Have Drones Killed Off Combat Helicopters?

Speaking in February upon the cancellation of the helicopter based Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program, as well as the announced end to production of the UH-60V Black Hawk in 2025, US Army Chief of Staff General Randy George said: “We are learning from the battlefield – especially in Ukraine – that aerial reconnaissance has fundamentally changed.”

He added: “Sensors and weapons mounted on a variety of unmanned systems and in space are more ubiquitous, further reaching and more inexpensive than ever before.”

Speaking at the same press conference, the head of the US Army Futures Command, General James Rainey commented: “We are absolutely paying attention [to events in Ukraine and Gaza] and adjusting, because we could go to war tonight, this weekend.”

The announcement marked a major reassessment of the previously ever-present role of the helicopter as a reconnaissance, combat, transport and logistic platform on the modern battlefield.

This was even more noteworthy because the FARA program was in the final stages of what had been an almost 20-year search to replace the Bell OH-58 Kiowa observation, utility, and direct fire support vehicle. It had already reached the stage where the final pre-selected bidders, Sikorsky and Bell, both had prototypes ready for final testing and assessment.

What has triggered this abrupt change in direction?

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Military issues commentator David Axe wrote in a Telegraph article at the time of the US army announcement that there has been “an absolute bloodbath among helicopter pilots on both sides…  the helicopter is dying, the Ukraine war is killing it.”

Axe’s assessment was supported by figures produced at the time by the Oryx open-source analytical site and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). These showed that Russia had lost almost 40 percent of its attack helicopters, including its latest Ka-52 (NATO: Hokum) and almost 20 percent of its transport fleet, while Ukraine had lost more than half of its admittedly much smaller rotary-wing force.

The cause of this was that military planners had no experience of a conventional war of the size and scope that developed from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In particular, military strategists on both sides underestimated the impact that ground-based air defenses would have on the modern battlefield.

Serhii Kuzan, a former adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, said that the lesson was amply demonstrated by the huge losses and ultimate failure of the large-scale Russian mass heliborne assault on the Antonov airport near Hostomel. The operation during the first week of the invasion was intended to be the spearhead for the attack on Ukraine’s capital less than 30 kilometers away.

Douglas Barrie, an IISS military aerospace advisor, told Defense News that the vulnerability of combat helicopters that led to the high number of losses has led to a change in tactics by Russian forces and their use of longer-range stand-off weapons such as the Kh-39 air-to-surface missile – but the losses continue.

What do drones bring that helicopters don’t?

The cancellation of FARA frees up potentially billions of dollars to invest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – in simple terms, drones – that many believe, based on the Ukraine experience, will drastically alter the face of the battlefield.

General Rainey believes the immediate future of military aviation will still see pilots in cockpits. He said at the FARA announcement: “The requirement to be able to conduct reconnaissance and security is still absolutely valid” but comes down to “how much risk to accept”. This will help to decide therefore whether a manned or unmanned option is the best solution.

The US and other nations are focusing their efforts on the development of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV). These will carry out all the functions that helicopters once did: intelligence acquisition, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance as well carrying weapons such as air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW).

These UAVs are currently under real-time human control, but developments in AI will very soon provide them with the ability to operate semi or even fully-autonomously in the future. Kamikaze drones that have been the scourge of the battlefield in Ukraine will have a place, but it is likely that future generations will also be AI driven and propelled from a carrier drone singly or in swarms in what the US Army calls “launched effects.”

What about helicopters?

Despite Axe’s grim assessment, the rotary wing aircraft is not dead yet, but the way it is used in the future will and has to change. Combat helicopters will be made more survivable by the use of longer-range standoff weapons such as those Russia has turned to – indeed the Air-Launched, Tube-Integrated Unmanned System 700 (Altius 700) which is a prototype “launched effect” UAV dispenser currently undergoing trials is mounted on the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter. Helicopters can also act as airborne controllers and relay stations for UAVs, extending and supplementing their operating range.

Helicopters are likely to play an essential role on the battlefield as logistic, transport, troop insertions and medical evacuation platforms in hard to get at areas – although one day even those roles may be usurped by UAVs.

In the meantime, as General Rainey said: “The future is going to be about who can properly integrate humans and machines effectively.”