James Sherr: It is time we stopped praising Ukraine for ‘exercising restraint’

James Sherr, a fellow at the Russian and
Eurasian program at London-based think tank Chatham House and a Western
analyst on security issues in Ukraine and Russia, is critical of the Ukrainian leadership’s weak response.

Like Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
former adviser, Andrey Illarionov, Sherr believes that if Ukraine
wants the West to defend it, the country should start defending itself more
actively, including militarily.

Sherr also offers advice on
what Kyiv, Brussels and Washington should to do to stop Russia and to defend
Ukraine.

Kyiv
Post: You recently stated that Vladimir Putin’s objective is to make Ukraine
ungovernable and subordinate it. Does this view still hold now?

James Sherr: Yes, it does, and it has been
borne out by events.  One need only look
at the official Russian blueprint for settling the crisis. It makes the composition of its
government and its system of foreign relations subject to Russia’s consent. It includes a form of ‘federalisation’ that grants Ukrainian oblasts,
amongst other powers, the right to conduct their own foreign relations.  Accept that demand and you accept the
creation of six or seven new Transnistrias on Ukrainian territory.

Secondly, Russia’s objectives are borne out
by the damage inflicted on Ukraine months, in some areas years before the
invasion of Crimea began, and the depth of this corrosive work has only become
apparent in recent weeks.  Effectively,
Ukraine’s new authorities took over a state without a brain and without many
functioning ligaments. Important records and means of communication were destroyed
or compromised with Russian help during the final days of the (Viktor) Yanukovych
regime. Over the years, the Armed Forces have been systematically plundered. Military
(and civilian) command-and-control has been ruptured. The networks sustaining
the old oligarchical structures of eastern Ukraine have been eroded by the
joint work of the Yanukovych ‘family,’ local criminal structures and Russian GRU
[Russian military intelligence] and FSB [Russia’s Federal Security Service]. As
long ago as 2005 the latter entities began a systematic effort to finance and suborn
Security Service of
Ukraine (SBU) and Ukraine’s
Interior Ministry officers, and the cumulative damage has been considerable.  So the new heads of SBU and Ministry of the
Interior, as well as governors Ihor Kolomoysky and Serhiy Taruta are starting
almost from scratch.

Third, Russian objectives are confirmed by
the operations taking place at present: 
by the presence of hundreds of Russian special service officers who now
operate out of uniform in eastern and southern regions. They not only conduct
provocations and acts of brutality in their own right, but provide coordination
and finance for ‘self-defence’ forces, some of which are Blackwater-type forces
in disguise.

KP: By
Blackwater-like, you mean private security firms?

I mean private security firms that, unlike
their Western counterparts, not only have a contractual relationship with the
state, but are subordinate to it and to the military chain of command. It’s
hardly incidental that remnants of the [Ukraine’s former riot police units] Berkut who left the country have now reconstituted
themselves as a security firm under the same name, headquartered in Moscow.

Finally, Russian objectives are confirmed
by operations designed to intimate what might
take place:  by the massing of new
rapid-reaction forces on Ukraine’s borders, long-range weaponry, and the odd
raid here and there—all of it intended to maintain an atmosphere of
apprehension and suspense about ‘what Putin will do next’.

The political aims seem perfectly clear:  to make Ukraine ungovernable, to break it up de facto and de jure, to ensure that elections will not be national elections. If they succeed in these objectives, it will be
impossible for today’s so-called ‘illegitimate’ government to legitimise itself
or any democratically chosen successor. The economic aims are equally clear: to
destroy macro-economic order and deny investors (and the IMF) the
predictability they require for investment and assistance.

But when I spoke a month ago about Russian
objectives, I did not anticipate the annexation of Crimea.  I assumed that its occupation was simply a
bargaining chip in the battle for Ukraine. 
This is a battle for Ukraine, indeed
a war, but Crimea’s annexation has to change everybody’s calculus.  Up to that point, everything that occurred was
predictable. There was a coherent ‘normative basis’:  military doctrines, foreign policy concepts,
the ‘law on compatriots.’ There also were precedents and alleged precedents:
Abkhazia, South Osetia, Kosovo. But there are no precedents for annexation, and
Russia’s state documents on national security provide no ‘normative basis’ for
it. In his speech to the Federal Assembly, Putin referred six times to Kosovo,
but how is the independence of the one [becomes] a precedent for the annexation
of the other?

And even where there are precedents, they
are highly dubious. In 1999 NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia (and, for that
matter, the 2008 Russia-Georgia war) were preceded by months of diplomatic
activity (not to say ethnic conflicts) and in the former case by UN resolutions
censuring [former Yugoslav leader Slobodan] Milosevic. Yet between the signing
of the 1997 Russia-Ukraine State Treaty, which recognised Ukraine’s territorial
integrity, and the departure of Yanukovych, Russia did not once challenge Ukraine’s
sovereignty over Crimea in the UN or anywhere else.  For 17 years, it saw no threat to Russian
compatriots worth raising in any international forum.  Yet now we are asked to believe that between
21 February and 18 March, a threat not only materialised, but assumed such a
magnitude that annexation was the only appropriate response.  If you believe that, you will believe
anything. The only possible analogy with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo lies in
is its alleged illegality.  By drawing
this parallel, is Putin acknowledging that Russia’s annexation of Crimea is
illegal?

After March 18, all bets are off about
conflict in this region. 

Like Hitler, Putin says there will be no more
annexations, but why not? There are other ‘Russian’ entities, like
Transnistria, that have the same aspirations and other parts of Ukraine where
‘Russian compatriots’ face the same so-called threats from ‘radicals,’
‘fascists’ and the West. Why should Russia’s ‘principled’ policy not apply
there?  As long as no force stands in
Russia’s way, the possibility of further interventions and annexations will
arise at any time of Moscow’s choosing.

KP: The legality of Russia’s annexation of Crimea is questionable, but the fact remains
– Russia controls Crimea now. Will Putin stop there or he’ll go further into
the south and east, trying to get a loyal or controlled government in Kyiv?

JS: You might think its legality is
questionable.  But it’s not questionable to
the Ukrainian government, the European Union or the United Nations Secretary General. Who is going to
recognise this annexation? 
Argentina?  Maybe, but it hasn’t
done so yet. China? It won’t.

Where will Putin stop? The answer is simple:
when he achieves his objectives or when he is prevented from achieving them. A
number of Ukraine’s Western partners understand this, but some do not.  Many still put their faith in diplomacy, and
until the middle of this month, diplomacy and the ‘threat’ of sanctions defined
the West’s response. For many in our political and foreign policy
establishments, diplomacy is a narcotic, and they cannot live without it.  Alongside this dependency, other preoccupations
have arisen. One is ‘de-escalation,’ as if what is required on our part is a
form of ‘anger management.’ For Moscow, this is a very useful theme because it
shifts the focus from what has happened today to what might happen tomorrow. It
also puts as much of an onus on Ukraine as on Russia. We should recall the
warnings issued to Poland by British and French envoys in the days before war
broke out in 1939: ‘don’t provoke Germany.’ Once again, there are those in
Europe who believe that Ukraine should restrain itself rather than defend
itself. 

Diplomacy is not a form of medication. It
is a tool of policy. Until there is an objective, there is no policy.  What is the West’s objective, the end state we
want to achieve? Until we know the answer to that question, we should not be
conducting diplomacy, not least with a country like Russia that knows what it
wants, believes it knows how to get it and believes it is in a position of
strength as well.  Russia will change its
policy when its power structures conclude that its present course is harming
the country’s interests and their own. That will be the time for diplomacy.

KP:
You are arguing that Ukraine and the West should respond with strength to
Russian aggression. What do you think Ukraine and the West should do to keep
Putin out of Ukraine?

JS: First, let us be clear about the
objective, one that Ukraine and the West should share.  It should not be to punish Russia, deserving
of punishment as it is.  It should be to
revive Ukraine: to reconstitute the state, its sovereignty, control of its
borders, its macro-economic stability, security services and armed forces,
rebuild its institutions and, of course, do this on a democratic and
rules-governed basis.  That will punish
Russia amply, because on this basis, it will fail in its primary objective: to
subordinate Ukraine to its will.

Alongside this objective, we should
redouble and consolidate our efforts to diminish our energy dependency on
Russia: yours and ours. On the EU’s part, that means implementing and enforcing
the provisions of the Third Energy Package, completing the steps (such as
pipeline interconnectors) we have signed up to since 2007 and strengthening the
instruments of the European Energy Community, of which Ukraine is a part. On
Ukraine’s side, it means deep and sustained reform of the energy sector and
internal energy markets.  Only on this
basis will Ukraine attract the investment it needs to develop its considerable
indigenous hydrocarbon resources.  And
finally, we must take serious and considered (rather than showy or provocative)
steps to revive NATO as a serious military instrument in Europe.  At some point in this process, I suspect
sooner rather than later, Russia’s elites and the Russian people will be forced
to take stock of the economic and political consequences of their actions.

Sanctions matter. But they matter much more
in the context of a strategy to revive Ukraine and re-establish security in
east-central Europe.  How does Russia
profit if, in exchange for its recovery of Crimea, it loses Ukraine—not to say
investor confidence, a strong rouble, a fair portion of its energy market and
very possibly the South Stream pipeline as well? These are far more serious
sanctions than asset freezes and visa bans. Even if the West’s measures prove
half-hearted and disappointing, my sense is that we already have reached the
point where a return to ‘business as usual’ is impossible. Sooner or later, Russia
will feel this, and somebody in Russia will have to account for it.

Where Ukraine is concerned, Carlyle’s
dictum deserves repeating for the umpteenth time:  ‘If I am not for myself, who will be for me?’
As an outsider, I am baffled by the authorities’ failure to formally declare
that a state of war exists. The Armed Forces and the country need to hear this.
Ukraine has been attacked and invaded. Its assets and military bases have been
seized, centres of power have been occupied, and its navy has been
destroyed.  Although the new authorities are
becoming more decisive, there still is a perilous lack of clarity. To this day,
I’m not sure that soldiers and their commanders know what is expected of them. Here,
I am the first to agree that the West has not helped. It is time we stopped
praising Ukraine for ‘exercising restraint’. Our message must be:  ‘Ukraine has the right and obligation to
defend its armed forces, its citizens and its territory, and in this it can
count on our full support.’ Hesitation in Ukraine reinforces hesitation in the
West and vice versa. Those who say,
in so many words, ‘we should not be focusing on Crimea, only on the elections’
are doing untold damage to the country.

KP: Are
you referring to Yulia Tymoshenko?

JS: Names don’t help here, and the folly I
referred to is not confined to one person. But it is folly to suggest that the war can be set aside until a
politically convenient moment arises. Ukraine did not start the war. The war
has come to Ukraine.

KP: So,
you agree with the view of Putin’s former adviser Andrey Illarionov who said
that if Ukraine wants the West to defend it, Ukraine should start defending
itself?

JS: Ukraine is getting assistance from the
West now, more than most people realise, and it will continue to augment. But assistance
will come much more readily if Europe sees that Ukraine is taking the hard and
necessary steps—and not just military ones— to defend itself. More importantly,
Russia needs to see that Ukraine will defend itself, whatever it takes.

This is not a soft power contest. War is a
tool of policy, but it is also war, and as Clausewitz said, it has its own
syntax. Economic and institutional reforms take time to work, and they won’t
work if, by the time of the elections, half the country is transformed de facto into Novorossiya [lands north of the Black Sea incorporated into the Russian
Empire by Catherine II]. Ukraine and the West have a few months to change the
dynamic: not to prevail, mind you, but change the dynamic. If we do that, our
struggle becomes easier, and Russia’s becomes more difficult. Russia’s
strengths are short-term. Like Hitler, Putin fights short wars. He is a
treacherously agile tactician who tries to gain strategic advantage from
tactical steps. But in a prolonged contest with Ukraine and the West, Russia’s
weaknesses will prove telling. The challenge is to get to that point. We need
to reach what Churchill called ‘the end of the beginning.’ And we will do so
only if Ukraine and the West raise their game.

It is frustrating that in these conditions
of national emergency, some are still pinning their hopes on EU membership
perspectives and MAP. These things are beside the point. Even if they were
politically realistic, they would do nothing to help. In June 1940, the British
War Cabinet declared: ‘Every
citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every
British subject will become a citizen of France.’ Did
that help France? Perhaps somebody in the Kyiv
Post will draw a cartoon: one man drowning and another on the shore holding
a document entitled ‘EU Membership Perspective.’ Ukraine needs tangible
assistance and as quickly as possible. 
It will not be saved by grand gestures.

KP: What
kind of help does Ukraine need from the West?

JS:  On the economic side, Ukraine requires
emergency financial assistance, and it will get it.  Over the longer term, it requires a larger
and more comprehensive package of support for stabilisation and structural
reform.  If on 25 May, the country elects
a government committed to reform, it will get this assistance too.

On the political-military side, Ukraine
needs a package of reinforcing and augmenting measures to reconstitute and
strengthen basic communications, information security, intelligence,
counter-intelligence and the system of state planning:  the brain of the state, if you will. The ligaments
of the state—armed forces, security services, administrative structures, the
lines of authority, chains of command—need to be reinforced and in some cases
rebuilt. All of this requires a mixture of material, technical and human
support.  What can be done immediately
should be done immediately.  What takes
time should be done gradually and properly. The entire mechanism of NATO-Ukraine
cooperation and bilateral military-to-military (and intelligence) cooperation,
which functioned impressively until 2010, needs to be revived and upgraded. In North
America and Europe, in and outside NATO and in and outside government, there is
an impressive range of individuals who are willing to work alongside Ukrainian
colleagues and share their expertise. Unlike economic stabilisation, measures
of this kind cost millions of dollars, not billions of dollars. They don’t
entail ‘boots on the ground,’ nor do they risk force-on-force confrontation
with Russia. NATO needs to provide Ukraine with every measure of help
consistent with Partnership for Peace, the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership
and Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. The question of Article 5 does not,
need not and cannot arise unless a member of NATO is attacked.

KP:
So, it’s either Ukraine resists or it dies?

JS: You are being too dramatic. Ukraine
will not die. I am confident that, one way or another, it will resist and
survive. Until a short time ago, Ukraine’s new authorities were fumbling. They were
shutting out too many people whose help they needed. Yet even within the past
few weeks, one can sense a change of attitude and the first signs of cohesion.  But it’s uneven. The country needs to see a
spirit of urgency in all endeavours, the best people in the best positions and
war on cronyism. In departments of state, there needs to be a kinetic,
sparkling friction between inexperienced, but highly motivated new generation
people and seasoned professionals, including younger ones who have energy, open
minds and experience. This is happening too slowly, but it’s happening.

Russia won’t die either, but I am confident
that it will lose.  It does not
understand this country. Even if it wins this round, it will lose. The Kremlin thought
it won in December when Yanukovych signed the accord on December 17 [regarding
Russian $15 billion loan package], and Putin’s cronies announced that ‘Ukraine is
ours.’ Then in two months time, they found they had no influence in Ukraine at
all. We now need to show Russia: you take Crimea, you lose Ukraine; you take
more of Ukraine, you lose Europe. I think it’s eminently feasible.

Yuriy Onyshkiv is a former Kyiv Post staff writer.