Post that some severely damaged facilities have been restored and are at least partially supplying electricity to the Ukrainian grid, though it remains insufficient. Starting autumn, generation from solar power plants will also begin to drop.

“We’ll still face a 3-5 GW deficit. There will be blackouts; the only question is their duration and frequency,” said Ryabtsev.

That said, Ukraine might have a few “aces up its sleeve” to overcome the deficit – reserve imports and small-scale generation.

Imports and small-scale generation

Ukraine’s energy sector joined the European energy grid in March 2022, just after the invasion. Since then, Ukraine has steadily increased electricity imports from Europe. In 2024, import capacity reached over 1 GW, with plans to raise the limit to 2.1 GW by Dec. 1, according to Sergey Kovalenko, CEO of electricity company Yasno.

Additionally, small-scale generation capacity has been expanding. For instance, in Zhytomyr, new capacities were added, including TPPs using wood as a fuel source and gas compressor stations.

“We have 1.3 GW of distributed generation newly connected to the grid, with significant installations in Kharkiv as well,” Brecht noted.

Many social facilities (schools, hospitals, administrative buildings, police stations, supermarkets, gas stations, and restaurants) have installed mini-power plants or generators as backup sources during blackouts.

“Some were bought or donated by international funds, though often installed without coordination, especially if not handled by local energy experts. Businesses that purchase generators on their own tend to be more systematic,” said Oleksiy Kucherenko, first deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee on energy and housing.

Outlook and scenarios

According to Brecht, the total capacity from local generation and imports could be 13-15 GW, which might be sufficient to avoid blackouts in an optimistic scenario.

“We have two optimistic scenarios: no attacks, or only limited ones. The worst-case scenario involves numerous attacks, which would increase the risk of restrictions,” Brecht said.

Kucherenko added that the key question is where these strikes would be directed. “Everyone is anxiously waiting for potential attacks. With an increased load on the system, the likelihood of strikes grows. The main question is whether Russia would dare to target nuclear facilities,” he said.

So far, the nuclear industry, with three NPPs and almost 9 GW of total capacity under Ukrainian control, has remained operational, as attacks on nuclear sites are considered a gross violation of international norms.

“For new reactors and nuclear fuel storage, assessments of resistance to external events, like plane crashes and fire conditions, have been conducted. However, we lack assessments for targeted ammunition strikes,” the State Agency for Nuclear Energy Regulation told Kyiv Post.

But Russia has already crossed many boundaries of international law during the war.

“Each nuclear plant has essential infrastructure for electricity transmission, critical to any forecasts. Attacks on nuclear facilities are a global issue that demands serious international discussion,” said Kucherenko.

Can transmission continue if this infrastructure is impacted? The State Nuclear Agency said theoretically, yes, though massive strikes could disrupt operations.

“There are main and backup systems among the equipment. Protection measures against common threats (such as Shahed drones) are in place, but reliable ground-based defenses against various missiles remain nearly impossible,” the agency said.

Another growing threat is the increased drone strikes. Russia, struggling to keep up with missile production, has boosted its production and imports of Shahed drones from Iran. In October alone, Russia used nearly 2,000 drones against Ukraine, and this number is expected to increase. Kyiv Post recently spoke with the Shahed hunters in the capital – air defense is active, but the increased number of drones necessitates additional defensive weapons.

Business leaders interviewed by Kyiv Post are wary of relying solely on state support in safeguarding Ukraine’s energy security.

“We’re all strengthening our backup capacities. Everyone expects blackouts to some extent. It won’t be an easy winter, so generators and large stations are still essential,” said a top executive from a major retail network.

“There’s no reason to expect a total blackout this winter. Unlike fall 2022, we now know how to act and respond. There will be blackouts, but their severity depends on the weather. If winter is mild, with temperatures around -5°C, we could manage with minor outages, provided there are no massive strikes,” Ryabtsev said.