OPINION: Body Counts and Counterattacks, Transformer Roboboats, America First! And Winning Bigly!

In general, there’s been more positive news this week than for the last little while, but of course, that’s partly because of the low bar.

The Fighting

We the outsiders finally have a reasonably reliable number of Ukrainian soldiers lost dead or missing in combat, over the entire war. The source is the military journalist Yury Butusov, who says this is what the General Staff reported to Zelensky. People in the military such as they are say they’ve heard the numbers and believe them to be at least believable. My take is this is credible and probably true.

The bottom line is that since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has suffered losses 70,000 killed and 35,000 missing. This isn’t including injured.

It’s worth noting that The Economist, a couple of weeks back, said its estimate was 60–100,000 dead and missing, and 400,000 injured. Zelensky a couple of days later said the Economist’s death numbers were smaller: “a lot less than 80,000.” That’s sort of a check on the numbers put forward by Butusov.

The implication of those numbers is that, over the course of the war, yes, Russian casualties are outnumbering Ukrainian casualties, but, it’s not ten to one. From an attrition point of view, it’s probably a wash as to whether or not that’s good or bad news. Russia probably has five or six times more men it could try to push into the fighting, but the Ukrainians are more motivated.

Other Topics of Interest

Ukraine Conducts Tests on New ‘Ruta’ Missile – Zelensky

Ukraine’s president mentioned “successful tests” of a previously unveiled missile during a speech on Tuesday, though details surrounding the weapon remain extremely scarce.

Which brings me back to the single most important word in this war — firepower.

Here there is some good news. In general, Russian firepower is degrading, and we can see it, or the flip side, Ukrainian battleground firepower is increasing. The mainstream news source that reported it was Sky News, which did a report saying the ratio right now is 1.5 Russian shells to 1 Ukrainian shell, which probably is somewhat situational, but across the front, you hear that the Ukrainians have more shells to fire than before (another low bar) and battle reports of Russian attacks getting stopped by drones AND shell strikes are going up. SkyNews cited mostly unnamed analysts. Anecdotal accounts from the front in rough terms have been saying the same thing.

Likewise, glide bomb attacks are dropping off. This contradicts the Sky News report but the data is pretty clear as well. According to statistics published by the AFU, instead of 100-150 bombs a day now the Russians are managing 50-60. I’ve certainly heard that too and generally speaking, most believe it. If the AFU publishes a real lie — which to be fair is rare — then the local milbloggers and media call the military on it pretty much instantly. So, the general assumption is, the army may make mistakes with counts like this, but probably the figures it publishes aren’t intentionally fudged.

The usual suspects for why that is are the Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian ammo depots and Russian pilot fatigue and Russian Air Force maintenance. Whether or not the situation will last I can’t say, but, if you are looking for evidence that the Russian attacks are losing their force, it’s possible to find it.

Here’s a KP article that lays out the basics on that.

Anecdotally, more reports and engagement video are showing that yes the Russians have been losing 1,500–2,000 men a day in combat and that the quantity and scale of the Russian attacks are falling off somewhat.

Exhibit “A” is the town of Kurakhove, Donbas sector, which is one of the epicenters of the present Russian offensive.

By my count, it has now been effectively surrounded save for one supply road and a strip of land about 6 kilometers (3.7 miles) wide and 15 kilometers (9.3 miles) long, and the entire length of the road is beaten by Russian artillery and patrolled by their drones. Yet Kurakhove is holding.

There is some evidence that the AFU fortified the area and was looking for a defense fight in this area, a la Marne, but there are also complaints that the AFU doesn’t know what it’s doing and has stuck a bunch of territorials and a couple of decent brigades into a trap.

My observation is, whatever the AFU’s plan was, the Russian plan was to take the place like it had taken terrain over in October and November in this sector: quickly. That hasn’t happened. A reasonable explanation why — and this is widely the view by the Ukrainian military blogosphere — is that the Russians are running low of soldiers to commit to more assaults.

Plus, there was this. A bit to the north of Kurakhove, vicinity of Velyka Novosilka, on Wednesday, the Russians busted into the village of Novy Komar, and got hit by a proper local counterattack. Reportedly several vehicles lost, Russian infantry killed and wounded, survivors went to ground and, per their doctrine, started digging in.

This is not how, commonly, a Russian assault on a defended Donbas village has played out in the past few months. Normally once the Russian infantry gets in close, even with losses, the Ukrainians seem unable to dig them out.

But not this time. It seems like the Ukrainians had a plan ready to go, or maybe they just came up with one on their feet. The story is infantry and combat vehicles from 48th Assault Brigade, along with some element from 3/31 Mechanized Infantry, a single tank from 23rd Tank Brigade, all backed by drones from 241st Territorial Brigade (flight section Vyriy) counterattacked into Novy Komar and kicked the Russians out. Some fled, some were killed and some were taken prisoner. Supposedly, the defeated unit was 40th Naval Infantry. When it was over someone from the 48th did a vid of the brigade flag in the middle of the village, so everyone could know who owns Novy Komar.

Late addition: By accident today I met with a 48th Brigade veteran who is in contact with the guys on the line. He said the counterattack took place much as described.

It seems like it was not a big battle, maybe a company or so on either side, but, combined arms counterattacks are harder than just defending in place, and we haven’t seen the AFU pull little ops like this very often, and when it has taken place it’s usually been a prioritized unit like Azov, 3rd Assault, 92nd and 93rd Mech, or the Marines.

Farther north, Kupyansk sector, you may have been aware that in the latest round of successful attacks, the Russians managed to grab a pair of footholds on the west/right bank of the Oskil River which, if held, could become a big operational problem in the northwest theater.

I have no idea of the size of the bridgeheads/footholds, but over the past three days or so, one of them, in the vicinity of a village called Novomlynsk, was wiped out completely and the other was reduced to some shallow holes on the river bank, now under shelling and drone strikes. I understand 8th Mountain Assault did this.

Local Ukrainian counterattacks are rare, and I can’t remember when two successful ones took place in a single week. Maybe a coincidence, maybe a trend. But at least it’s evidence that the AFU plan goes beyond holding ground passively.

The long-range war

We’ve seen an uptick of British SigInt flights above southeast Romania over the past few days, which often has been a precursor to one of these usually complicated Ukrainian combined strikes at a target or targets in Crimea.

Then, on Friday morning, still dark, there was some kind of naval/air battle in the vicinity of the Kerch bridge, pitting, according to reports, six Ukrainian robot cutters — intent and target not really clear — and elements of the Russian Air Force and local naval security.

The Russians got some Mi-8 gunships into the air. This is the preferred aircraft for sea drone hunting because a door gunner can aim more accurately than pilots, apparently, and there was an engagement. However, both sides apparently drew off without losses, because it turned out the Ukrainian robot boats had machine guns of their own. At least one boat apparently launched its own drone.

Once the sun came up there was all the traditional hue and cry associated with Russian authorities responding to “attacks” on the Kerch bridge like claims of multiple Ukrainian weapons destroyed, no damage whatsoever to anything Russian, the smoke pots along the bridge getting fired up to foul the sea air, and traffic stopped either ways while officials say everything is under control.

I guess the Ukrainians were probing sea defenses to find out how the Russians deal with a threat to the bridge these days, and they stuck (remote-controlled) machine guns on the motor boats as a surprise.

This morning, the Ukrainian military put out a video of robot boats attacking the Russia-held gas extraction platforms to the east of Crimea. This in and of itself seems to have been a special operations raid with the mission of blowing up whatever the Russians had on the rig platforms, which historically is air and sea space early warning radars.

I’ve stuck the link to the video below, there’s all manner of bright orange explosions and mayhem. It’s already pushing Hollywood, apparently some of these robot boats launched flying attack drones of their own. So in a way, who needs aircraft carriers?

Still, there was only one possible screen grab to post here: a Black Sea dolphin escorting a Ukrainian Navy robot boat into combat, off the eastern Crimea shore. Attached.

Also on Saturday morning, there were explosions consistent with long-range Ukrainian drone or missile strikes in Adygea, which is roughly north of Krasnodar region and contains both refining infrastructure and air defenses that cover the Kerch Strait. So at this point, I’m not clear if the boat raid was the mission or a precursor to the big attack that’s still coming.

Trump for the Big Win in Ukraine

Reader Michael LaBonte last week accurately pointed out that I ding the US government all the time on Ukraine policy but I offer no suggestions of what they should be doing instead. He reasonably asked me, fine, cheap shots are easy, but the serious question what SHOULD America and more specifically the Trump administration do about the Russo-Ukraine War?

Challenge accepted. Of course, to take on that question one probably needs to decide: is this what’s the best possible policy that is impossible because of domestic political priorities, or are their policy options that are less than ideal, but would advance the political leadership’s top political priorities?

I decided to take a shot, first, at the possible and leave the ideal for another day.

The starting point is, of course, to acknowledge that from the point of view of the Trump team, Ukraine/Russia and the biggest war since World War II is a distraction that needs to be shoved aside so the administration can concentrate on What’s Really Important.

Per their dogma, this is dismantling the Deep State and particularly the revolving door between the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex, putting America First, onshoring high-value production, and demolishing government institutions that prevent American commerce from flourishing.

On the individual elector level, according to the party line, these policies will deliver reduced prices for housing, food, and gasoline.

At least as important for strategists and believers alike, on the official narrative/image creation level, this means making Donald J. Trump look great and showing him and America to be the winner and the most powerful.

LATE ADDITION: Pic added of Trump, Macron, and Zelensky meeting in Paris. I guess it’s possible Trump picked Ukrainian colors to wear but somehow I doubt it. This is textbook behavior: now bazillions of people like me, but a lot more importantly the Kremlin, will be wondering What Does It Mean? If it was intentional, the point was simple: To make Vladimir Putin nervous (Which is not the same as good terms for the Ukrainians. This is Trump posturing as he gets ready to negotiate).

In practical terms, and I’m not being Socialist or talking exploitation of the proletariat here, I’m just trying to describe the policy as it’s being described by its own advocates, all of this boils down to policies that aid and abet Wall Street, US capital, and American big business first and foremost.

From that point of view, according to the next White House team, the Russo-Ukraine war must stop because a major war in Europe undermines capital flows and American business and forces the US to spend resources on European defense and security when the “real” US enemy is China. No one cares about the Ukrainians.

(Ironically, many in Trump’s leadership team made their careers as fighters against the “real” US enemy of World Islamic Terrorism, and only converted to the belief that China is the Devil only recently, but I digress.)

Further, the incoming White House takes American capacity to exert its will, wherever it wishes, as an article of faith. In their mind, if America fails it is because American resources and will were improperly deployed. Their tenet is that America is all-powerful and awesome (this has sometimes been called the Masters-of-the-Universe syndrome, image featuring He-Man attached.)

Russia and Putin are a perfect punching bag to validate that way of seeing things. It is, in my opinion, a basic conviction across the incoming administration, that Russia is a bit player that gets too much respect, and that needs to be put in its place. Yes some of them think it’s cool Putin is a despot, but, they see him as weak and unable to defend Russia’s economic interests, and as un-American, so fair game.

Are there future US policy moves on the Russo-Ukraine War that would foster the image of American omnipotence, that would make American big business a lot of money and look like Big Wins for the administration? Absolutely. The most obvious one they have been talking about for some time.

RECOMMENDATION NUMBER ONE:

Force the world price of oil below $60/barrel.

Right now it’s $67. $50 would be even better. The liberals will scream about the environment, fossil fuels, global warming, and greedy energy corporations. Screw them, they lost the election. Low energy prices pretty much always jump-start the US economy. Prices come down at the US gas station. I am far from the first to observe that US voters think about gasoline prices the way that peasants in pre-revolutionary France or Imperial Russia thought about the price of bread.

At the same time, attack Russia’s capacity to export energy worldwide, not because America likes Ukraine, or that America opposes big countries invading small countries on dumb pretexts. The reality is America either has little idea where to find Ukraine on the map or just doesn’t like Ukraine if nothing else, on the grounds that all foreigners as suspect since they’re not Americans.

Russian energy market share lost is US energy market share gained. Besides the profits and even better US balance of trade, this would have the nice side effect of showing the world that Russia can’t stand up to American big business and the might of American capital.

Is Russia vulnerable to a drop in oil prices? The answer to that question is, yes, emphatically, Russia is incredibly vulnerable. Big capital likes nothing better than forcing out competitors and grabbing their market share.

Numbers vary, but a common estimate is 1/3 of the entire Russian state budget depends on energy export revenues, all of which are tied directly to the price of oil. It would not be much of an overstatement to say that the single biggest threat to the Russian state, right now, is a substantial drop in world oil prices. Here’s some market research on world oil breakeven prices dated 2023, and I’ve attached a graphic from that report to this review:

For those of you who find looking at graphics tiring, the text version of that is that, as of 2023, Russia needed to sell oil at a price of $42/bbl to cover production costs and balance the external trade balance. But, that price had to be $118/bbl to do the foregoing, AND cover state spending without going into deficit.

The qualification is that, of course, US producers sell product on the same world market, and the price point at which US shale becomes unprofitable to produce is probably $50–60. So yes Trump can try and torpedo world oil prices, BUT he would have to also figure out a way to keep US producers, who work in shale with higher production costs solvent. If most Russian crude were physically unable to reach the market, that would be one way. Tax breaks or similar for US producers might be another way. But the point is, even though Saudi Arabia, who has the cheapest production costs of anyone, would probably love Donald Trump destroying Russian AND US production, it’s not something the White House can do easily and without risk.

But the payoff is that oil is Russia’s economic jugular vein, and even hints can threaten it. Numbers vary, oil and gas export revenues account for about 30–50% of the entire Russian state budget. Right now retail interest rates in Russia are 21% officially and around 30% annual if you want to buy a house. Inflation officially is 8% and if you look at the actual basic consumer good baskets, it’s probably 15-20%.

A big cut to world oil prices in Spring 2025 would make all those things worse. Were economic problems to snowball in Russia, in my view, that might well trigger public unrest in Russia by Fall and things almost certainly would get worse from there. This is an existential, personal threat to Putin: he is from Leningrad and he knows who lived in Winter Palace and what happened to the last Tsar.

So, along with creating downward pressure on world oil prices, it’s win/win for the US to do what it can to make it as physically difficult as possible for Russian oil that is recovered, at whatever price, to reach market. Widen sanctions on intermediate traders and downstream refiners. Use the US Navy to hunt down and sink Russia’s shadow tanker fleet. Banks that facilitate that business don’t need to be on Swift. Corporations energetic in Russian oil trading, probably need sanctioning because their accounting isn’t transparent enough to prevent terrorists from making money from illicit energy revenues. All of this departs from the conventional international rule of law, but again, the Trump administration’s philosophy is that every time the institutional convention is overturned, they are doing their job right and making America stronger.

The beauty part of this is, Putin is stubborn. So, the longer the sanction process goes on, the more market share and profit Western capital led by the US and Wall Street can grab.

This strategy would of course be disastrous for countries that produce oil at costs higher than about $60, and, as noted, if steps aren’t taken, US shale producers as well. Superficial research leads me to believe the Algerians, Iraqis, Kazakhs and Omanis would be particularly screwed as their production costs are higher than the Russians. The Biden administration might have seen that as a problem.

For the Trump administration, that’s a straight path to “Who cares?”

Sure, there’re plenty of practical problems with this scenario. But, from the point of view of the internal logic and doctrine of the incoming administration, it’s hard to see how they can or will resist attempting it.

Colorized image of John D. Rockefeller attached as an example of the US mindset the incoming administration sees as worth emulating.

RECOMMENDATION NUMBER TWO:

Declare the US no longer the leader in the international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and acknowledge reality. Stay in NATO because of the leverage it gives over individual European states.

The Europeans are paying more into Ukraine than the Americans and have been doing so for some time. Say so, admit it publicly, and take the win.

Likewise, European contributions to NATO are rising rapidly and unlike the US, their defense budgets (well most of them) aren’t buying things like aircraft carriers and bases in the Philippines and Syria that arguably have zero to do with NATO and deterring Russia. Declare American satisfaction that Europe is stepping up, which means America can leave Europe to the Europeans. Graph of contributions attached.

As it seems I am pointing out in about every other review these days, the point here is that US-doing-everything-Europe-is-doing-nothing is a hoax. Subtract things like US military operations, bases and assets in the Middle East and Asia, and it’s pretty obvious: the US is sort of a middling contributor to NATO.

According to today’s news, it has about 80,000 men and three combat brigades in all of Europe: this means US force commitments to Europe are slightly bigger than Portugal’s, but distinctly smaller than Romania’s. So even before taking office, Trump has defeated NATO. All that’s left is to declare victory and accept the praise and thankful prayers of the faithful.

Going forward, the US can continue to say it believes in NATO, even if few anywhere believe Donald J. Trump would go to war for Estonian independence. But, in return for that, the US gets to keep access to all those nice US Air Force bases in Europe so useful for deployments to the Middle East where the oil is.

Even better, once US defense commitments to Europe are decoupled from US domestic politics, then it becomes much easier to play national security hardball and make more American corporations more money, in the security sector.

The incoming administration wants an end to crazy Pentagon contracting and cost overruns, but, they are thrilled to do the exact same deals forking out super-profits to US corporations, provided foreign taxpayers are picking up the bill. Another win!

The incoming administration for the most part sees Europe as a passive market to be exploited, and led by politicians who are fun to push around. The moment the US gets out of the business of “running” NATO, all manner of American profit-maximizing becomes possible.

Norway is thinking of undercutting US LNG in European markets? Trump and his staff get to point out to Oslo that Norway don’t have a navy, America does, and that America thinks NATO security would be best served if American LNG got priority access to the Belgian and Dutch markets. Transnistria and Moldova flare up and the Germans and the Romanians (say) decide that actually taking action is hard, the better policy is to push the easy button and beg America to do something? Tough luck, there’s no serious money for US big business in Moldova. Figure it out yourselves. Framaton or Siemens get the idea they should help the Ukrainians build more and better nuclear reactors? Not a chance, that’s a job for General Electric, nuclear materials in Ukraine (and the money that go with it) are a core US national security interest. Don’t like it? Well guess what, the US isn’t so thrilled being part of NATO. Etc. Etc.

A European might say all of that would be perfectly possible by just discussing things ahead of time like gentlemen in private, there’s enough money to be made by all. But that would miss the other primary indicator of success the Trump administration (I think) will always seek, to wit, a “deal” negotiated in confrontational talks that Trump and America “win.”

The policies that validate the administration’s ideology that the leader is always right and that, because America is big, America should get what it wants, always, are the policies the administration should follow.

Ukraine, meanwhile, gets to deal with the US on terms the incoming administration loves, to wit, deals that make American corporations money.

That is perfectly suitable to the Ukrainians, sure it’s less American money overall, but it will be tied to real support driven by the profit motive, and critically, there is next to zero chance that support would become a political football in the US. As we have seen, over time, the Ukrainians prefer not to use American aid, too many headaches.

RECOMMENDATION NUMBER THREE:

Another tenet of the incoming administration’s dogma is that the Pentagon is a cesspool and that if US taxpayer money is mostly wasted there. It’s run by clever generals who’ve spent entire careers leading Congress and Presidents down the garden path to buy more and more expensive weapons that either don’t work or cost several times more than the target they’re designed to blow up.

An article of faith is that, always, US private industry left to its own devices will make better weaponry, more cheaply, and do it faster than the US military. But for the wreckers — or reformers, as they are already calling themselves — the problem is that with a big state institution like NASA or DoD it’s really hard to prove your better way actually works, and then weaponize that success into eliminating the entire institution.

Many of you who watch the news will have seen that the Ukrainians just unveiled their latest long-range strike drone, called the Peklo (pictured) which according to the announcement has really spiffy specs — it’s jet-propelled, it flies at about 700 kph (435 mph) so about three times faster than propeller drones and is that much harder for the Russians to shoot down. Range is 700 kilometers, meaning, more than ATACMS or Storm Shadow. Picture attached. My guess is about four of these things would be a similar destructive punch as one of those Western missiles. The Ukrainians are now manufacturing it.

This is where Draining the Swamp and Breaking Down the American Military-Industrial Complex — remember, this is a central party line of real America dogma — comes in. What the incoming administration should do is throw money at Ukrainian Peklo production. Why? Because of all the wins.

Win — The Ukrainians will gear up production orders of magnitude faster and cheaper than the Pentagon would do it. Then the administration can beat the Pentagon about the head and shoulders for price-gouging and inefficiency. See? Even the “stupid” Ukrainians can source and produce new weapons systems without it costing more than a moon shot. The beauty part is that no one in the Pentagon can argue “That won’t work” or “You’re not a military expert, this proves nothing. The Pentagon isn’t fighting a big conventional war. Ukraine is.” So a defeat for entrenched Pentagon general credibility and a victory for Draining the Swamp.

Win — The Russians are arm-twisted in exactly the way the administration prefers, which is by American “power” applying leverage without ever risking American lives. Putin can complain all he wants, but the bottom line is that if 100-drone strikes are hitting Russia every two or four days, not only is whatever the Ukrainians target going to get slowly demolished, but, the Putin regime will have no way to conceal it from the Russians. That is an almost existential threat Putin can neither ignore nor easily counter. And the Americans can say, hey, all we’re doing is helping the Ukrainians make weapons, they’re the ones picking the targets and planning the strikes.

Reprinted from https://stefankorshak.substack.com/ with the author’s permission. You can find the original article here.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.