It’s that time again — Ukraine is entering a new political season.
In less than 100 days, President Volodymyr Zelensky will reach the midpoint of his term. And although he didn’t announce his reelection bid, I’m confident that Zelensky will try to seek a second term.
This is indicated not only by the mood in the President’s Office, but also by the latest survey published by the Rating Sociological Group this week. The figures are a consolation for Zelensky: He’s returning to a positive balance between public trust and distrust.
The latest poll shows almost the same picture as in the first year of Zelensky’s reign, when he enjoyed his honeymoon with Ukraine’s society.
Now the situation is not as rosy, but Zelensky still tops the ranking — he’s supported by 50% of respondents, while 48% are not backing him. According to the poll, at least 31% would re-elect him in the first round — this is almost the same result he got in the first round of 2019 election.
For Zelensky, popular support remains the most important factor in his decisions. And, if ratings stay high during the second half of his presidency, his plans for 2024 are easy to predict.
Top focus
Deoligarchization is going to be the main topic of the second half of Zelensky’s presidency.
The success of this campaign will eventually determine his reelection bid: This is indicated by both insiders’ information and the very logic of the political process.
Removing the country’s powerful oligarchs from any decisions of state importance was one of Zelensky’s election promises. But there is also a pragmatic reason for him to do it.
Zelensky, who doesn’t have his own media, will benefit from minimizing the influence of Ukraine’s oligarchs through the TV channels they own. That is why deoligarchization will remain the key message for Zelensky.
Split with speaker
Another thing that will mark this political season is the split between Zelensky and the speaker of parliament, Dmytro Razumkov, which will become even more obvious. Especially after Razumkov has publicly stated that he doesn’t agree with the president’s proposal to create a registry of oligarchs and authorize the National Security and Defense Council to fill it.
Razumkov, who once helped run Zelensky’s election campaign, is now distancing himself from the President’s Office, and sometimes even acts in opposition to it.
There is nothing new here: In Ukraine, almost every speaker of parliament used the position to fulfill their ambitions. Oleksandr Moroz and Volodymyr Lytvyn were the most prominent leaders of parliament who tried to use the speaker’s seat to win the presidency, but failed.
Now Razumkov aims to form a core of like-minded people in parliament that he can lead. It already includes several heads of parliamentary committees, such as Serhiy Babak, chairman of the education committee; Dmytro Natalukha, chairman of the economic policy committee; and Yaroslav Zheleznyak, chairman of the 20-member Voice faction.
Another goal for the ambitious speaker is to establish a separate channel of communication with each oligarchic group, which guarantees him access to television. Razumkov regularly appears in favorable broadcasts on the TV channels of Rinat Akhmetov and even Petro Poroshenko.
Oligarchs to fight back
Zelensky’s desire to carry out deoligarchization — whether it is real or not — was met with the opposition of most oligarchs. Now they seek to replace the current government and increase their influence. Sometimes, resentful former members of Zelensky’s team come in handy.
For example, in the last six months, Oleksandr Danyliuk, the former finance minister and former secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Danyliuk has been a regular guest on Akhmetov’s TV channels.
In September, former Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk, who had spent several months in the U.S. on an internship at Atlantic Council, appeared on several of Akhmetov’s TV shows as well.
Both former allies have criticized Zelensky’s de-oligarchization idea, among other things.
But the main blow to the deoligarchization scenario can be struck by a team play of Razumkov and Arsen Avakov.
The former interior minister, who had been in office for 7.5 years and seemed omnipotent, handed over his office keys without a fight in summer 2021 and, after voting for his resignation, went to Italy, where he owns real estate.
After Zelensky successfully took on the main villain in Ukraine’s media world Viktor Medvedchuk and a notorious chairman of the Constitutional Court Oleksandr Tupytsky, Avakov’s conflict-free resignation was another important operation to limit the potential risks that could emanate from centers of influence not controlled by the president.
Avakov’s departure was a serious loss for the opponents of deoligarchization. He was a reliable ally for the richest Ukrainians, none of whom were harmed during the years of his rule in the Interior Ministry.
Avakov was not afraid to try to sabotage the imposition of sanctions on oligarchs like Pavel Fuchs and Dmytro Firtash at the National Security and Defense Council meeting, in Zelensky’s presence. Avakov also backed Razumkov’s idea that sanctions can’t be imposed against Ukrainian citizens.
But Avakov’s departure from public politics didn’t mean the end of the backdoor deals.
Blow from ombudsman
Avakov found an opportunity to attack deoligarchization — he did it with the help of his ally Lyudmyla Denisova, the parliament’s ombudsman for human rights. In the past, both Denisova and Avakov were members of the People’s Front party.
Recently, Denisova sent a letter to Razumkov demanding that the law on deoligarchization doesn’t get passed in its current version as it violates human rights.
It’s interesting that the ombudsman made it her priority to play along with the 10 richest families in a country where the rights of much less protected groups are systematically violated.
Denisova was outraged that “a certain category of citizens will be discriminated against as a result of their assets disclosure” — meaning, discriminated against based on their wealth.
She is also worried that officials will be forced to report about their contacts with oligarchs. According to her, if such a meeting was “personal,” reporting it will mean “interference in personal and family life.” It is difficult to imagine a personal meeting between an oligarch and an official. Denisova also saw an “indirect introduction of censorship” in this law.
Finally, she promised to appeal to the Constitutional Court if the law is passed and advised Razumkov to send the draft to the Venice Commission, or European Commission for Democracy through Law, for examination.
This idea has become a real lifeline for those who seek to remove the law. According to my information, Razumkov’s intention to send the law to the Venice Commission is supported by Poroshenko’s faction, as well as pro-Russian Opposition Platform For Life, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna, and even Holos (Voice), whose leadership follows Razumkov.
However, Zelensky has already promised to respond to such a scenario with a referendum, and its outcome is predictable — the people of Ukraine will overwhelmingly back deoligarchization. Such a referendum could be the best gift for Zelensky on the eve of the presidential election, as it will allow dividing the political arena into “friends of the people” and “friends of the oligarchs.”
Washington watching
At the same time, oligarchs must have been disappointed with the results of Zelensky’s visit to Washington on Aug. 31. The U. S. leadership didn’t publicly criticize the deoligarchization bill. It wasn’t mentioned at all in the joint statement of Biden and Zelensky. Some pro-Russian media in Ukraine noted it and tried to spin it as the U.S. giving Zelensky a greenlight for his deoligarchization project.
The same was the impression of Yuri Vanetik, a U.S. lawyer and lobbyist who is suing Ukrainian oligarch Pavel Fuks in California.
“I know from my sources that Biden gave (Zelensky) a certain carte blanche,” he told me. “Ukraine will soon begin a legal attack on oligarchs, who remain a source of corruption and economic stagnation. Ukraine will liberalize markets and take back control of strategically important industries now controlled by a handful of people, using the practice of compulsory purchase. Those (oligarchs) who will cooperate will get a more loyal attitude. In the future, the U.S. will encourage Ukraine to take even more aggressive steps to eradicate the corrupt system.”
Kolomoisky in trouble
Ironically, the oligarch in the most trouble is Ihor Kolomoisky. The same oligarch who was considered to be a puppeteer of Zelensky and the biggest winner of his presidency may turn out to be its biggest loser.
The oligarch, imperceptibly to himself, had become too toxic for Ukrainian politics and too appealing a target for the U.S. to demonstratively punish cross-border corruption.
Although Kolomoisky recently celebrated an interim victory in the U.S. when the Delaware Court of Chancery postponed PrivatBank’s lawsuit against him, this euphoria is short-lived.
Kolomoisky is still spending millions on lawyers in the U.S. to no avail, as he seeks to avoid much more serious problems in connection with the FBI investigation against him. The investigation focuses on the alleged money laundering by Kolomoisky in the U.S., the case in which the U. S. Department of Justice has already filed three lawsuits to confiscate Kolomoisky’s property in Ohio, Texas, and Kentucky.
Possible criminal charges are looming and that can turn Kolomoisky into an easy target for the FBI around the world.
The noose is tightening around Kolomoisky — not only in the U.S. but also in Israel, the country where he is a citizen and which he saw as an option to escape justice.
Israel is also becoming unreachable for him, as local authorities are hearing the claims of the state-owned PrivatBank against Kolomoisky in connection with money laundering through the local Discount Bank and are awaiting his questioning.
At the same time, Israeli police have reportedly opened a fraud investigation regarding Kolomoisky and several of his associates. The case allegedly revolves around a 2019 deal between Kolomoisky’s partners and a company belonging to Belarusian oligarch Nikolay Vorobei. Kolomoisky’s associates allegedly failed to pay $20 million for the coal they bought in 2019 from Vorobei’s company and resold to Centrenergo, a major Ukrainian state energy company.
And there is every reason to expect that Kolomoisky will become the next Ukrainian oligarch after Pavlo Lazarenko and Dmytro Firtash who will feel the grindstone of international justice.
But whether Kolomoisky faces justice in Israel and the U.S. is not that important — what’s important is whether he faces it in Ukraine.
This will be not only a precedent for punishing an oligarch but also a guarantee of a successful presidency for Zelensky.
