ANALYSIS: Poland and Ukraine - Divided in Past, United in Present

Poland and Ukraine share a lot, including a common history. This history includes examples of fruitful cooperation as well as conflicts. Both elements contribute to historical memory, which plays a crucial role for nations. This memory is formed based on facts, but also on narratives, myths and external influences.

Among societies that have coexisted, it is natural that disputes exist. Such disputes can be observed between Poland and Ukraine. Each country has its own memory. Changing this memory is difficult – as it is an element of a nation's identity.

There are many contentious issues between Poland and Ukraine. From Warsaw's perspective, the key issue is the “Volhynia Massacre,” commonly considered an ethnic cleansing, whose 81st anniversary is on Sunday, July 7. It is coinciding with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s planned visit to Warsaw.

The difference in perspectives on this issue is evident even in the language used. In Ukraine, it is more often referred to as the “Polish-Ukrainian conflict.” However, less emotional but extremely important aspects for discussion concern much earlier periods.

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (The First Republic of Poland)

To provide a broad perspective on the issue, Kyiv Post sought opinions from two historians: Professor Frank E. Sysyn from the University of Alberta and Dr. Bartłomiej Gajos from the Mieroszewski Center.

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“I think that the major issues to be discussed come from the early modern period. They involve the degree to which the political structures and social structures of the Kingdom of Poland incorporated the elite of the Ukrainian lands and to explain why the Cossack-led revolts challenged that system,” Sysyn said.

Gajos also points to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as the period from which to start and highlights common myths associated with it: “It was forgotten (in 19th-century Poland) that the Commonwealth was a state not only of the Polish nobility but also of the Lithuanian and Ruthenian nobility.

This process of forgetting is excellently illustrated by the reaction of Polish society after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when stores began to change the name of “pierogi ruskie” to “pierogi ukraińskie” out of sympathy for Ukraine. The adjective “ruski” refers to Ruthenia, not Russia, which was part of the Commonwealth! On the other hand, among Ukrainians, there is a widespread notion that the Commonwealth was not their state, that the elites were foreign, and that the peasants were oppressed by the Polish Catholic nobility. It is forgotten that many of the nobility were Ruthenians, ancestors of today’s Ukrainians. For example, King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki of Poland had Ruthenian roots among the Rurikids. It was also a state of the Ruthenians....”

Yet Professor Sysyn does see differences in the Polish and Ukrainian perceptions of this period. “This discussion involves issues of serfdom, colonialism, and religious culture. For Polish historiography, questions such as why serfdom was not more fully resisted on Polish territories or whether the concept of gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus [Latin for: of Polish nationality, but Ruthenian origin] is a later myth may be especially salient. For Ukrainian historiography, issues of emphasis on Cossacks as defenders of Ukrainian land or identity, or the degree to which the Commonwealth can be seen as a conduit of Western values may be seen as important.”

According to Gajos, the period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth isn’t only a time around which many myths and differing opinions came up, but also an element that most unites: “The union of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is an experience showing that citizens – unlike in the Russian tradition – are not passive objects in the hands of power but co-create that power and are subjects. They also have the right to revolt if they believe the ruler is violating their rights... In my opinion, we share a very strong sense of agency and dignity because we have the experience of being co-creators of a single state – the Commonwealth.”

According to both historians, the 19th century changed a lot. As Professor Sysyn notes: “Modern national communities emerged only at the end of the 19th century. For contemporary Poles, this meant the problem of how to rethink Poland, which could not easily encompass lands where non-Polish speakers were in the majority, and how a national movement that had depended on the gentry could incorporate the peasantry. For Ukrainians immersed in populism, this process involved how to treat non-Ukrainian speaking elites and, in particular, Roman Catholics as ‘Poles.’ The First World War came before these processes had been worked out. The Polish and Ukrainian movements had to define where Poland and Ukraine would be, a process that led to both a bitter war in Galicia and a later attempt to unite against Bolshevik Russia. I think the other points for discussion will be an examination of the Ukrainian policies of the interwar Polish republic, a study of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict during World War II, and a discussion of what the establishment of new borders and population transfers engineered by Moscow meant for the somewhat frozen period up to 1989.”

20th century

The events of the 20th century are a much more sensitive topic for Polish society because many witnesses to these events are still alive, making them more immediate and tangible than events from centuries ago.

Likewise for the Ukrainians who remember their treatment under Polish rule during the inter-war period when they saw themselves as an oppressed minority and resisted.The same applies to how they perceive “Operation Vistula,” during which authorities of the nascent communist People’s Republic of Poland carried out mass relocations of Ukrainians from the territories of present-day Poland because of continuing resistance.

Focusing for a moment on the Volhynia issue, the differences were evident last year during the 80th-anniversary commemorations held in Lutsk. The Presidents of Poland and Ukraine, Andrzej Duda and Volodymyr Zelensky, issued a joint statement on the platform X: “Memory and historical truth are the foundations on which we build our future. Today, on the 80th anniversary of the Volhynia tragedy, we pay tribute to all victims and commit to further cooperation for peace and reconciliation.”

Public opinion in Poland did not welcome this statement enthusiastically due to the lack of a clear identification of victims and perpetrators.

Gajos addressed this issue: “What happened in 1943-1944 is the most painful and politically sensitive. In Ukraine, the dominant opinion is that it was an equal civil war between the Ukrainian and Polish undergrounds, whereas source research clearly indicates that the UPA conducted a deliberate ethnic cleansing of the Polish population in these territories, resulting in the deaths of about 100,000 Poles. In retaliatory actions, Poles killed 10,000-15,000 Ukrainians.”

He added: “It’s difficult to speak of a myth in Poland regarding offenses against Ukrainians, such as those after World War II. Operation Vistula (1947), the deportation of 140,000 Ukrainians from the eastern territories of present-day Poland and the policy of denationalization until 1952, as Professor Gajos believes, is either completely unknown among the general public or known as a supposedly necessary step to deal with the Ukrainian insurgency.”

Observing the internal Polish discussion on this topic, one can get the impression that the Polish side, especially the families of the victims and witnesses of the events, primarily cares about symbolic issues – exhumations of victims, proper burials and the creation of memorial sites. Thus, in the Polish debate on this topic, it’s difficult to find a collective responsibility applied to Ukrainians.

The problem is also interesting from the Ukrainian perspective. Today, at the political level, the cult of Bandera is not anti-Polish at all but decidedly anti-Russian. Despite the need for appropriate commemoration of the Volhynia crimes, it should also be noted that these events did not arise from nowhere. Although it can’t be used as a justification, it must be acknowledged that Ukrainian population was often systematically discriminated against while Polish settlers were given many privileges.

Another issue is the propaganda conducted over the years. The narrative of the Polish National Democracy (Endecja) and the communist PRL defined Ukraine as a “non-nation.” The image of a Ukrainian was equated with a bloodthirsty Banderite, aiming to foster Polish animosity and build prejudice.

More recent history does not raise any controversies. Poland was the first country in the world to recognize Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity in 1991, supported Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity and continues to support it in its struggle against Russia, as well as in its NATO and EU aspirations, which won’t provoke future discussions.

Dialogue

The Polish-Ukrainian historical dialogue was initiated by émigré communities representing both nations, even when neither country was sovereign, with both operating under Moscow’s influence.

In the post-World War II era, the two main proponents of a Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation were Jerzy Giedroyc, the editor-in-chief of Kultura, the leading Polish émigré socio-cultural magazine based in Paris, and the Ukrainian émigré journalist Bohdan Osadchuk (Aleksander Korab). In 2004, after Giedroyc's death, Osadchuk concluded: ”Never before in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations have there been so many elements of agreement and cooperation, and so few factors of discord and opposition.”

Sysyn adds: “We now have over 30 years of history between the contemporary Ukrainian and Polish states. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Polish reaction to Ukrainians’ plight have made broad elements of both societies interested in the other. “This situation augurs well for discussions of the past and it is essential that professional historians find new ways of disseminating and analyzing their findings.”

The professor also notes the research inequalities that existed between historians from both countries.

“With over 30 years since the fall of Communism and the full independence of both countries, there has been ample opportunity for discussions among their historians and examining their historical past. The exchange is still not an equal one because whatever the limitations of historical research in People’s Poland, most periods before the 20th century could be written on fairly freely and even the 20th century could be researched. In contrast, Soviet mandates had severely limited examination of the Ukrainian past and much of Ukrainian history had to be discovered and rediscovered. In addition there is an imbalance in the number of historians working on research and the funds available, with Poland in a relatively better situation even after the immense progress made in Ukraine... What is most positive is that within Polish and Ukrainian historiographies there are divergent views so that any commissions that are formed are likely to find scholars mixed in their evaluations.”

However, regardless of the research differences, methodological approaches or even the adoption of different perspectives, the dialogue process continues. It isn’t conducted by historians only. Currently, in Volhynia, there are Polish-Ukrainian workshops going on organized by the Polish-Ukrainian Reconciliation Association. Such dialogue and grassroots work at the societal level strengthen mutual ties, especially on a topic that over the years has been the subject of many political disputes between Warsaw and Kyiv.

Future

We are on the eve of signing a bilateral Polish-Ukrainian security agreement. In the context of history, this would have been unthinkable for many affected by the conflicts described in this article. Zelensky’s visit will coincide with the 81st anniversary of the Volhynia massacre. Certainly, political gestures will bring a variety of responses, both positive and negative.

Nonetheless, both societies should aspire to achieve what France and Germany did in the 1950s. Their reconciliation laid the foundation for today’s European Union. Despite the many disputes between these countries, we now observe cooperation and lasting peace.

Agreement and dialogue based on history are crucial for both nations, Poland and Ukraine, not only due to Russian aggression but also for the friendly coexistence and integration of both societies. On an individual, human level, this includes everyday matters such as the education of Ukrainian refugee children in Polish schools. Historical disputes involve navigating a path filled with truths from both sides. In seeking consensus, it is essential to respect not only the facts but also the emotions and memories of each side. Only this will open the door to lasting friendship between the nations.

As Gajos said, citing words from 1976, when Polish writer and activist Giedroyc wrote to Ukrainian historian Ivan Kedryn-Rudnycky: “There are many issues between Poles and Ukrainians – issues that are unpleasant or very difficult. However, I do not believe that we should use inaccurate information. It is in the interest of our nations to normalize relations, which requires telling each other the whole truth – but only the truth.”