Thirty-one years ago, Ukraine emerged, pursuing an independent home policy and acting sovereignly in international relations. Now, though, this nation is fighting tooth and nail for its independence and sovereignty in a bloody war against Russian invaders. It is probably at the final stage of asserting and solidifying its statehood.
The road to this stage has been very long. Ukraine embarked on it as the medieval state of Kievan Rus. In the 9th-13th centuries it was not yet Ukraine proper and not quite a state, but it had the basic characteristics of sovereign agency: military and administrative control of territory, tax collection, army, relations with and recognition by other countries.
The Ukrainian state that emerged four centuries later in the wake of liberation from Polish oppression as Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s Hetmanate (a Cossack state in the central and north-eastern regions of Ukraine), partly restored its sovereign agency as a vassal autonomy: control of territory, tax collection, army, relations with and recognition by other countries. All these were in place but limited by treaties with suzerain states that provided military assistance.
One hundred years later, that defective agency ended up with the complete liquidation of Ukrainian statehood, and Ukraine vanished from the European political context.
The third attempt for sovereignty was made in 1917-1921, when Ukraine ventured to separate from the Russian Empire – first as a federative entity, and then as the independent Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR). The nascent state was incredibly weak. The UNR barely managed to control its territory, was in a permanent state of war, and was only recognized in the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (from which it never drew any strategic dividends, though).
It was only seven decades later that Ukraine succeeded in proclaiming its independence. I was directly involved in the turbulent events that began in this country in 1987. I can say that Ukraine’s independence was proclaimed or, more correctly, restored due to a number of interacting and interdependent factors.
The principal one was the rise of a mass national drive for independence in western Ukraine and parts of central Ukraine. It involved a minority of Ukrainian society and was a passionate movement of 25-30 percent of Ukrainians who united around the People’s Rukh (movement) of Ukraine. Yet, this factor proved to be decisive.
The national drive for independence was necessary but not sufficient. There were several necessary conditions.
One was a rift in the Communist ranks and the creation of the democratic platform in the Communist Party of Ukraine. It consolidated the national camp with political activists from the east and south of the country. The 125-strong opposition faction in the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had 80 MPs representing the Rukh and more than 40 representing the Democratic Platform. This factor took the drive for independence nationwide.
The second necessary condition was the formation of an informal group of pro-sovereignty Communists in the stratifying Communist ranks. Their advantage was that they held the key positions in the parliament which had become an alternative center of authority in Ukraine.
In August 1991, the entire Supreme Council Presidium was already beyond the Kremlin’s control and was a decisive factor on that decisive day, August 24.
The third contributing factor was the Donbas coalminers’ spontaneous strike movement. Although there were no political or nationalistic demands, the spreading movement rocked the foundation of the Soviet Union. The democratic parliamentary opposition quickly established contact and effective interaction with them, primarily in setting forth economic demands.
The fourth necessary condition, which some consider the main one, was the turf war between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The power game in Moscow opened a narrow window of opportunity for Ukraine.
The foremost political leaders of that time must be given credit: They were active and responsible enough to make the most of that window – a rare case in Ukrainian history.
Undoubtedly, the entirely legitimate proclamation of independence played the decisive role in the establishment of Ukraine as a subject of international law but did not empower it as a full-fledged player. Russia did not give up on Ukraine but only loosened the “long leash” (as Gennady Burbulis, Yeltsin’s closest ally, put it) for a while and then pulled the energy-dependent and corruption-ridden nation back into the empire.
One of the reasons Ukraine failed to radically transform its post-Communist economy and remained swamped in Russia’s domination is that the West acquiesced to Ukraine remaining within Russia’s orbit instead of following the example of the Baltic and Eastern European nations.
Those who steered the country proved to be too weak to resist the threats and temptations. So it took Ukrainians tremendous efforts to make their own way. They went through the Orange Revolution in 2004, then the Revolution of Dignity and Russia’s incursion in 2014. Now they are fighting the Russian army to defend and liberate their land and finally break free from their centuries-long dependence on Russia.
It was not until this abominable war that Ukraine stood up and spoke in full voice as a nation and state.
Moreover, Ukraine is setting an example to many other nations that are still colonized. It is becoming a state that will formulate – together with allies – a new global security agenda based on principles of liberty, trust and law; on free interactions among democratic nations, and on creation of equal international unions.
Declaring our independence on Aug. 24, 1991, we certainly did not foresee the long and painful road that lay ahead. Yet, we were convinced that we were going the right way and were guided by the right ideals.
I am convinced that we are now in the last and roughest miles of this road in pursuit of our great goal of preserving and establishing Ukraine as a genuine state – independent domestically and sovereign internationally.
