OPINION: Trump’s Road to Ukraine Peace Runs Through Tehran

At noon on Jan. 20, 2025, Donald Trump will become president for the second time. Unlike during his first term, Trump takes office with America engaged in two wars. One involving an ally, Israel, and one a country whose security we pledged to support, Ukraine.

Trump campaigned saying he would negotiate an end to the Ukraine war. Unlike former President Richard Nixon, who promised “peace with honor” in extricating the United States from the Vietnam quagmire but delivered instead a messy American exit from Saigon (an exit that was unparalleled in its chaotic quality until President Joe Biden’s Afghanistan fiasco), Trump hasn’t overpromised on how he will end Russia’s war against Ukraine.

But how to get it done?

There is a Realpolitik case and a moral case for Trump putting maximum pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to bring about a negotiated peace. That is to say, a peace that guarantees Ukraine’s national security and preserves as much of its territorial integrity as possible.

The stunning fall of Aleppo in Syria illustrates how a resolution to the war between Russia and Ukraine lies in the Middle East. A combination of focused military action and Teddy Roosevelt-style diplomacy can simultaneously end Iran’s nuclear program, and perhaps bring about the downfall of its regime, while bolstering Trump’s position at the negotiating table. Trump should take advantage of the interconnectedness of today’s global political ecosystem.

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For more than a decade, Russia and Iran supported the now deposed dictatorial regime of Syria’s Bashar Assad. Iran did so because of its hostility toward Israel and desire to surround the Jewish homeland with a “ring of fire.” Moscow intervened in Syria’s civil war during the Obama administration to support Assad because Putin envisions Russia as a rising global power. But Putin miscalculated again.

Israel’s near-destruction of Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy militia in Syria and Lebanon, combined with the great strain of the Ukraine war on Russian forces and armament, meant that Syrian rebels were able to secure a lightning strike seizure of Syria. Assad is now in Moscow, his regime is now history.

That brings us to Tehran and Ukraine.

After all, Iran cannot pretend it is not a party to the war in Ukraine. Two years ago, Iran began supplying Russia with Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles for combat use against Ukraine. More recently, Iran began shipping hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.

This is only the latest in a long line of Iran’s provocations that amount to a casus belli. Tehran’s attempt to assassinate Trump is the most flagrant, but its massive ballistic missile barrage of Israel is more than sufficient cause for concern. Iran has now shown its readiness to inflict mass casualties from ballistic missile strikes. Once Iran’s ruling ayatollahs build a nuclear weapon, not only Israel but all of Europe will be vulnerable.

The moment is ripe for an offensive by the U.S. and Israel to weaken and disrupt the Russia-Iran-China axis that threatens world peace. Now that Israel has virtually destroyed Iran’s air defenses, and with Iran’s ally Assad out of power, Trump should authorize a joint strike with Israel on Iran’s nuclear facilities, missile production, and drone manufacturing sites. Military action could be preceded by an ultimatum to Iran to dismantle its nuclear program and a “snapback” of United Nations Security Council sanctions and embargoes on Iranian weapons transfers, but neither action is likely to yield satisfactory results.

Military action would both weaken the Iranian regime and deprive Putin of a vital source of munitions. It would also send a signal to China that the U.S. will not stand by idly while an alignment of hostile powers prepares for World War III.

Putin put us on the threshold of world war almost three years ago by invading Ukraine. Moscow’s “special military operation” is just the beginning of Russia’s plans to reconquer Eastern Europe. Across the globe in Beijing, Putin’s war is being studied as a test case for China’s annexation of Taiwan and attacks on American bases in Asia to drive U.S. influence all the way back to Hawaii.

Facing facts requires us to realize that the axis of Russia, Iran, and China is actively preparing for an escalation of combat, stockpiling strategic materials, conducting joint military exercises, testing hypersonic ballistic missiles, and expanding naval patrols into all the world’s vital waterways. China is trying to diversify its foreign currency reserves away from the dollar and is working with Russia to insulate its financial system from U.S. and international economic sanctions. Once these preparations are complete, war could escalate rapidly unless Trump takes decisive action to end it now.

Just as the West’s feeble response to Putin’s annexation of Crimea 10 years ago set the stage for his invasion of Ukraine, how Trump handles Russia now will determine whether we diminish the danger of WWIII here and now or whether we will be doomed to fight later when our adversaries have grown stronger. The right strategy today can put an end to the avaricious ambitions of all three regimes.

Deprived of Iranian weapons and losing a valuable partner in their axis, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping would reassess Western resolve and reevaluate their expansionist objectives. The stage would be set for Trump to pursue negotiations with Putin for a truly honorable end to the war.

That is the Realpolitik case for continuing to support Ukraine in its struggle for independence from Moscow. The moral case rests on understanding how Ukraine surrendered its most valuable defense against Russia at the behest of the West.

In 1994, Ukraine voluntarily gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal and signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This triumph of denuclearization came about because the U.S., Russia, and the United Kingdom jointly committed to respect Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty.

As an adviser to former Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk’s administration and sherpa for the International Disarmament Corporation, a consortium of nuclear weapons firms, I was deeply involved in the political drama surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament.

Giving up its nuclear arsenal was not easy for Ukraine. Nationalist politicians fearful of Russian revanchists fought in parliament to keep the weapons. Ukrainian politicians who agreed in principle to become a nonnuclear state wanted steep compensation for the warheads’ value. Both factions were united in opposing turning over their nuclear deterrent without firm security assurances about the territorial integrity of their newly independent nation. Meanwhile, the U.S. and Russia pressed equally hard for the weapons’ destruction under the terms of the START agreement first negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union under President Ronald Reagan.

At stake for the U.S. was more than the successful implementation of the START treaty. In the early 1990s, the possibility of war between Russia and Ukraine was real. For months on end, my trip briefing materials as I shuttled between Washington and Kyiv warned that I might be entering a war zone. Heavy-handed Russian pressure to return the arms contributed to the crisis atmosphere. I was in Kyiv the night the Rada, Ukrainian Parliament, finally voted in favor of nuclear disarmament. Tensions were so high that the relief was palpable.

In addition to forestalling a war on Europe’s threshold and implementing the START nuclear arms cuts, there was an added benefit for the U.S. if Ukraine gave up its nuclear warheads. By voluntarily surrendering nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees and aid, Ukraine set a powerful precedent. If Ukraine could be persuaded to surrender the world’s third-largest nuclear stockpile, the ultimate objective of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, eventual nuclear disarmament, might be achievable.

Later that year Presidents Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin of Russia, Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine, and British Prime Minister John Major signed the Budapest Memorandums, guaranteeing Ukraine’s security and existing borders. America owes it to Ukraine to take effective measures to enforce the 1994 Budapest agreement.

That means welcoming Ukraine into NATO and putting Putin in a bargaining position where as much of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty as possible is restored.

This article is reprinted with permission from the Washington Examiner. The original can be seen here.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.