Exclusive: Former Polish President on Ukraine, Putin’s Imperial Obsession (Part 1)

This exclusive interview with Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the former two-term Polish president (1995-2005), covers recent events in Ukraine, Russia and Poland. The ex-president was heavily involved in Ukrainian affairs during his presidency and remains so to this day. The interview covered what went on behind the scenes during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity and whether the subsequent Russo-Ukrainian War could have been avoided.

Here is the first part of the interview.

You were President of Poland for two terms, and Polish-Ukrainian relations were very intensive during this time. How did cooperation with your partners in Kyiv develop during this time?

I was elected President of Poland in 1995 when Leonid Kuchma was the President of Ukraine. Polish-Ukrainian relations are historically complicated and yet strategically important. I decided to be very active and support an independent Ukraine. The 10 years of my presidency were a period of extraordinary activity in this direction.

There were many visits, both official and unofficial, as well as numerous conferences, business meetings, and cooperation between universities. At the beginning of my first term, together with President Kuchma, we signed a joint declaration in May 1997 “On Understanding and Reconciliation.”

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Kuchma was an excellent partner - he was heavily Sovietized, but he had a full Ukrainian national consciousness and knew the Ukrainian language. At the same time, he had a distance from Ukrainian nationalism, which made conversations with him go well.

The most significant event at that time was the 2004 Orange Revolution during which, together with Javier Solana (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and Valdas Adamkus (the President of Lithuania), you played a mediating role. How did this process unfold?

I wouldn't have been able to play the role of mediator effectively if it weren't for the contacts and knowledge I had gathered. After Kuchma's term ended, the first round of presidential elections took place. From the very beginning, I advised the outgoing president to maintain a distance from both competing groups.

I told him in conversation, “It so happens that two of your former prime ministers, Yushchenko and Yanukovych, are running in the election. Make sure to position yourself in such a way that, regardless of the election results, you will be in the winning camp, thus preserving your influence.”

Throughout my activities, I maintained relationships with both people in power and the opposition. I knew all of them well.

Kuchma was an excellent partner - he was heavily Sovietized, but he had a full Ukrainian national consciousness and knew the Ukrainian language. 

When the crisis began and protesters gathered on Kyiv's Maidan square, President Kuchma called me. The timing was surprising to me - 3 a.m. During this conversation, Kuchma was very nervous and asked for my help. He wanted me to come to Kyiv because the situation threatened bloodshed. He repeatedly emphasized that he didn’t want blood on his hands. I understood the seriousness of the situation. Those advocating for a forceful solution were exerting strong influence on Kuchma. I decided to get involved.

Early in the morning, I consulted with my team and organized a group that included Stanisław Ciosek and Jacek Kluczkowski. They went to Kyiv to assess the situation. Meanwhile, I began working on elevating my involvement to a European level. I wanted to avoid the accusations that were already being made then and now - that the Ukrainian dispute is a conflict between two empires, Russian and Polish.

The truth is that Russian imperialism indeed exists, while the Polish one ended a long time ago.

I contacted Javier Solana, with whom I had become friends when he was Spain's Foreign Minister, before he became NATO Secretary General. He agreed to get involved. Next, I asked for support from the then-President of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus, with whom I also had close relations. As an older and respectable man, he was to be a guarantor of calm conditions. It was also advantageous that Lithuania doesn’t border Ukraine.

We arrived together in Kyiv on Dec. 1, 2004. It was snowing and the demonstrations had paralyzed the city. Kuchma was staying at the residence in Koncha Zaspa near Kyiv. We started the talks. I told him that the best solution was to organize a round table under his patronage. Participants would include people from Yanukovych's camp, Yushchenko's camp, and us. Kuchma agreed to this mode of negotiations.

The next question was whether to invite the Russian side to the talks. I supported this idea - if an EU and Polish representative were involved, the Russian representative should also be there.

Kuchma went out to call Putin. After a while, he returned and said that Putin agreed to the conditions and pointed to Boris Yeltsin as the Russian representative. There was silence on our side, and then I said that this was out of the question. All of us involved were active politicians holding office, and Yeltsin was retired. Not only for protocol reasons was this format unacceptable - I knew Yeltsin well and was certain that with his involvement, nothing would come of it. The talks would end in complete misunderstanding.

Was an agreement reached with the Russian side?

Yes, Kuchma called Putin again and explained the situation. Putin appointed Boris Gryzlov, who was the Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, as the Russian representative. He was also a difficult figure.

A much more constructive person turned out to be Viktor Chernomyrdin, the then-Russian ambassador to Kyiv and former prime minister, whom I also knew very well. An agreement was reached on the format of the round table.

I proposed the Mariinsky Palace in Kyiv as the venue for the talks. Kuchma's advisors didn't like this location due to the lack of heating. I replied that since the people on Maidan were freezing, we could too.

As preparations for the meeting began, we received news that several thousand miners from Donetsk were on their way to Kyiv. They were supposed to deal with the protesters on Maidan. The situation was becoming dangerous.

I decided to contact Yanukovych, who was associated with the miners. After several unsuccessful attempts, I managed to reach him. I told him that if he didn't stop the miners, it could end in civil war. I also threatened that if he didn't pull them back, we would break off the talks and go to Brussels, where we would hold a press conference and present our view of the situation. All the responsibility would fall on Yanukovych.

Fortunately, he came to his senses and withdrew the miners. The talks took place, and the outcome is well known.

I'm not convinced that Ukraine made the most of the opportunity it received after the Orange Revolution

You were involved in Ukrainian affairs even after your second term ended, including during the Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan) in late 2013-2014, which was perceived as Ukraine's final break from Russian influence. During that time, you also took on the role of mediator between Yanukovych and the protesters. Witnesses claim that you managed to prevent further bloodshed, which kept the number of victims of the Heavenly Hundred from being higher. How did these events unfold?

I don't want to take credit for stopping the bloodshed, but I am proud that during that crisis, I managed to facilitate the repeat of the second round of elections.

Unfortunately, I'm not convinced that Ukraine made the most of the opportunity it received after the Orange Revolution, but that's another topic. I know Ukraine and its history well. I know both politicians and ordinary citizens. My knowledge and involvement in Ukrainian affairs became my recognizable hallmark worldwide.

During Yanukovych's tenure, Ukraine was supposed to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. At the same time, Yanukovych imprisoned Yulia Tymoshenko and several other politicians.

I told Yanukovych directly that he was making a historic mistake and knowing the moods of young Ukrainians, depriving them of a European perspective would be a disaster.

Discussions were held with Mykola Azarov, the then Prime Minister, and Martin Schulz, the then President of the European Parliament. A solution was sought, and the idea emerged to create a European group that would assist in implementing pro-European reforms and help free Tymoshenko and the others. Help was sought from me and Pat Cox, an Irish liberal who was a former President of the European Parliament.

From 2012 to 2013, we led a special mission under the auspices of the European Parliament. Our mission involved aiding judicial reforms and securing the release of the aforementioned political prisoners. It was a delicate and challenging task. What was interesting was the combination of Cox and me. I knew Ukraine inside out, while he was visiting the country for the first time and discovering it.

I recall our first visit to a court in Kharkiv, which involved Yulia Tymoshenko, who was in the hospital at the time. She was represented by her lawyer, who aggressively challenged the court during the hearing. After it ended, Cox, who didn't speak Ukrainian, asked me if what he was told was true. I confirmed it. He was astonished and remarked that if an attorney behaved like that in an Irish courtroom, they would be penalized!

I explained the situation - this was the first opportunity for Tymoshenko's lawyers to speak out, which led them to perhaps overstep their bounds a bit.

Nevertheless, our duo did good work - we managed to secure the release of Yuriy Lutsenko and Valeriy Ivashchenko. As for Tymoshenko herself, we saved her life - she wouldn't spend that time in harsh imprisonment. Ukrainian prisons were severe and did not meet modern standards - the last investments related to them were made by Pyotr Stolypin, that is, during the imperial period.

However, the issue of releasing political prisoners was not the only concern - significant work was also done on negotiating the Association Agreement with the European Union.

Indeed, unfortunately, the Association Agreement with the European Union wasn’t signed. We concluded our talks with Yanukovych and his team in 2013. To understand these events, one should look at Yanukovych's meeting with Putin in Sochi on Dec. 6, 2013.

We don't have [access to] any public documents, but in my opinion, Putin exerted serious pressure on Yanukovych, as a result of which Yanukovych backed out of signing the Association Agreement with the European Union.

The signing of this agreement was supposed to take place at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius at the end of November 2013. I told Yanukovych directly that he was making a historic mistake and knowing the moods of young Ukrainians, depriving them of a European perspective would be a disaster. They would protest against his regime and demand a European course. That's how Euromaidan began.

If there was a window to prevent the Russian invasion in 2022, it was during the years 2002-2004

In 2001, during a conference with President Kuchma in Łańcut, you said: “The more Ukraine is in Europe, the safer Europe is.” In a sense, these words turned out to be prophetic. Could there have been a way to avoid a full-scale invasion in February 2022?

Just a few years ago, I might have said that it was possible, but today I believe it wasn't. The idea of rebuilding a Greater Russia had been maturing in Putin for a long time. It became so strong that he would have done anything to sabotage any pro-European and pro-Western actions by Ukraine. He wanted to pull Ukraine into Russia's sphere of influence.

If any mistake was made, it was during the early Putin years, from 2002 to 2004. Discussions were ongoing then about Ukraine's NATO membership perspective, but Russia wasn’t passive. Russian services were involved, for instance, in the “Kolchuga Affair” (2000-2002), which was aimed at derailing Ukraine's NATO aspirations. If there was a window to prevent the Russian invasion in 2022, it was during the years 2002-2004, not later.

Certainly, the Orange Revolution played a crucial role. In my view, it triggered two strong reactions from Putin.

Firstly, he realized that Ukraine could turn Westward, which would undermine his concept of reintegrating Ukraine into the Russian empire.

Secondly, he saw that the voice of the people could count. Ukrainians demonstrated this by protesting against electoral fraud and demanding democratic reforms

Putin was deeply afraid of the success of a democratic Ukraine, which could become an example for Russia. If democracy could be established in a large post-Soviet country like Ukraine, why couldn't it happen in Russia?

I believe the Orange Revolution was a watershed experience for Putin. Unfortunately, in this sense, avoiding Russian aggression proved impossible.