OPINION: Red Thin Line – How to Play Russia

For years, Russia has employed an escalating language of force, creating faits accomplis, waging hybrid warfare against Poland, the Baltic states, and other countries on NATO’s eastern flank, and regularly engaging in nuclear blackmail. In contrast, much of the Western political class has acted in the opposite manner, opting for de-escalation. But is this approach effective?

The fear of the “red lines” drawn by the Kremlin seems unwarranted at this point. Many of these lines have been crossed, most recently in a spectacular manner with Ukrainian forces entering Russian territory in the Kursk region.

This bold move by Kyiv not only demonstrated that the Kremlin’s threats are often bluffs but also allowed Ukraine to seize the narrative and respond to Russia in a language it understands.

The operation in the Kursk region has multiple dimensions – military, informational, and political. This unexpected incursion into Russian territory sent an important message to the Russian people. While it may not suddenly cause Russians to respect or sympathize with Ukrainians, it may lead them to doubt their own state.

Of course, the belief that “the tsar is good, the boyars are bad” still persists in Russia, but it’s important to remember that in the eyes of Russian society, the country can be led by a thief, a criminal, or a degenerate, but never by someone weak. Violence is pervasive in Russia, from cradle to grave, both symbolically and in every aspect of social life.

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How to talk to Russia?

Russia clearly doesn’t know how to handle the humiliation of having its territory breached – since the first day of the Ukrainian operation, Kremlin propaganda has been claiming that it was Polish and NATO forces involved. This rhetoric fits perfectly into Russia’s narrative of a “war with the collective West.”

For years, Russian authorities have described Ukraine and Ukrainians not as a nation and state but as a “territory” that slipped out of their control. It’s evident that the Russian cult of strength and violence is cognitively incapable of processing the Ukrainian offensive.

This is reflected, among other things, in the words of Lukashenko, the Belarusian leader allied with the Moscow regime, who in an interview on Thursday called for negotiations to end the war.

He said, “It is not needed by Ukrainians, Russians, or Belarusians.” Could there be a better argument to support the thesis that Russia only understands the language of force?

Seizing the Narrative

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion, there were attempts by Western politicians to seize control of the narrative.

On March 15, 2022, during his visit to Kyiv, Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of Poland’s Law and Justice party (PiS), stated, “A NATO peacekeeping mission or a broader international arrangement is needed in Ukraine.”

Similar sentiments were echoed by the current Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski from the Civic Platform (PO), who suggested in his comments that the presence of NATO forces in Ukraine would be beneficial.

French President Emmanuel Macron also made similar remarks.

It’s no secret that there is a significant qualitative gap between NATO forces and the Russian military. The mere act of making such statements could cause the Kremlin to think twice before taking further steps.

The Ukrainian operation in the Kursk region demonstrates that de-escalation is not necessarily what prevents further escalation – at least not in this case.

The West should allow Ukraine to use all means necessary, including using the offensive weapons provided to it on Russian territory.

The West itself should also be prepared for anything, not just defending against Russian hybrid attacks but responding to them below the threshold of war. This includes cyberattacks on Russian systems and destabilizing Russia at a socio-political level.

Unfortunately, democratic countries face legal obstacles here. Unlike regimes like Russia and Belarus, there are limitations. Nevertheless, even within these constraints, policy must not be toothless, at least at the rhetorical level.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.