Executive summary
- Russia is pursuing an aggressive policy of election interference in the countries of the former USSR. In Moldova, where two rounds of presidential elections were held on October 20 and November 3, Russia sought to defeat the incumbent pro-European president Maia Sandu. In Georgia, where parliamentary elections were held on October 26, a victory for the ruling “Georgian Dream” party was in Russia’s interest. In both countries, Telegram served as a primary platform for disseminating pro-Russian narratives.
- We identified 133 political Telegram channels in Moldova, of which 98 maintain a critical stance towards pro-European president Maia Sandu. Most of these channels target Russian-speaking audiences, frequently referencing Russian politicians and publications from propaganda media. Between June and November, we identified over 1200 such reposts. Besides adopting Russian propaganda, these channels actively repost each other's content, forming interlinked networks.
- In the Georgian segment of Telegram, 38 of the 96 political channels support "Georgian Dream." A coordinated network exists among the channels related to the pro-Russian information portal "Alt-Info." This portal is affiliated with a television channel of the same name, which ceased broadcasting after the parliamentary elections, as well as with the Georgian political party "Conservative Movement," whose activities were banned in August 2024.
- Pro-Russian channels in both countries share ideological similarities – they oppose EU integration. In Moldova, they also oppose unionism – the movement advocating unification with Romania. Another trait of pro-Russian actors is exploiting the “Ukrainian scenario,” suggesting that if a country like Moldova or Georgia tries to get closer to the European Union, it could lead to a military confrontation with Russia. They blame this potential conflict on European-leaning politicians, labelling them as anti-Russian and controlled by Western powers.
- A common tactic of pro-Russian channels is to avoid expressing direct sympathy for Russia. Instead, they promote the benefits of neutrality for “ordinary citizens,” often arguing that better relations with Russia would benefit everyone economically. Another common theme is the defence of “traditional values,” typically expressed through an anti-LGBT agenda.
- We detected a 2-4 fold increase in bot activity on VK, one of Russia's most popular social networks, immediately after the elections in both Moldova and Georgia. In both cases, bots repeated themes from pro-Russian channels in Moldova and Georgia, attacking pro-European forces and accusing them of being "puppets" of the West. In Georgia, bots also described a scenario in which an opposition victory could lead to deteriorating relations with Russia, potentially escalating to renewed conflict and a repetition of the “Ukrainian scenario.”
Introduction
In a recent report, US intelligence stated that Russia uses information influence in other countries, including to undermine confidence in the institution of elections and representative democracy in general. Also, in 2023 the EU declared that they expect interference in the European elections by Russia and China “on an even larger scale.” Russia's influence in the West often takes the form of “soft power” – disinformation operations through its own or local media, whataboutism on political issues, or usage of local radical politicians to deepen cleavages within society.
On the other hand, in the countries of the former USSR, Russia is pursuing a much more aggressive policy, viewing them as the zone of influence and trying to intervene as much as possible. The Kremlin can subsequently transfer some of the methods developed in the post-Soviet countries to the West.
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At the end of October, elections took place in Moldova and Georgia. Russia is considering both countries to expand its own influence – through information operations and situational alliances with local pro-Russian forces, as well as through leveraging via occupied territories there.
There is a broad interference toolkit in Moldovan elections – from direct bribery of voters (according to Moldovan intelligence services, pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor spent 15 million euros to bribe 130 thousand voters) to information influence operations.
Georgia’s Ruling Party Installs Far-Right Loyalist as President Amid Ongoing Protests
For example, on October 11 Meta reported on the blocking of a network of inauthentic profiles on Facebook. The network had been calling to vote against Maia Sandu in the presidential elections and to say “no” in the EU integration referendum. Meta's review of information threats for the 2nd quarter of 2024 has already mentioned Russian information operations in Moldova precisely in the context of criticism of the current government.
As a result, the elections and referendum took place with Sandu receiving 42.3% of the votes in the first round. The support for European integration was at 50.38%. But the drama did not finish – the next day Sandu officially stated about external interference in the electoral process, calling it “an unprecedented attack on freedom and democracy.” Ultimately, the second round took place on November 3, in which Sandu won with 55.35%.
In Georgia, Russian influence is exercised through the ruling Georgian Dream party, whose founder is Bidzina Ivanishvili, an oligarch with business interests in Russia who formerly had Russian citizenship. Over the past few years, the Georgian parliament with the Georgian Dream majority has adopted a law on “foreign agents” copied from the Russian one, as well as a law banning “LGBT propaganda.”
“Georgian Dream” used the narrative about “foreign agents” in its election campaign. For example, a party and its affiliated media resources often used keywords such as “agents”, “external influence”, “revolution”, “intervention” to denote the opposition. Ultimately, Georgian Dream won the elections on October 26, gaining 53.94% of the vote. This allows the part to have a majority in the parliament and further access to policymaking. The opposition does not recognise these results, and some parties refuse from obtaining parliamentary mandates. Numerous protests were also held in Georgia, challenging the elections.
However, the situation in Georgia is different from Moldova, where there are popular and visible pro-Russian actors. In Georgia, the current government is trying to implement a “multi-vector policy.” For example, after the victory of the Georgian Dream in the elections, the current Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated that he has no plans to restore diplomatic relations with Russia. This happened against the background statements of the European Union to terminate the negotiation process for Georgia's accession to the union earlier that month.
On the other hand, in August 2024, the mentioned Meta removed a coordinated network in Georgia. Company indicated that the network of accounts was associated with a Russia-based legal entity that published content in support of Kobakhidze’s party.
In this text we will look at one of the dimensions of Russian interference in the information space of Moldova and Georgia – influence through pro-Russian Telegram channels. Also, we observed bot activity in Russian social media VK, which reflects the agenda of pro-Kremlin propaganda and aims at the Russian audience.
On the Right Bank of the Nistru: pro-Russian Channels in Moldova
Telegram Channels Network
On October 18, the news website curentmd published a false story claiming that President Maia Sandu had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and suffered regular panic attacks. The story was allegedly based on a “trusted contact” who obtained her medical report from an Austrian clinic. This false narrative was rapidly amplified by the Telegram channels balkancentre and gagauznewsmd, as well as Russian propaganda outlets like EurAsia Daily.
The story above is an example of a fake from pro-Russian Moldovan channels designed to discredit the current government in order to strengthen their own position. We found at least eight similar fake stories that were distributed through a network of such channels – from “the sale of the army to Romania” to the “call of the European Commission” to hang LGBT flags on state institutions in Moldova. The fakes appeared in the channels balkancentre, gagauznewsmd, primulinmd, gagauzia_v_efire, mv6566, gabrielcalin, e_tiraspol, smuglianka, newsmd24, pacalasitindala, insider_md.
In total, we found 133 Telegram channels in Moldova that publish political content. Of these, 98 channels (74%) take a critical position towards Maia Sandu and actively campaign against her re-election. 76% of these channels target Russian-speaking audiences in Moldova.
We assessed the audience distribution of the two political camps. However, our method has one limitation: the total number of subscribers includes duplicate subscriptions. For example, if one user subscribes to two or more pro-Russian resources, then we count each subscription as a unique user.
On channels opposed to Sandu, there are 9 times more subscribers than on those who support the current president. Also, channels that criticise Sandu have a significantly higher audience – the number of views of their posts is 14 times higher (645 million versus 45 million views during the observation period).
In addition to sources targeting the audience in the regions controlled by Moldova, we took into account 10 channels with a total of 102 098 subscribers whose audience is located in unrecognised “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic” – a region that claimed its “independence” from Moldova in the 1990s. We did this because residents of the “PMR” have Moldovan passports and, accordingly, the right to vote in elections in Moldova. The total number of subscribers of these channels is 9% of the total number of channel subscribers in our sample.
In most Telegram channels, regardless of political orientation, the number of subscribers correlates with the number of views. However, we found 10 channels that likely have some inauthentic subscribers. 7 of them are opposed to Sandu. One such channel, moldovanina, often refers to Russian officials – like this statement by Press Secretary of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova that the West is turning Moldova into a “silent slave.” In the context of elections, this channel refers to words of the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov that elections in Moldova are not democratic. Also, this channel published a fake that NATO countries are directly involved in the Russian-Ukrainian war. Another channel, np_inform, directly reposts Russian propaganda – RT about elections, TASS about the injury of a military correspondent Evgeny Poddubny, or the words of Ilan Shor in the quote by Vladimir Solovyov.
Ratio of subscribers number and average number of post views for political Telegram channels in Moldova
Channels criticising the current government and promoting the opposition exist in a closely-knit network. Like channels with a share of inauthentic subscribers, other channels of the network often repost content from Russian state media RIA Novosti, TASS, RT, Perviy Kanal, Rossiya 24, MIR 24, Zvezda TV, as well as Russian politicians and propagandists Dmitry Medvedev, Maria Zakharova, Margarita Simonyan, Vyacheslav Volodin, Vladimir Solovyov, Olga Skabeeva and others. We identified more than 1 200 such reposts. Also, these channels actively repost each other.
Channel moldova_acum, for example, quotes Maria Zakharova, who spoke about “cleansing the information field” reflecting on the refusal of accreditation for a RIA Novosti employee to cover the elections. The salutmd channel referred to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who said that NATO is “trying to capture Moldova.” Another channel, fluieras, quotes Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev in the context of the Moldovan initiative to recognize the famine in Moldova after the Second World War as genocide, and the proposal to ban the Russian Orthodox Church in Moldova. He ironically calls the initiative as “written off the Ukrainian manual”.
Some of the channels critical of the president form information clusters, which are characterised not only by reposts of each other, but also by connections with specific political figures.
At the centre of one of these clusters is the channel of the pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor and the TV6 channel controlled by him, the Moldovan version of Perviy Kanal, Channel Five, Arguments and Facts, and Sputnik.
The second big cluster consists of the channels associated with the former journalist Gabriel Călin. He previously worked for the fugitive Moldovan oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. In 2024, Călin was spotted at an event in Moscow dedicated to the creation of the NGO “Eurasia”, initiated by Ilan Shor.
One of the clusters was particularly active in reposting each other, although being disconnected from other parts of the networks. This cluster is not affiliated with political figures in Moldova as well. It consists of the anonymous channels “United Moldova”, “Gagauzia on Air”, “Moldovan Mole”, “Moldova Online”, “Moldova Now”. This cluster attracted the attention of Meta, which banned this cluster on Facebook due to spreading misinformation. The content of these channels is no different from other clusters – criticising Sandu, scepticism related to the European Union, and supporting pro-Russian political forces.
Key Topics of the Network
Most of the political content of opposition channels consists of news pieces that portray the current government in a negative way. In addition to general criticism of the current government and the expression of Euroscepticism, these channels mention energy security – this topic accounts for 11% content. This is related to the fact that most of Moldova’s electricity comes from the Cuciurgan power station, which is located in the uncontrolled “PMR”. Moreover, Sandu is accused of the fact that electricity in Moldova is becoming more expensive, but Moldova continues to purchase energy from Romania (implicitly pointing out that it is better to buy cheaper energy from Russia).
Another focus of pro-Russian channels is economic, and 7% of the content is devoted to it. For example, a channel primulinmd wrote that Sandu “wants to leave Moldova poor.” Channel vedomostimd accuses Sandu of the rise in food prices. Channel e_tiraspol uses IMF data on GDP growth rate to argue for the economic strength of BRICS – a part of a broader narrative that Moldova needs to reconsider its foreign policy.
Political Context
Pro-Russian narratives are an important element of Moldova’s information field. They have gained new strength since 2022, after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For example, there was a spike of xenophobic content about Ukrainian refugees. Another example is large-scale advertising campaigns supporting Ilan Shor. Also, pro-Russian blogger Tudor Șoilița, addressing Sandu in one of his videos, claimed that she wants to drag Moldova into a war so that the country “repeats the fate of Ukraine.”
In addition to the information dimension, Russian influence in Moldova dates back to the declaration of its independence in 1991. Russia has a military presence of “peacekeepers” on the territory of the unrecognised “Transnistrian Moldavian Republic” – a quasi-state entity on the left bank of the Nistru river, which declared “independence” during the collapse of the USSR. Since the mid-1990s, when the combat between Moldova and the “PMR” was frozen, the latter has been a lever of pressure on Chisinau.
In addition to the “PMR”, the region of Russian influence in Moldova is Gagauzia, a region that received autonomy in the 1990s. Recent examples of influence include transferring financial support for local pensioners in cooperation with Shor, the Russian NGO Eurasia and the Russian bank Promsvyazbank. Marina Tauber, a member of the Moldovan Parliament from the Shor party, directly declared that this “collaboration” exists. Also, the region periodically play a separatism “wild card” when it comes to pro-European sentiments in Moldova. Moreover, the head of the region at the moment is Evghenia Guțul, a representative of the Shor party, who went to Russia in March 2024 and met with Vladimir Putin. Putin, in turn, allegedly “promised to provide support” to Gagauzia.
“Kremlin Dream”: pro-Russian Telegram channels in Georgia
Telegram Channels Network
In the Georgian segment of Telegram, we found 96 channels writing about politics. The majority of channels, 54%, write in Georgian, the rest are published in Russian and are aimed at both Russian-speaking citizens of Georgia and Russian migrants.
We checked the channels for support of the ruling Georgian Dream party and opposition to Georgia’s European integration, since these two factors do not always coincide, but are a marker of attitudes towards Russia. As a result, we identified that more than 40% of channels support Georgian Dream or promote a narrative against Georgia’s European integration. Only seven channels reposted Russian media outlets such as Sputnik, RVvoenkor, News Kremlin, Rybar, RBC, Soloviev Live, Tsargrad TV, and others. In total, we identified approximately 50 such reposts. In terms of total subscribers count, channels opposed to Georgian Dream have 343 439 subscribers – this is 2.3 times more than the channels supporting the party and anti-EU channels combined.
Among Georgian channels there is the most active cluster, which accounts for 35% of publications. It is associated with Alt-Info – a radical pro-Russian media holding, created in 2019 as a TV channel. Over the 5 years of its existence, this channel has become a hub of xenophobic rhetoric, attracting Georgian political fringes. In 2020, Meta removed Alt-Info resources from Facebook for spreading misinformation and hate speech against LGBT people. The political party "Conservative Movement," founded in 2021, is affiliated with Alt-Info. In April 2024, the Georgian Central Election Commission declined to register this party for the parliamentary elections. In September 2024, the US imposed sanctions against the founders of the holding, Konstantin Morgoshii and Zurab Makharadze, for “serious human rights abuse.”
A distinctive feature of Alt Info is its positioning as an anti-system force. They criticise both the policies of the Georgian Dream and the foreign policy of former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was an opponent of the Georgian Dream.
Key Topics of the Networks
In the Georgian-language segment of Telegram 12% of content has a strong anti-EU character, the main driver of which is channels associated with Alt-Info. For example, the channel of shotamartinenko, co-founder of the holding, connects “European future” with depopulation and inevitable death. Channel politnewsn1, which regularly reposts “Alt Info”, indicates that European integration will certainly lead to the spiritual decay of citizens. And the channel of one of the leaders of the “Conservative Movement” giorgikardava asserts that the law on “foreign agents” will not be able to effectively counter pro-European forces in the country, so more effective measures are needed.
The Russian-language segment of Telegram is also sceptical about Georgia's European integration. For example, the shotaapkhaidze channel, responding to EU criticism of the laws on “foreign agents” and the ban on “LGBT propaganda”, writes that the European Union does not respect the sovereignty of Georgia. He ends his thought with the phrase “we are not interested in such European Union.” georgiafacts channel ponders that it is beneficial for the European Union to bring “the most loyal government” to power to protect “all their liberal values.”
Another topic of the Russian-language segment is content aimed at delegitimisation opposition, it occupies 30% of the total number of publications. For example, channel dezhurniy on election day posted about “provocations” from the opposition. GeoSosedi channel borrows the wording of the Georgian mayor’s office, which called the opposition “liberal fascists.” The above-mentioned georgiafacts accuses Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili in a “prearranged” negotiations with the opposition if the latter wins the elections.
One of the central themes in pro-government Georgian channels (both in the Russian-language and Georgian-language segments) is avoiding a war with Russia – it appeared in 17% of content. Georgian Dream blames its political opponents for starting the war with Russia in 2008 and presents itself as a force that intends to keep the country from being drawn into a new conflict. In this regard, the case of Ukraine is used as an illustration of what will happen if Georgian voters choose the opposition. For example, beqanews channel borrows the words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that the West, through the hands of the opposition, is “trying to open a second front against Russia” in Georgia.
Speaking about the opposition, the channels predicted possible unrest and provocations supported by the West via interference in the electoral process. realitypill channel in this regard published an entire conspiracy theory about how the opposition will carry out a coup d’etat, for which it is preparing, among other things, by brainwashing Georgian citizens.
The network's messages also highlight the government's economic achievements and its close relationship with the Georgian Patriarchate in upholding traditional values. For example, the georgiafacts channel praises the current government for significantly reducing the unemployment rate in Georgia, and the eurasiaexpress channel highlights the church’s high appreciation of the law about “LGBT propaganda” adopted in the parliament.
Pro-government Georgian channels also contain a significant topic of coverage of the events of the war in Ukraine, which is presented in the context of the superiority of the Russian army over the Ukrainian one, as well as the inability of Ukraine’s allies to provide any significant assistance in this war. Moreover, the channels’ content contains messages that sanctions against Russia only worsen the Georgian economy.
Political Context
In Georgia, as in Moldova, part of the country is occupied by Russia. Since 2008, two regions in northern Georgia have been under occupation. They exist in the form of unrecognised states – the “Republic of Abkhazia” and the “Republic of South Ossetia”.
Since the 2008 war, Georgia has experienced a rollback from the European integration process. Although the ruling Georgian Dream party declares the importance of maintaining relations with the European Union, in reality its policies largely contradict the practices of integration with the EU.
There is also a high degree of polarisation in Georgia, which is exploited by both Russian propaganda and media resources loyal to the Georgian Dream. Forces opposed to the ruling party are often represented as “war parties” that will lead the country to a new escalation and direct military conflict with Russia.
Russia's influence is visible in Georgia primarily through the regulatory activities of government bodies. In the spring of 2024, the Georgian parliament adopted a law on “foreign agents,” which is designed to make local non-governmental organisations more “transparent.” Under the terms of this law, all organisations that have more than 20% of their funding from abroad are recognised as “agents of foreign influence.” This norm is copied from a similar Russian law. The same applies to the activities of the current government in relation to LGBT people – the government restricts the rights of sexual minorities in every possible way.
VK bot activity increased significantly on election days
We have studied bot activity on VKontakte in the context of elections in Georgia and Moldova, despite the fact that it is primarily aimed at domestic Russian audiences. Messages spread by bots can serve as an indicator of what narratives the propaganda is promoting. This allows us to compare them with the content of pro-Russian actors outside Russia.
Since June 1, we identified the active usage of bots on the social network VK. They published almost 900 publications about the elections in Moldova and 1 600 about the elections in Georgia, according to the project Botnadzor. Of these, 90% were comments on news publications. Among all comments on news about the Moldovan elections, the percentage of bots was 5% and 1.5% on the Georgian elections.
The peak of bot activity occurred on October 21, the day after the first round of elections in Moldova, when the number of comments doubled compared to voting day. Similar behaviour of bots was recorded for the Georgian elections: their activity significantly increased by 4 times two days after the vote.
Among bot comments on the elections in Moldova, almost 80% were devoted to criticism of President Maia Sandu and her pro-Western course, her “undercover work” for the United States, drawing Moldova into the confrontation between the West and Russia, comparisons with Ukraine, and accusations of Sandu’s undemocratic methods of fighting her opponents and economic problems. Bots also questioned the fairness of the EU integration referendum.
- The influence of the West is obvious, Sandu is a pro-Western bitch, people are only getting poorer, and she keeps screaming about Europe
- In short, it’s clear. Moldova is following the crooked path of Ukraine. Well it's their choice
- It is clear that the elections will be rigged, Sandu will not play by the rules
- The results of the referendum and elections have, in fact, already been determined. We already know how many voted and for what, without illusions, friends: everything was decided in advance. If you don’t take any action now, you can safely say goodbye to the independent republic. Everything else is just an appearance until the X hour, and then we will all be sent to NATO.
Another 7% of comments consisted of fake messages about members of Sandu’s team: for example, about the homosexual relations of Moldovan Foreign Minister Popșoi or the dissemination of a video of Economy Minister Dumitru Alaiba in the company of naked women in a sauna.
70% of bot comments on the Georgian elections are devoted to topics of Western influence on the voting result and its attempts to reverse the course of the elections, and also contain many references to Ukraine and a possible escalation of relations with Russia. In bot messages, the victory of the Georgian Dream party is a choice that will allow Georgia to avoid war.
- Nobody wants to repeat the Ukrainian mistake; everyone should understand perfectly well that we need to be friends with our neighbours, and everything will be fine with us.
- Yes. The Americans will not allow the former Soviet republics to exist in peace. This is unrealistic for them. They crawl everywhere with their noses. Georgia is just one of the countries, as well as Moldova, Armenia, Belarus. They don’t live in peace, they don’t want to let them improve relations with Russia
Similar themes are shared by Russian propaganda media. In the case of Moldova, Russian propaganda had two main themes – delegitimisation of elections as rigged and critique of Sandu’s policy (23%), as well as fitting the elections into the geopolitical context and the struggle for influence between Russia and the West (35%).
A separate topic, unique to Moldova, is content dedicated to polling stations in Russia, namely to reducing their number. Russian propaganda often pointed out that the reduction connected with Moldova’s deliberate desire to worsen relations with Russia.
In the context of Georgia, Russian propaganda demonised the opposition in the same way as the ruling power in Moldova – 36% of the content is devoted to this. Propaganda calls opposition the “puppets of the West” and declares about the opposition’s plans to carry out a coup d’etat if the Georgian Dream wins.
Conclusions
Pro-Russian narratives in Moldova and Georgia have certain similarities - they are directed against integration with the EU and call for an imaginary “neutrality”. In addition, both countries use the threat of escalation of territorial conflicts with Russia, referring to the Russian-Ukrainian war as a warning. In this matter, pro-Russian channels call their opponents “Russophobes” and "party of war".
At the same time, similar narratives are used in completely different ways. In Moldova, campaigns are aimed at discrediting the current government, personalised by Maia Sandu and the Action and Solidarity party. In Georgia, pro-Russian channels support the status quo in the form of the power of the Georgian Dream party, despite the facade of “European integration” and “anti-Russianism.” Accordingly, in the Moldovan case the transparency and integrity of the elections are criticised, while in the Georgian case, on the contrary, their legitimacy is emphasised.
Although the presidential elections in Moldova did not align with the Kremlin’s expectations, in some regions the pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo scored 80% of the votes or higher . Parliamentary elections are ahead, they should take place no later than July 11, 2025. We expect that Russia will try to influence them too, because in the current parliament, Sandu’s Action and Solidarity party has a majority.
In the case of Georgia it was possible to save the status quo, which is satisfactory for Russia. International organisations, including the OSCE, stated about violations of the electoral process. Also, according to the OSCE representative, these elections became an indicator of what is called a “democratic backsliding”. In the near future, Georgia may repeat the fate of Belarus until 2022 – thus, being a Russian satellite that tries to play “multi-vector” through maintaining formal ties with the West (and being a useful ally to evade sanctions).
Methodology
Moldova: we collected all messages from 133 political Telegram channels from June 1 to November 2, 2024 (the list of channels is below), 101 published in Russian. The list of these channels was compiled based on Tgstat data, keyword searches and reposts. We also collected data from 40 000 posts and comments on VK using a set of keywords about the Moldovan elections.
Georgia: we collected all messages from 96 political Telegram channels from June 1 to October 29, 2024 (the list of channels is below), 44 published in Russia. The list of these channels has been compiled thanks to the Telemetr.io service – we have collected a longlist from the categories “news” and “politics”. Afterwards, we removed the irrelevant channels. We also collected data from 180 thousand posts and comments on VK using a set of keywords about the Georgian elections.
We employed a topic modelling technique and clusterisation to distinguish different types of channels, as well as for discovering common patterns in large collections of texts. This method facilitated the identification of primary document clusters (document groups based on the similarity of their contents). Short summaries were generated for each cluster with a GPT 3.5-Turbo language model. A combination of these techniques provided our research team with a high-level overview of online discourse around all four topics.
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