With every war, a classic debate re-emerges: Is superior technology a decisive factor for victory and to what degree?
In the case of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, now in its fourth month, it’s a particularly poignant question.
For me, it was partly answered in a windowless, concrete Ukrainian cyber bunker in eastern Ukraine two weeks ago. I watched on a gamer’s screen as a drone destroyed a Russian BTR 80, a much-lauded armored personnel carrier with a likely price tag upwards of half a million US dollars.
The soldier who flew the drone and accomplished the mission – a former IT professional – built it from parts bought on the internet. It can move at 120 kilometers per hour, dodge electronic signal blocking, fly up to four kilometers away, and costs around $500.
But let’s step back for a moment.
On the one hand, there is the Russian Federation, once considered the ‘second strongest military in the world’, with its emphasis in doctrine and practice to big pieces of technology, be they land-borne or air-borne. Whether under Vladimir Putin or in Soviet or Tsarist times, Russia has historically utilized military technology to at least project, if not assert, its power.
On the other hand, there is Ukraine which de facto had minimal military personnel or major armaments in 2014, when Donbas and Crimea were forcibly occupied by Russia, but has since rapidly improved its strength and capacity. However, that development has been constrained by a frail economy, an on-going hybrid war by its foe, and limited access to Western intellectual property and support.
The Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Centre, a policy and programs NGO working closely with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has long participated in related developments. I saw the bunker when I joined one of their field visits to eastern Ukraine. Their Chairman, Serhii Kuzan, said:
“Fighting against a bigger and better armed foe was made possible in two aspects for Ukraine. First, a new generation of Armed Forces commanders who are both loyal to independent Ukraine and successful in their battles with Russia in Donbas. Second, a major reform of the Armed Forces in 2019, with the aim of beating the Russians through mobility, autonomy in decision making, and technological excellence.”
In many respects, those aspects reflect Ukrainians’ own anti-authoritarian and tech-savvy traits. As one small example, even in wartime, Ukraine has better connectivity, better mobile phone carrier services, and (arguably) a more dynamic IT sector than most Western countries. One draws strange looks, for example, when asking for a printed menu – rather than a QR code – in cafes in even middle-ranking, front-line cities here.
The military innovations are raft. The use of self-produced ‘kamikaze drones’ is one example, but part of a larger capability. The aforementioned cyber bunker can visually and digitally track the positions of all Russian military pieces within a range of hundreds of square kilometers.
Speaking in Russian, a young intelligence officer (with seven years of combat experience) pointed to an outer ring of artillery pieces on a screen and told me that “they are waiting on a visit from Mr. Howitzer.”
The officer has what many of his Western peers would envy. He produces ELINT (electronic intelligence drawn from drones and satellites) and HUMINT (human intelligence drawn from operatives, reconnaissance units and an innovative national hotline for citizens to call). He also directly acts on intelligence via weaponized drones, special operations and other missions against his enemy.
Another way the Ukrainians transform digital capability into battlefield advantage is the use of an app to direct artillery fire. Rather than rely on conventional chains of command to select targets and direct fire, Ukrainian artillery units can opportunistically ‘claim’ targets of convenience from those listed on their bespoke app. Uber meets salvos of steel. It’s the crowdsourcing of combat capability.
By contrast, their Russian opponents have until recently relied on artillery support that is largely directed by their mechanized infantry Battalion Tactical Group (BTG). Slow and geographically limited.
You might be thinking: Won’t this just collapse if somebody pulls the plug on the internet
Enter a certain eccentric billionaire. While discussions were well advanced prior to Russia’s advance on Feb. 24, internet access has been expedited by Elon Musk and the Ukrainian Government. Now, some 40 low-orbit SpaceX satellites beam high-speed, easy-access internet to Ukraine, including through some 11,000 plug-and-play, pizza box-sized Starlink reception stations, some powered by field generators or car batteries.
A senior leader of a voluntary defense unit, based then in Kyiv’s outskirts, recounted their special operation to place some 40 stations that enabled continuous, fully encrypted communications and visuals during a critical stage of the battle for the Ukrainian capital. Thereafter, there was a direct correlation in the destruction of Russian battlefield units, which now stands at some 1000 neutralized tanks and personnel, which now stands at some 31,000 killed in action.
In the successful defense of Kyiv and Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city, Starlink and other innovations, coupled with shoulder-mounted weapons such as Javelins, NLAWs and Stingers, let the Ukrainians move deadly fast against a better armed opponent, but one also struggling with food, fuel and other logistical resupply, as well as poor discipline.
The war has now shifted to the east and south of Ukraine, and to a focus on artillery and other bombardment of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure followed by small-scale infantry advances. The technological dimension of the war has changed with it.
Perhaps out of desperation, the Russians, who have lost some 20 generals in battle, have switched to pressing their own technological advantage: deployment of more artillery and missile launch systems, the greater range of those systems, and more currently available ammo.
They nevertheless will hit some more operational walls, as well as their on-going problems with effective command and morale. For example, a Ukrainian officer told me that it typically takes three years of production to resupply the artillery shells that the Russians have fired in three months.
For their part, while still highly motivated, Ukrainian officers now openly speak of low stores of older Soviet artillery ammo. Even as they wait for the critical mass of Western military aid to arrive, they point out the numerical imbalances that will be ongoing and their need for even more longer-range howitzers and missile systems.
They say that they are 100 per cent determined to take the fight to the enemy, but they must have the adequate cover to do it. To date, it is estimated that some 150 to 200 howitzers have been pledged between the U.S., Canada, Australia, U.K. and other allies, while Ukrainian officials have requested 1,000 units.
For Putin, it’s now as much about using his artillery advantage to inflict psychological terror and force a mass exodus among Ukrainians. He simultaneously waits for the West to grow war weary or annoyed with the higher prices and food shortages that he initiated.
Indeed, having now stated that he acts as Tsar Peter did, whilst collecting record oil revenues, Putin counts on a political backdown that delivers him an imperial vision of a ‘New Russia’ based on Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson provinces. A compromise that not only costs millions of Ukrainian lives but effectively let’s him achieve global leverage and imperial destiny through murder.
War is about constant calibration, be it in the sights of an individual soldier’s weapon or in the command centers of global leaders. The outcome in the next few months in Ukraine will be very much about who can recalibrate the most quickly and effectively, including technologically.
Kuzan believes the next few months to be critical and a key test for Western democracies to quickly deliver more effective firepower.
The Ukrainians have shown themselves incredibly adept over the last three months. Whether Western leaders will be equally adept going forward is another matter.
