We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history.
When observing the events, big and small, in contemporary wars, I find myself drawn back to the theory of war to provide the intellectual foundations to understand what is happening and why. Not everything can be explained by satellite images, newspaper articles or the online OSINT community (as good as it is). Military theory often provides context to better explain what we are seeing in the war in Ukraine. As Clausewitz’s quote above notes, the major campaigns of this war are always grounded in politics, not just the search for military advantage.
The big development in the war in Ukraine in the past two weeks has been Ukraine’s Kursk offensive and the seizing of over 1100 square kilometres of Russian territory. This has been an impressively planned and executed Ukrainian ground operation. It has demonstrated Ukrainian learning and adaptation after the failure of its 2023 counteroffensive, which will be the topic of a future article here. The Kursk operation may also change the direction of the war.
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Ukrainian objectives for the Kursk operation have gained some recent clarity with statements by the Ukrainian President, as well as other Ukrainian officials. In the past 24 hours, President Zelenskyy has spoken of how the Kursk operation seeks to achieve several objectives.
The first objective is political. Zelenskyy has described how "we’ve already expanded and will continue to expand the circle of those who support a just end to this war. It's essential that Ukraine enters this fall even stronger than before." Ukraine must not only be stronger as the year tapers off into Winter, but it must also be seen as such by its supporters, the international fence-sitters and those who are actively supporting Russia.
Scholz urges Ukraine talks in first call with Putin since 2022
This is important because the Ukrainian aim here is to demonstrate that Russian victory is not inevitable, and that Ukraine can fight and win. These comments are also intended to help ensure continued support from the U.S. and NATO, address the cuts in German assistance to Ukraine next year, and to have restrictions on the use of weapons in Russia lifted.
Another element of this political objective is to pierce the Russian bluffing about escalation. Ukraine has demonstrated, again, that the various red lines projected by the Russian president are nothing but a chimera designed to reinforce Western political timidity about decision-making on the war, and shape Western decisions about provision of weapons. Remember when the provision of artillery and tanks was supposed to escalate the war?
The creation of a buffer zone is another objective described by Zelenskyy. This cleverly appropriates Russian language, which the Russian president used to justify its invasion of Kharkiv oblast earlier this year. But it is throwing down a gauntlet to the Russians by stating that Ukraine intends to hold at least some of the territory it has seized in Kursk, and that this will be an ongoing military and political problem for Russia. It also offers a potential future negotiating point but absorbs significant Ukrainian military resources.
Finally, Zelenskyy mentions the Kursk operation being part of a larger effort to destroy Russia’s war-making capacity. He notes that “our primary task in defensive operations overall [is] to destroy as much Russian war potential as possible and conduct maximum counteroffensive operations.” While this includes the full range of military operations across Ukraine, as well as its strikes on strategic energy and military targets in Russia, Kursk is designed by the Ukrainians to lure the Russians into a fight that they were not expecting on their own territory.
The operation thus far has demonstrated an effective orchestration of close and deep operations. These deep operations, such as interdiction of Russian reinforcement convoys, airfield strikes and dropping bridges over the Seim River to secure the Ukrainian flank and potentially shape Ukrainian operations south of the river, have all enabled the Ukrainian advance and complicated Russia’s response. The Ukrainian advances, while continuing, have slowed in their second week.
Ukraine’s advance into Kursk. Source: @UAControlMap
At some point soon, Ukraine’s advance into Kursk will culminate due to a combination of the Russian response, casualties, extended lines of communications and the limits placed on the operation by the President and the Commander-in-Chief, General Syrskyi. Once this occurs, the Ukrainians still have the three options available to them, which I explored in this previous post.
In short, the three options I examined were as follows:
Option 1. Option 1 is for the Ukrainian forces to consolidate on the terrain they have seized so far and then defend it until some form of negotiation takes place.
Option 2. The second option is for the Ukrainian forces to undertake a partial withdrawal from the territory it has seized, back to ground that is more defensible. This would include the creation of a buffer zone.
Option 3. The third option for Ukraine would be to fully withdraw back to the international border between Russia and Ukraine.
Option 2 now appears to be a stronger possibility than the other two options. Indicators that lead me to this observation include the apparent deployment of an Engineer Brigade, which is normally used for operational level tasks such as hardened C2 and logistics facilities and more robust obstacle zones. The dropping of the Seim brigades might also indicate an indication to widen the Ukrainian salient to the west – although it might just be a flank protection measure as well. The recent statements by President Zelenskyy also gives an indication that Option 2 may be the preferred approach in the coming days or weeks.
This will take a lot of Ukrainian resources to hold. But will also take a much larger Russian commitment to push them out.
At this stage of the Ukrainian offensive, there are three issues that will exert an influence on the ultimate outcome of the Kursk offensive as well as the direction of the war in Ukraine into the northern fall and winter. These are: Russia’s immediate response to Kursk; Russia’s medium-term choices in military strategy; and, the resolution to the dilemma of how Ukraine and Russia can fight two concurrent major campaigns.
Russia’s Immediate Response and Strategic Choices
The initial shock of surprise experienced by the Russians has begun to wear off. They are slowly assembling their response to the Ukrainian Kursk offensive, although this Russian response remains insufficient in scale and coordination.
One of the complicating factors for the Russians is their recent changes to command and control in the region. While old saying “amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics” might hold some truth, command and control is THE key topic that military planners and leaders discuss at great length to get right.
Dara Massicot covered this topic in a post on 13 August. As she wrote then, “the entirety of the area was formerly the Western Military District (2010-24). Russia decided to split it up in March-April 2024 to cope with NATO expansion. It named two commanders: Lapin (LEMD) and Kozovlev (MOMD)…this AFU operation has successfully exploited seams of responsibility between the FSB, Rosgvardia and MOD.” Unity of Command is an important principle of war in every Western military institution for good reason. The shortfalls in this area will continue to compromise Russia’s response.
Russia however has been moving more ground units and formations into the Kursk area of operations. As a British Ministry of Defence post mentioned on 16 August, “after initial disarray and disorganisation, Russian forces have deployed in greater force in the region [and] they have begun to construct additional defensive positions.” These deployments, notwithstanding the chaotic conditions that prevail, will have had an impact on Ukrainian tempo and the pace of their offensive operations.
Russia faces some tough choices now that Ukraine has established itself on Russian territory. The most important one is where on its frontline is it willing to take more tactical and operational risk? The response to the Kursk incursion will require infantry, armour, EW, fires, drones and a range of combat service support organisations. Even the Russians must economise with these forces in their maintenance of the long frontline in Ukraine. So far, there have been redeployments of some Russian forces from the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine as well as from within Russia itself.
However, if the fighting in Kursk continues for months and months, and pushing the Ukrainians out is harder and more costly for the Russians than anticipated (which is very likely), even tougher choices will need to be made by the Russian military leadership and Putin. At the moment, Russia’s choices for its overall Ukraine strategy until the end of this year probably encompass variants of the following:
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Sustain the main effort in the Donbas with Kursk being a secondary effort. This would see Russia focused primarily on seizing key Ukrainian cities in the Donbas, compromising the overall Ukrainian scheme of defence there. This would be a significant achievement for the Russians, despite its high cost, because it moves them much closer to controlling all of the Donbas.
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Sustain the main effort in the Donbas but at a lower tempo and step up Kursk response operations. This might compromise the Russian ability to seize key cities in eastern Ukraine but might force a shut down in the Ukrainian Kursk offensive at an earlier point. Like the other options, this presents the Ukrainians with opportunities to target Russian forces in transit to Kursk, and identify new weak points in the Russian frontline which might be exploited.
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Designate the response in Kursk as the Russian military main effort for the war. This would see a major shift in Russian forces from Russia and Ukraine to seal off the Kursk incursion and push the Ukrainians back into Ukraine. However, it would probably see the Russian attempts to seize Pokrovsk and other strategic cities halted, or at least paused until 2025. This option would also present many more targeting opportunities to the Ukrainians in their deep operations to destroy Russian war making capacity, while also presenting additional weaknesses on the Russian frontline that Ukraine might exploit (assuming it has the forces remaining with which to do so).
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Designate the Kursk and Donbas operations as ‘equal’ main efforts. While this doesn’t make a lot of military sense, and probably is not able to be fully resourced, this might be the option that Putin directs out of political expediency.
At this point, the nuclear issue should also be raised briefly. Is it possible that Putin could consider the employment of tactical nuclear weapons to defend Russia and expel Ukrainian troops from ‘the motherland’. The key question that Putin would ask his generals would be whether the use of such weapons would fundamentally change the course of the Ukrainian campaign in Kursk, and the war in general. The answer at this point is probably ‘no’. And given all of the political, strategic and humanitarian downsides of using nuclear weapons, the prospect of their use by Russia at present appears very limited.
Ultimately, the Russian decision will be one that makes most sense politically to Putin. Military realities are important to him but the survival of his regime is an existential matter. Putin will need to decide which is the most dangerous to his regime – giving up on taking Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 (and continuing towards them next year), or not regaining control of Russian territory quickly.
What all of these options demonstrate is that Russia can potentially sustain two concurrent major ground operations in Ukraine and Russia. How well they might do so, and the Ukrainian capacity for concurrently fighting two major ground campaigns, is explored next.
Fighting Two Major Ground Campaigns Concurrently
One of the early lessons the Russians appear to have learned in 2022 was that multiple, concurrent major campaigns were not only difficult to orchestrate but very difficult to resource with sufficient infantry, fires, air defence and Russian air force support. From mid 2022, the Russians focussed their ground operations in eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the Ukrainians have focussed on one major campaign at a time, be it the Kharkiv and Kherson offensives or the 2023 counter offensive, while sustaining defensive operations elsewhere.
The current situation is somewhat new. Both sides are now undertaking two concurrent major campaigns that are consuming large quantities or manpower (especially for the Russians), munitions and supporting arms such as EW, drones, logistics and air defence. While both might be able to surge their forces for short periods, it is unclear if the Ukrainians or Russians can sustain such an approach for months at a time. One side or the other will have to make a difficult choice about their priorities and significantly reduce their resourcing for one of their major campaigns.
One of the issues that will influence how long the Ukrainians can stretch their tactical and operational advantages in Kursk is the ongoing Battle of the Donbas, and particularly the continuing Russian advance on the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk. This city is an important logistics hub in the Donbas and forms a key link in a chain of Ukrainian defensive locations in the region. On the Pokrovsk axis, Ukraine appears to have been unable to halt the Russian advance as they capture settlements south of the rail line. Russian forces appear to have also advanced into outer Toretsk, as well as advancing in Niu-York.
The Russian Pokrovsk axis of advance. Source: Institute for the Study of War
Thus far, despite their losses in Kursk, the Russians have not been distracted from their grinding advance on Pokrovsk. While there may be important tactical, operational and political gains if the Russians seize it, it remains to be seen whether the Russians can sustain their pressure here in the Donbas and resist the growing political imperative to act decisively against Ukraine’s thrust into Russia.
While Russian mobilization, and ongoing monthly recruiting, appears sufficient to providing the manpower for these two campaigns (at least for the present), Ukraine is still in the process of reinforcing and expanding its forces in the wake of the new mobilization laws.
There are no magical solutions to the reconstitution and force generation challenges faced by Ukraine in the wake of 2023 operations. While there has obviously been progress on this front since the beginning of the year, training lots of new people and generating effective combat units are two very different concerns. Ukraine still faces force generation challenges and an overall deficit in personnel compared to Russia. For Ukraine to undertake its Kursk operation, it will have had to take risk in many other parts of the frontline, including defending against the Russian Pokrovsk and Toretsk axes of advance.
Resources will be a significant influence on which of the campaigns either side chooses to sustain as its main effort. The culminating points for both Ukraine in Kursk, and Russia in the Donbas, will play a role. Other potential operations, such as subsequent Ukrainian operations in Belgorod, offensive operations to take advantage of Russian weaknesses caused by troops redeploying to Kursk, and the continued defensive deployment of forces along the border with Belarus, will also be considerations in strategic decision making.
But ultimately the choice of which ground campaign will be the focus for Ukraine and Russia will hinge on political considerations. For Russia, as I wrote above, Putin will need to choose which of his major operations in Ukraine or Russia will deliver the most progress against his desired strategic outcome, and which of them – if not properly resourced – will be the most dangerous to his regime.
For Ukraine, the question of how much territory can be ceded in the Donbas, casualties in the Kursk operation, the Russian response, use of Ukrainian offensive capability elsewhere, and the feedback from allies will influence their decision. As Zelenskyy noted in his recent speech, “it's essential that Ukraine enters this fall even stronger than before.” This is not just a statement of military strategy. It is also a statement of political necessity. As such, Ukraine will be hoping the Kursk offensive will deliver a shift in the political momentum in the war, just as the Ukrainians have seized the battlefield initiative.
The coming weeks will give us more insights into which if the Ukrainian or Russian strategies for two concurrent major campaigns will prove successful. But like all wars, prediction of the ultimate outcome to this dilemma remains impossible.
Conclusion
For the foreseeable future therefore, both Ukraine and Russia must commit to conducting two major ground campaigns concurrently. While Russia is probably better placed to resource two such campaigns, neither Ukraine nor Russia is likely to be able to do so into 2025. The issues explored in this article will hopefully inform readers about how complex and challenging the decision making will be about Kursk and the Donbas campaigns for Ukraine and Russia in coming weeks and months.
Unfortunately, as stunning and clever as the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk has been, it may not change Putin’s overall war goals. Previous setbacks, including the Russian Army’s defeat in its 2022 Kyiv offensive, its defeats in Kharkiv and Kherson as well as the international sanctions regime, have not modified Putin’s overall goal of subjugating Ukraine and destroying its capacity to exist as a sovereign, prosperous democracy. Kursk, unfortunately might only make him more determined to achieve this – assuming he remains president.
But, if we are lucky, Ukraine’s audacity, demonstration of offensive capacity and most importantly – will – might convince the U.S. and its NATO partners to reconsider their strategy for supporting Ukraine and the level of resourcing it provides. A new strategy of defeating Russia in Ukraine, proven possible in the Battle of Kursk, should be the evolved course for the West. Until then, both sides will continue smashing away at the other in the hope that their opponent culminates first and that they can break the will of the other.
This analysis was originally posted on Mick Ryan’s Substack and is reprinted here with the author's permission.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
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