Note from the Editors. The following is the text of a presentation delivered by Kyiv Post’s Chief Editor Bohdan Nahaylo at a Ukrainian Historical Encounters Series Special Event entitled: “Russian-Ukrainian ‘Memory Wars’ in Western Academia and Media” held on Sept.16, 2023, at the Ukrainian Institute of America in New York City during a panel discussion on “RU-UA Memory Wars in the Realms of Print Media, Broadcast Media and the Internet.” Click here for Part 1 and Part 2.
A grave new world
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The media environment has certainly changed radically since Ukraine became independent. We’ve shifted away from newspapers. Not that after the Soviet era, with its state-controlled and subsidized mass circulation press, Ukraine ever managed to create a national, widely read Ukrainian-language newspaper of the sort that remained the norm in Western countries. With all due respect to Den’ and a few other examples, these publications were not able to become the daily news staple for a massive readership.
In independent Ukraine, TV became the all-important factor, and still remains a key source of information for many. No wonder the oligarchs were so interested in controlling the TV channels to promote their interests. But the internet became increasingly important as access to it, and familiarity with its workings and potential, spread. It resulted in the rapid emergence of social media, reliance on which has now become so widespread. Look at how the numerous and diverse Telegram channels have sprung up as sources of information about Russia’s war against Ukraine, not to mention the popularity of Facebook, Viber, TikTok, etc.
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We have reliance on hearsay, speculation – biased, unreliable and sometimes fake information – and on self-important, self-promoted “experts.”
And this in turn has ushered in the age of the bloggers. Anybody who’s got the confidence to talk for long and sound convincing online will have followers who will take what they say as gospel. In 2019, one of them, the pro-Russian videoblogger Anatoly Shariy even created his own political party, which took part in the parliamentary elections.
One after another, dubious personalities have continued to emerge almost out of nowhere, and for long periods become household celebrities as self-styled political commentators, oracles and founts of knowledge, presumably reflecting political aspirations, such as Andrii Palchevsky or, more recently, Oleksiy Arestovych.
So, the worrying fact is that many people in Ukraine have become used to getting their news (and ideas about history, too) not from genuine historians or informed proper journalists who try to be balanced, check their facts, and work as per the standards of Western scholarship and journalism.
Facebook and other social media became major sources of knowledge. Instead of a Ukrainian BBC – the creation of which should have been a priority after independence was achieved – we have reliance on hearsay, speculation, biased, unreliable and sometimes fake information, and on self-important, self-promoted “experts.” This did not help Ukraine’s image in the West, nor enhance understanding of its past and present.
Enter Zelensky
Nevertheless, to Ukraine’s credit, the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019 were democratic and fair and became a watershed. The “patriotic” Poroshenko was overwhelmingly rejected, and a political newcomer – a Russian-speaking comic actor of Jewish origin and unknown capabilities and intentions, Volodymyr Zelensky, who had satirized the political system – voted into office. This was a catastrophic turn of events for Poroshenko and his diehard supporters, but it provided a new opening for the country.
The Ukrainian media, and for that matter much of the nationally minded intelligentsia and diaspora, were caught by surprise. Without probing deeper as to reasons for the political shift, many journalists and cultural figures dismissed the new president as an inexperienced clown, even as “virtual” puppet of Moscow and compliant Ukrainian oligarchs who through his highly popular TV series “Servant of the People” had somehow “zombified” the nation, as the writer Oksana Zabuzhko put it at the time.
Hate posts in the social media became all the more common and the chasm between the self-styled conservative “patriots” and those seeking change deepened. This did not help promote a more balanced and informed approach to history, and it, like the language issue and religion, were used by manipulators for their own ends, dividing rather than consolidating society and tarring the country’s image abroad.
Fortunately, whatever the initial doubts about him, his team and methods, Zelensky began to rise to the challenges he had inherited. With Russia adopting an increasingly threatening tone, he closed down the pro-Russian TV channels and moved to regulate media in accordance with the EU’s requirements for Ukraine’s accession. He also began to clip the wings of the oligarchs and to prise the media away from under their influence. Needless to say, the new president was immediately accused of moving in the direction of censorship and dictatorship.
Russia’s all-out assault in February 2022 became a decisive moment for Ukraine: to be or not to be, was the question at stake. Zelensky’s leadership in sync with the defiant resoluteness of the Ukrainian population saved the day and enabled the country – the underdog in the eyes of most of the outside world, to carry the fight to its bitter enemy.
Russia’s war has forced Ukraine out of its infantile stage and sped up its maturation as a responsible, modern democratic state that has truly emerged from its neo-provincial cocoon of self-centeredness.
As a media-savvy accomplished actor, the new president was well equipped – just as Ronald Reagan had been when president of the United States – to adapt to the role of a great communicator on behalf of his nation. The difference both internally, and especially externally, soon began to make itself felt. Whatever one may have thought of him until then, Zelensky swiftly assumed a Churchillian image both at home and abroad.
The great communicator in action.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is seen on a screen as he joins via video conference the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Copenhagen, Denmark, on October 9, 2023.Liselotte Sabroe / Ritzau Scanpix / AFP
When had a Ukrainian leader become so present – virtually omnipresent – on the world stage, in the parliaments and diverse international fora? Presenting Ukraine’s case and pleading for maximum support. And when had a Ukrainian president maintained such direct contact with his own people, reporting almost daily to them through his video statements?
Yet this immensely positive achievement has been accompanied by a somewhat controversial centralizing trend. Zelensky’s decision after the major Russian assault to consolidate most TV news stations into a single 24-hour “marathon” channel – excluding those connected with his political rival, Poroshenko – has raised concern in some quarters about restrictions on democracy. Furthermore, the Foreign Affairs Ministry appears to have gradually been sidelined and officials in the President’s Office allowed to assume the role of key spokespersons commenting daily on all subjects – the war with Russia, domestic matters, and developments on the international scene.
As the discussion continues about what is permissible and reasonable in the name of national security during wartime and what might suggest authoritarian tendencies, Zelensky has nevertheless become, as a war leader, the symbol of a changed Ukraine. He has shepherded a transformation wherein a political nation is emerging, or rather, finally crystallizing, and Ukraine has finally become seen, heard and accepted on the international stage. Russia’s war against Ukraine has forced it out of its infantile stage and sped up its maturation as a responsible, modern democratic state that has emerged from its neo-provincial cocoon.
Three of the journalists who have made a difference. From left to right: Peter Dickinson, Iuliia Mendel, Michael Bociurkiw.
Looking ahead: Challenges and Priorities
Withstanding the ordeal of war will be an immense achievement, but ensuring that the peace is won, in the sense that proper use of it is made, is looming as the next major challenge.
When the war ends, and not knowing what form this might take, the task of reconstruction and modernization will be daunting. Managing billions and billions of dollars will be key to upholding Ukraine’s credibility and trust before the outside world and internally before its own population – as will be projecting Ukraine’s image, identity and heritage to counter Russian revanchist and vindictive claims.
In Zelensky Ukraine has been fortunate to have had an extraordinary communicator at its helm during the war, inspiring, explaining, pleading and consoling. But whoever leads Ukraine when peace arrives will have to be a second Napoleon, not in the military sense, but that of a reformer and administrator.
According to the British historian Andrew Roberts, writing in 2014 in his monumental biography, Napoleon the Great:
The ideas that underpin our modern world – meritocracy, equality before the law, property rights, religious toleration, modern secular education, sound finances, and so on – were championed, consolidated, codified and geographically extended by Napoleon. To them he added a rational and efficient local administration, an end to rural banditry, the encouragement of science and the arts, the abolition of feudalism and the greatest codification of laws since the fall of the Roman empire.
And this is still pretty much what a Ukrainian equivalent of Napoleon will have to do.
As for the media – the press as we used to call it, as well as Ukraine’s diplomacy and academia, they will need to rise to the occasion. A genuine, thriving, independent and responsible media of the appropriate quality and level will be needed more than ever as an overseer, guarantor, advisor and whistleblower: to ensure proper adherence to the Western terms of conditionality on the basis of which its massive support has been given, comprising of openness, accountability and good governance, and encouraging the country to move along its new path.
Undoubtedly, better preparation of Ukrainian journalists adhering to Western standards is needed. Perhaps some of the institutes in the West could therefore focus not just on history and politics, which are very important in the memory war, but in fighting the selective-memory whores employed by Russia by providing Ukraine with the trained professionals properly prepared for the task.
And the challenge is likely to become even more complicated. Combatting the fake news and disinformation generated so relentlessly and massively in diverse ways by Moscow is likely to be compounded by the recent appearance of Artificial Intelligence as a tool for creating written and artistic content. AI draws uncritically from the information already out there to create its product. To offset its impact synergies between Ukrainian historians, journalists and diplomats will be needed.
Conclusion
After more than 32 years of independence and 10 years of war with Russia, of which almost two have been on an all-out level, it is time to reflect on the lessons learned and identify the areas for improvement in Ukraine’s fight not only on the battlefield, but in the intensified memory war with Russia and battle for external understanding and support.
Despite residual deficiencies in Ukraine’s journalistic and diplomatic outreach, much progress has been made in recent years in reversing the tide in the history wars with Russia. The achievement of independence itself, and the country’s self-affirmation in internal democratic “revolutions” and resisting Russian military aggression have spoken for themselves. The name of Ukraine’s capital has been de-Russified internationally from Kiev to Kyiv. Since 2006, the Holodomor has been recognized by the European Parliament, Ukraine, and 33 other countries as a genocide against the Ukrainian people. And, thanks to the efforts of Professor Frank Sysyn and his colleagues in North America, the 10 volumes of Hrushevsky’s fundamental History of Ukraine-Rus have been translated into English and are available for scholars, while Plokhy’s bestselling The Gate of Europe has provided a new lucid standard for the general reader.
Three of the historians who have made a difference. From left to right: James Mace, Serhii Plokhy, Timothy Snyder.
Still, new approaches are needed to respond to changes in the way information is presented – in short, a more creative, confident and self-critical manner is called for in producing honest, reliable, and accessible coverage of the past as well as the present. The media’s role, after all, is not only to counter disinformation, but as a free press to inform, educate, and warn, to enhance the level of awareness and political culture, and to build a cohesive, tolerant, inclusive society in a Ukrainian democratic state that can be accepted and integrated into the broader democratic world.
And this also means that Ukrainians must become less introspective, self-pitying and preoccupied with themselves. There has to be less of the “we, we, we,” and “you owe us, we are entitled, give, give, give,” and more sophistication and understanding of the outside world that has accepted and helped them.
After victory, the new Ukraine, forced to mature, rebuild and renew itself by Russia’s war against it, will need to balance its traditional self-centeredness and smugness with becoming more involved in international affairs, more universal and consistent in its approach. It will have to become a team player in the name of international democratic solidarity and, on the basis of the heroism and example that Ukraine has set, play a leading role in setting and defending standards at home and abroad while correcting stereotypes and fake history promoted by Russia and its allies.
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