For the last year, we have persistently been told that the so-called “Russia-Ukraine War” has reached a “stalemate.” I use the term “so-called” because I find both phrases highly misleading and inaccurate. Both result from an effort to “belittle” the war and the battlefield.
In this article, however, I will limit myself to discussing the alleged stalemate.
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The perception of a stalemate is linked to the land war and the slow and marginal changes to the frontline. However, neither reflects the full scale and scope of a war being fought with both military and non-military means; on land, in the air, at sea, in space, in cyberspace and not least, in cognitive space.
The land war
On Aug. 6, Ukraine executed an assault against Kursk Oblast to the surprise of both Russia and Ukraine’s international partners. In a fully transparent battlefield, it managed to secretly relocate and deploy units from at least four elite brigades and execute a surprise mechanized assault. Within two days, it had routed Russian forces, taken prisoner of war and occupied 350 square kilometers of its territory. The area has since expanded.
Until recently, active hostilities have been conducted along a 977 km (607 mile) front line. Ukraine has just increased the front line, stretching Russian forces.
The operation is a reminder of Ukrainian achievements from 2022, forcing Russian forces to fully withdraw from Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and partly from Kherson oblast. Ukrainians liberated 54 percent of occupied territories. While Russia has since gained the initiative on the battlefield, its marginal advances have come at the cost of nearly 382,000 casualties since last summer.
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More importantly, since Feb. 24, 2022, Russian stocks of combat-ready heavy equipment have decreased by 75 percent and it lives off its reserves. Its present war efforts depend on its ability to repair and send soviet legacy tanks, APC and artillery to the frontline. Some believe it will run out of heavy weapons in 2025.
Additionally, Ukraine has actively targeted Russian fuel and ammunition depots to reduce Russia’s ability to maneuver on the battlefield. It has greatly evolved its drone warfare capability, to a degree where unmanned systems “outperform conventional weapons, including artillery.”
Air Warfare
The Ukrainian Air Force, previously consisting of soviet legacy combat aircraft and air defense systems, has for 900 days denied Russia air superiority over Ukraine. It is presently in the process of replacing the above with fourth-generation F-16, Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T and several state-of-the-art short-range air defense systems.
According to the Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, it has destroyed over 8,000 enemy aerial targets over the past two and a half years: hundreds of warplanes and helicopters, thousands of cruise missiles and drones.
Ukraine has been actively hunting and degrading the Russian air defense network. In Crimea only, it has damaged or destroyed about 19 S-300, S-350, S-400 and S-500 divisions, dozens of launchers, and more than 15 radar stations. Russia has lost more than 900 air defense means in total since the start of the full-scale war.
Ukraine has also launched strikes against Russian air bases, destroying and damaging air surveillance radars, strategic bombers, fighter jets and not least, stockpiles of ammunition. It has demonstrated the ability to strike targets 1,800 km (1,120 miles) inside Russian territory.
Maritime warfare
In the report “The Impact of Ukraine’s Asymmetric Approach on Russian Sea Power in the Black Sea“, the Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) concluded that Ukraine has fundamentally changed the balance of power in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov over the last two years.
“The Ukrainian Air Force, Ukrainian Navy, Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR), Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), and Special Operations Forces (SSO) are waging a joint campaign aimed at limiting the Russian Black Sea Fleet freedom of operation, reducing Russia’s ability to sustain offensive operations in all domains, and, not least, setting the conditions for the liberation of the Crimean peninsula and restoration of sovereignty over Ukraine’s maritime exclusive zones.
Ukraine has been deliberately targeting Russian warfighting capabilities, command and control nodes, A2/AD capabilities, critical logistical hubs, and Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) across the Black Sea region.
Having already lost 33 percent of the Black Sea, Russia has lost the ability to freely project maritime power in the Black Sea and beyond. Ukraine has degraded Russia’s ability to conduct sea denial operations, including its capacity to uphold an effective maritime blockade.”
Space
If Desert Storm was the first space war, the war in Ukraine is seen as “the first commercial space war.”
Even 5-10 years ago, access to space capabilities was limited to only the most powerful states, primarily the US, China and Russia. Since the start of the full-scale war, however, Ukraine has been able to compensate for its lack of national space capabilities by buying commercial data and services, primarily from US companies. “The proliferation and sophistication of such commercial space services provide huge opportunities to Ukraine, enabling it to compete in and through the space domain.”
“International and commercial space information sharing and innovations in terrestrial hardware and software have allowed Ukraine to exceed Russia in the use of space at the operational, strategic, and diplomatic levels.”
It has provided Ukraine with superior command and control, intelligence, situational awareness and secure communication. It has enabled Ukraine to not only stop and force a far superior military power to withdraw but also inflict unsustainable losses of manpower and equipment.
Cyberspace
As recently as at the end of July, Ukraine allegedly launched one of the largest DDoS attacks in history on Russian internet infrastructure, targeting critical resources and accessing a vast amount of confidential data.
The attack, which lasted a full week, was directed against resources that were either directly or indirectly, involved in supporting or financing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The operation interrupted online services across all major Russian banks, national payment systems, telecommunications providers, government resources, and more.
DIU warned that this was just the beginning of even more significant attacks. “We advise the Russians to start preparing for the collapse of their digital infrastructure.” Ukraine is, after all, an IT superpower.
Cognitive space
A major part of the battlespace of the more than 10-year-long war occurs inside the cognitive spaces of populations and key decision-makers and policymakers. Using war, disinformation, cyberattacks, blackmail, provocations, fabrications, military deceptions, and other active measures, it creates a virtual reality that prompts its opponents into making the political decisions Russia wants without suspecting (or acknowledging) they are being manipulated.
President Putin has repeatedly warned the West not to cross a “red line” with Russia, stressing that this would trigger an “asymmetrical, rapid and harsh” response. The threats are made credible by its willingness to use military power to achieve its strategic aim and objectives, supported by its violations of laws of armed conflicts and conventions meant to protect both civilians and combatants.
Whereas Russia’s campaign within the cognitive space has largely failed in Ukraine, it has been far more successful in the West. NATO members – those who have forgotten the cost of occupation and oppression – have chosen to self-deter and step back from their commitment to using a mix of political and military means to stop a war that threatens the security of the Alliance.
Conclusion
The perception of “stalemate” is highly misleading. It is in part borne out of a single-minded focus on warfare within one out of six dimensions. However, it also reflects a lack of confidence in Ukrainian capabilities and not least, an inflated belief in Russian invincibility. The latter is a result of both ignorance and Russian information operations.
900 days ago, US intelligence was concerned that Kyiv could fall under Russian control within days. The fear was quickly replaced by euphoria as Ukraine decimated the northern invasion forces and forced them to withdraw. Western enthusiasm increased further as Ukraine routed Russian forces from Kharkiv oblasts and later, parts of the Kherson oblast.
Europhobia and enthusiasm created highly unrealistic expectations ahead of the so-called summer offensive starting 4 June 2023. Many, failed to realize that the slow and incremental defense support that had allowed Russia to force generate, dig in and fortify their defensive positions, also failed to deliver the tools Ukraine needed to succeed. Consequently, excitement turned into disappointment that was made worse by Russia seizing the battlefield initiative from October 2023.
Many lost sight of the many extremely important developments elsewhere. Ukraine has used the last year to generate new forces, shape the battlefield (e.g., hunting Russian artillery, air defenses, and destroying fuel and ammunition depots), decimate the Black Sea Fleet, develop drone warfare and the production of drones, as well as develop its own defence industrial base and new weapon systems. It has launched offensives in cyberspace and successfully defended cognitive space.
It has launched a peace plan supported by 84 countries and international organizations. Ukraine has successfully convinced most of its international partners that it is in their core national interest to continue to support its efforts to defend itself and European security.
The US and the EU have committed to providing billions in long-term defense, financial and humanitarian support. Ukraine has signed 25 bilateral security agreements ensuring long-term support.
And just as increasingly more were calling for negotiations despite the very dynamic “stalemate,” Ukraine once again surprised the world by launching the Kursk offensive.
It is time to widen the perception of the war and stop calling it a “Russia-Ukraine war.” The full scale, scope and complexity of the war must be acknowledged.
Ukraine will not allow the war to turn into a so-called “stalemate.” It has long realized that the war can only be resolved through victory.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
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