The world witnessed Russian President Vladimir Putin interacting with his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian on Oct. 11 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. President Masoud Pezeshkian’s first interaction with President Vladimir Putin following his victory in the recently held Iranian presidential elections has increased speculation among strategic experts and scholars as to what was the outcome of this engagement.
During the meeting, Putin reiterated Moscow’s mirroring of elements of Tehran’s foreign policy. In contrast, Pezeshkian reflected sheer optimism for the growth of the strategic partnership between the two nations, which was reflected during discussions over the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty between the two nations on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan this month.
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According to one Tehran-based scholar, that, although the agreement was ready to be signed in Kazan, both sides agreed to sign it during later bilateral visits; Putin extended an invitation to Pezeshkian to visit Moscow as one of the regular series of meetings. The postponement and likely timings have forced scholars to speculate.
Israel’s response to the more than 200 rockets Iran launched on Oct. 1 finally came in the early hours of Oct. 26, killing more than four Iranian soldiers, causing limited damage to a few radar systems.
With Tehran providing armed UAVs, kamikaze drones and ballistic missiles to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it hopes Moscow will share critical air assets among other technologies, with a few squadrons of Su-35, S-400 air defense systems, and rocket fuel technology topping the list.
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As Moscow’s engagement with Jerusalem has deteriorated since Ukraine’s invasion, it has the necessary motive and seeming willingness to support Tehran and its terrorist Axis. The primary motive, according to one Lebanese scholar, is Moscow’s intent to intensify the Israel-Iran conflict further, hoping to further embroil Washington and its allies in the West in the region, shifting their focus from Ukraine.
We feel Moscow may treat any “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Iran more carefully. It has no intention of seeing Tehran withdraw the Iranian Axis elements or military assets currently supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad or witness an elevation in hostilities resulting in spillover. Which means, Moscow is likely to support Tehran in a way that fulfils its regional objectives but also puts it in a position to call for restraint on Tehran’s strategic calculus.
Transfer of military technology to Tehran
Since Tehran began transferring Shahed and Mohajer tactical UAVs to Moscow in late 2022, its politico-military leadership has been hoping Moscow will make this arrangement “more permanent.” The Islamic Republic’s air force continues to rely on equipment pre-dating the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It cannot match Israel’s superior air force with a plundered and operationally inefficient fleet of aircraft in need of frequent maintenance, feeding its hope for procuring a few squadrons of Su-35.
According to one journalist, Tehran’s rush to procure the fighter aircraft faces severe logistical challenges and delays. His raticle reiterated the statement issued by Brigadier General Mahdi Farahi, the Deputy Defense Minister of Iran, last November, declaring the plans to procure Su-35 and Yak-130 aircraft in addition to Mi-28 attack helicopters.
Brigadier General Farahi’s statement was hailed by roughly all walks of life in Iran; his statement further reflected Tehran’s decision to pay for the procurement of Su-35 in full. This also gave joy to Moscow’s armaments industry, which speculated the transfer of the Su-35 as the foundation for greater military engagement between the two states, some even speculating the potential transfer of twin-engine stealth multirole fighter aircraft, Su-57 - soon.
Contrary to Tehran’s expectations, the much-awaited Su-35 transfer to Iran looks doable, at least on paper. One Tehran-based journalist attributed the delay to Moscow’s decision to replenish squadrons on the Ukrainian front.
Alternatively, we feel the delay reflects Moscow’s reluctance to alienate Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. As the Iranian military leadership looks for alternatives to deter Israeli Air Force’s air superiority, especially following its recent attack on Iranian military installations, it is desperate to shift the balance of power in its favor.
Moscow announced the transfer the S-400 air defense system to Tehran in early 2019, but this also remains unachieved. Tehran is forced to rely on its domestically produced version of the S-300 – the Bavar-373. Moscow may be reluctant to provide the S-400 for fear that Iran would transfer some units of to Syria, in an attempt to counter Israeli air domination in the region.
With Israel striking military assets inside Iran, which many considered impossible, Moscow may view the potential transfer of S-400 inside Syria as more than plausible. It remains unclear whether Moscow’s decision to transfer some S-400 technology in addition to technical experts to Iran has cemented this view.
Will Moscow arm the Iranian Axis?
Besides reinforcing Iranian deterrence capability, Moscow is in a perfect position to arm Iranian proxies, principally Hezbollah. After a Russian made arsenal was found in Hezbollah’s hands in Gaza, one Lebanese expert opined that, in the light of the conflict in the region, Moscow may at best-expand its military assistance to Hezbollah but only in Syria.
Another Lebanese journalist referred his interview with a Hezbollah fighter who acknowledged having custody of SA-22 surface-to-air missile caches received from Moscow. Although the authors cannot verify the claim made by this individual, Hezbollah fighters have been accused of using the Shayrat military airfield in Syria for training UAVs, assisted by Russian trainers on the ground. This points towards a more profound strategic relationship between Hezbollah and Moscow and somewhat confirms the validity of military technology transfer between the two.
Moscow’s perception of the Israel-Iran conflict
As Tehran’s politico-military leadership hails the comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia, Moscow doesn’t seem to share the same enthusiasm for the prospect, with many expressing severe concerns about the possibility of spill-over, engulfing the Middle East monarchies, resulting in more significant support from Washington and its allies.
To that end, Moscow may limit its support to Iran by providing small arms to Hezbollah, at best. Moscow may choose to wait before signing a comprehensive partnership agreement with Tehran, reflecting its decision to forfeit any efforts to spiral ongoing hostilities into a potential regional war.
It remains unclear whether Moscow will divert more than small arms to Hezbollah, especially from the battlefields of Ukraine. Moscow’s condemnation of Houthi attack son UAE in 2022, secured Abu Dhabi’s neutrality during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
With Russian arms exports increasing to the emirate since 2022, Moscow is unlikely to do anything to alienate its seventh largest trade partner in the region. This does explain Moscow’s intention to mediate between Israel and Iran, which it did unsuccessfully in April and could invite both parties to meet in the immediate future, before signing the comprehensive strategic partnership with Tehran.
With the future of Moscow’s engagement with Jerusalem in shreds, it chooses to tread its partnership with Iran carefully but may run out of options if the violence escalates.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
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