Europe paid close attention to the November 2020 US presidential election. However, the Old Continent was split on its hopes as to who should prevail in the race. Most European capitals, predominantly in the west, breathed a sigh of relief at former US Vice President Joe Biden’s victory. Since the end of the Cold War, Western Europe has been blessed with peace and security as a result of the buffer zone created by NATO’s eastward expansion, which separates Europe from its traditional source of a military threat, Russia. Therefore, this part of Europe hopes that America’s policy priorities return to an international agenda focused on ideological, economic, climate and social issues.
According to Old Europe, the greatest threat stems from the challenge to the leftist–liberal idea of democracy, as well as from the demands for traditional family values, (mostly Christian) religion and conservative principles to play a part in public life. This part of Europe wants to return to its particular version of multilateralism. It wishes to re-establish itself as the gold standard for international norms and behaviours. The Franco-German tandem, also known as the European powers that be, would like to dominate the continent economically and reinforce Western Europe’s global standing. This pair will not stop short of limiting the free flow of labour and services by introducing the necessary EU directives in order to achieve this goal. Paris and Berlin will also not hesitate to make use of their technological advantages in the field of energy. Instead, they will hide behind environmental slogans to enforce their economic agenda.
Our part of Europe, the continent’s Central and Eastern area, is not naive enough to believe that it is all about clean air. Today’s environmentally focused energy policy is a tool of economic rivalry designed to deal with competition. Forget about European solidarity. The infamous Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline exposes the selfishness of the powers that be in Europe. It has become a standing joke that European solidarity was buried together with the pipeline in the Baltic Sea.
A Central and Eastern European perspective on Trump and Biden
European leftist–liberal elites expect Biden’s administration to meet them halfway. Indeed, the newly elected president’s executive orders seem to be heading in that direction in at least a few areas. The US is rejoining the World Health Organization and the Paris Accords. Russia has finally got what it wanted with the extension of the START nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The Green New Deal has essentially become the Democratic Party’s new religion. However, Europeans may be in for a surprise because Biden might yet be willing to retain certain aspects of Trump’s policies.
Such continuity is what a number of Central and Eastern European capitals are hoping for. History has not been easy on our region. We understand that security and independence should never be taken for granted. For that reason, national security plays an important part in various areas of our lives. Our part of Europe is not blind to traditional military threats. In our region, the strategic detente and the peace dividend that followed the end of the Cold War are long-forgotten memories. In contrast, Russia has not allowed us to forget about its imperial ambitions for the last 25 years. It has been active in the Caucasus and in Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus. Moscow has not given up on political and economic interference in far-distant countries either. Russia’s militarisation, frequent large-scale military exercises, military incidents sparked by Russian warplanes and submarines, mass-scale hacking/cyber-activity, and propaganda and fake news all cause anxiety for the Central and Eastern European states. Energy blackmail has been Moscow’s strategy of choice for years. In our part of Europe, the consequences of the use of coal are the least of our worries. What we truly fear is the prospect of being hit by Iskander missiles or invaded by Russia’s ‘little green men’ (Buckley et al. 2014).
Despite the debunked Russia-collusion allegations, former US President Donald Trump’s administration acknowledged Central and Eastern Europe’s security concerns. Not only did Trump fulfil the 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit’s obligations to deploy battalion groups and to implement his predecessor’s decision regarding positioning a US division on NATO’s eastern flank, but he also continued to extend the permanent missile defence system in Poland. Finally, Trump’s administration met our energy-security needs. The liquefied natural gas terminal in Swinoujscie is supplied with American natural gas. Furthermore, Trump’s US was a steadfast opponent of Nord Stream 2 and backed up its position with economic sanctions. Together with Central and Eastern Europe, the US saw the project for what it truly is: a geopolitical scheme that could be weaponised by blackmailing our region. Trump’s US did not buy the pseudo-environmentalist narrative.
In the not-too-distant future, Poland may be getting its first nuclear power plant based on American technology. Trump’s administration was also supportive of our regional integration projects. The Three Seas Initiative, established by Poland and Croatia, was backed by the US, which contributed to the fund for infrastructure and energy networks. Finally, let us not forget that Poland became a country with a visa-waiver agreement with the US while Trump was president. The previous exclusion of Poland from the visa-waiver scheme might have been symbolic, but allies should not be subjected to such humiliating treatment.
The era of a new US president has begun. In our part of Europe, we have been closely following his decisions related to international security. As stated above, we expect President Biden to sustain aspects of the previous administration’s policy. We hope we will still have a common understanding of the international environment, of threats and of how to deal with them. Furthermore, we anticipate that the ongoing multi-billion-dollar military and energy cooperation deals will keep the new administration’s focus on Poland and our region. These are our hopes. Unfortunately, there is also reason for concern.
US policy under Biden
The stability of the US is worrying in this context. Biden’s inaugural address was filled with calls for unity and reconciliation. What followed has seemed to contradict this message. A number of decisions simply reversed Trump’s policies. In many cases, it looked as if the goal was to undo Trump’s actions out of spite and revenge. Other decisions, along with Biden’s personal appointments, appear to be motivated by ideology and racial and gender-related issues. There seems to be no merit behind these moves. Vice President Kamala Harris’s program envisages numerous social, political and economic changes based upon ideology. All of these factors raise questions regarding the internal stability of the US. Will the conservative base of American society accept far-reaching social changes? Last year alone, the Black Lives Matter agenda was met with pushback from the parts of US society that did not agree with the movement’s distorted version of reality obscured by political correctness. Traditional values are also prevalent within the Latino community. Conservatives may also push back against the vice-president’s progressive agenda. If the social revolution continues, it may destabilise the country, especially when enforced by undemocratic or dubious legal means.
Another important issue for us is whether Washington’s ideological experiments will affect its foreign policy. Will common national interests be the key factor or will shared ideology determine future alliances? These ideological changes may, of course, be spun as putting universal values, such as democracy and human rights, first. The influence of American diplomacy will certainly suffer as a result of mixing foreign policy and ideology. If Washington’s diplomats engage in the promotion of a leftist worldview, the leading role of the US among democracies will be questioned.
The place of the US in the global economy and our cooperation in that field is another potential problem. The new administration has come up with a new concept for economic policy. It is possible that President Biden will be willing to maintain his predecessor’s course and try to contain China’s economic expansion. However, his attitude towards energy and climate is worrying. Radical changes will weaken the US economy. American competitiveness will suffer. Central and Eastern Europeans will anxiously follow how it all affects the natural gas market. The deliveries of natural gas we have been getting from the US play a crucial part in our energy mix and energy security. The attitude of the US towards the Russo-German Nord Stream 2 project will also require our undivided attention.
The third problem is Washington’s future relationship with NATO and the European Union. Trump pushed European members of the Alliance to fulfil their 2014 obligations and spend 2% of their respective GDPs on defence. It is in the current US administration’s interest to sustain that approach. There is, however, the prospect of a return to the policy of the early days of the Obama administration when Germany was put in charge of security in our part of Europe. Unfortunately, it is already clear that Germany is not interested in that role and is not willing to fortify NATO’s eastern flank with additional troops. For years, Berlin has maintained the misguided opinion that Russia should not be humiliated. The false Russian narrative of its supposed marginalisation and entrapment has become an article of faith, despite Russia’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the G20 and (until recently) the G8.
Russia is also present within every significant initiative dedicated to dealing with regional stability issues such as those in the Middle East and those caused by Iran and North Korea. Both NATO and the EU have offered Russia privileged frameworks for partnership. At the same time, Russia is not believed to be part of the problem, but rather is seen as an indispensable participant in the solution to various crises. Unfortunately, Moscow is the actual source of these crises and only pretends to be interested in offering solutions. Naive expectations that Russia should play a positive part in stabilising the international environment are wishful thinking. Paradoxically, NATO’s military presence in close proximity to Russia’s borders is what makes the frontiers more secure. The Alliance poses no threat to Russia. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe hope Biden will not be talked into experimenting with more dialogue with Moscow. Putin only respects strong competitors on the international stage. This strength should be represented by a US-led NATO.
In the meantime, France and Germany have been pushing for “strategic autonomy” in the EU. The idea is to create European defense structures or an EU army. Such attempts are worrying, as Europeans cannot afford to duplicate NATO’s existing structures. Nor can they afford rivalry with or emancipation from their close cooperation with the US. Without Washington’s involvement and military support, the chances of creating European defence structures in the near future are close to zero. A facade of EU defence structures will not provide Central and Eastern Europe with security. The hope is that the new administration will not fall for the detrimental dreams and delusions of grandeur of certain EU member states and their leaders.
The fourth and final cause for concern on our list is the new administration’s personal attitude towards Russia. Our part of Europe sees Russia for what it is: an imperialistic, aggressive power that constantly destabilises the international status quo. American debates on a potential policy change with regard to containing Russia and penalising it with sanctions are highly disturbing. There is the looming prospect of President Biden being tempted by another Russian reset. His predecessors have already attempted this or glimpsed a democratic soul in Putin’s eyes. American think tanks associated with the Democrats have already started to engage in debate over a democratic Russia. The illusion of Russia’s system of government not being immanently linked to authoritarianism is making a comeback. Such notions are followed by old and erroneous ideas about replacing isolation with dialogue. Russia wants to return to the negotiation table over disarmament and arms control. Finally, it wants to talk about its “near abroad.”
Dialogue is a good thing. There is, however, a time and a place for everything. Requesting dialogue with Moscow at the same time as it is poisoning its dissidents and arresting thousands is poor judgement and bad timing. Dialogue cannot lead to appeasement; this has already been proven historically. Aggression against Georgia or Ukraine cannot be rewarded by getting back to business as usual.
Russia has been tempting the US with arms control talks. On the surface, this seems to be a good start. Weapons are expensive. Excessive stockpiling can lead to dangerous and unexpected incidents. Historically though, arms control talks have always been linked to other policy areas. Obviously, Russia’s willingness to further limit its stockpiles of missiles, warheads or conventional weaponry will have a price. Unfortunately, the bill will include demands related to our part of Europe, perhaps limiting NATO’s military presence or even undermining the sovereignty of certain states in our region.
No discussions of Russia’s interests or supposed rights in its neighbourhood should ever take place. Moscow has been spreading the idea of the “near abroad,” the “Russkiy mir” and its area of influence for a long while. Russia constantly needs to be reminded that its interests reach only as far as its internationally recognised borders. Russia has no right to get involved in the internal matters of Ukraine, Belarus or Moldova’s Transnistria region. Whenever it does, it must be rebuked. The hope is that Biden’s administration will continue to remind Russia that all sovereign states have the right to choose their own socio-economic means of development. That includes the right to freely choose alliances. Therefore, NATO should keep its gates open to new potential members in the east.
It is also important to acknowledge how meagre the achievements of the Minsk Peace Process and the Normandy Format have been. A full-scale war was indeed prevented. However, Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is ongoing. There is also the frozen conflict in Georgia. Finally, Russia’s involvement and support make it impossible to find a solution to the crisis in Belarus which followed last year’s rigged presidential election. How then, do we deal with Putin?
A transatlantic agenda on Russia
Appeasement is definitely not the right approach. Putin has no respect for any sign of weakness. On the other hand, we cannot afford to threaten Russia with military action. The punishment should be severe, but it should not undermine peace. The next batch of sanctions should exclude Russia from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) payment system. It is also important to ensure that the laundering of money belonging to Russian oligarchs and international institutions outside of Russia is effectively prevented. There is a lot of noise about Russia being a kleptocratic state. The flow of dirty money can and must be stopped. Russia’s energy sector also needs to suffer a significant blow. After all, Moscow pays for its army and its military interventions with energy money. Putting a halt to Nord Stream 2 for good would therefore be another effective move. The money Russia makes selling natural gas and other resources is not spent on the modernisation of the country. Rather it is used to buy more weapons and support the Russian army. The hope is that, together with the US Congress, the new American administration will stop the construction of what is essentially a tool of political blackmail that is to be used against our part of Europe.
The US could also work with the EU on a Magnitsky-style sanctions package against Russian institutions and Moscow’s decision-makers. Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny managed to expose the assassins who used the banned military-grade chemical agent against him. The ruthless way in which Russia dealt with the demonstrations following Navalny’s imprisonment is another reason why sanctions against Russia should be reinforced. New sanctions must impact those Russian elites who openly support Putin or benefit from his imperialistic policies. Navalny called for such an approach during his meeting with the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (European Parliament 2020). Imposing sanctions on Russian celebrities would constitute a subsequent step. We should consider ostracising them from international society. Scientists, artists and athletes should all pay the price for Vladimir Putin’s imperialism.
Facilitating the integration of Ukraine and Georgia with NATO and the EU is another option, although it seems unrealistic. The EU’s Eastern Partnership should have offered the prospect of membership from the start. This process could be put into high gear by including these countries in the Three Seas Initiative. This programme has Washington’s support. In this way, the US, together with the EU, could finally stabilise our part of Europe.
Conclusion
The US and the EU are not helpless in the face of Russia’s imperialism. We have at our disposal an arsenal of punitive measures capable of containing Russia and providing Europe with security. What we need right now is political will. We must all realise that long-term solutions for peace in Europe are worth much more than quick deals with Russia. Transatlantic sanctions against Russia must go well beyond what was agreed upon at the Feb. 22 meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council (Council of the European Union 2021; European Council 2021). Targeting those directly responsible for the poisoning of Alexei Navalny is not good enough, even for face-saving symbolism. Putin’s goons were not going on a trip to Rome or Paris in any case. In order to tackle Russia effectively, sanctions must target the political elites responsible for the decisions that led to the imposition of punitive measures in the first place. The Russian oligarchs and financial elites who back Moscow’s criminal conduct cannot be overlooked either. Finally, the transatlantic community must present a unified position and this will only be achieved when Berlin understands how shortsighted its Russian policy has been.
References
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Leonard, M., Shapiro, J., Pisani-Ferry, J., Tagliapietra, S., & Wolf, G.B. (2021). The geopolitics of the European Green Deal. Policy Contribution, Bruegel, 2 February. https://www.bruegel.org/2021/02/the-geopolitics-of-the-european-green-deal/ Accessed 22 March 2021.
Mearsheimer, J.J. (2018). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. New Heaven: Yale University Press.
NATO. (2020). Relations with Russia. 9 October. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50090.htm#:~:text=For%20more%20than%20two%20decades,channels%20of%20communication%20remain%20open. Accessed 22 March 2021.
Witold Waszczykowski is a member of the European Parliament from Poland in the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. He is the chair of the Parliament’s Delegation to the EU–Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee and a vice-chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Waszczykowski served as Poland’s minister of foreign affairs from 2015 to 2018. You can follow him on Twitter: @WaszczykowskiW.
