Mikheil Saakashvili is back in the headlines. The flamboyant politician who served as president of Georgia and governor of Odesa Oblast has finally received a new job in Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed him the head of the Executive Committee for Reforms, part of the National Council of Reforms.
Saakashvili has already had meetings with his new status, including one dedicated to the ongoing reform of Ukroboronprom, a notoriously corrupt conglomerate of state-owned defense enterprises.
The arrival of Saakashvili to Zelensky’s team is meant to counteract the frustrating departure of some people who had hard-earned reputations as reformers in the West. Many were fired this spring, most of them because they failed to show quick results.
The idea to get Saakashvili involved originated in late 2019. The administration was looking into several possible jobs for him, including even interior minister.
Back then, when Zelensky’s new government was in its first months, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov threatened to quit at least twice. The first time happened when they wanted to take away his control of the National Guard. The second time took place when the administration wanted to appoint the new leadership of the National Police and Avakov disagreed with the candidates. Both times, Avakov got his way.
According to my sources, then-Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk not only considered Saakashvili as a replacement of Avakov, but even interviewed a candidate who would head the National Police under Saakashvili as the minister.
But Avakov’s bluffing worked, and he was angry with Honcharuk for looking for his replacement — so Avakov had his hand in the firing of Honcharuk.
Avakov is into his seventh year as the interior minister, and no one is yet able to remove him. The arrival of Saakashvili, who had a public spat with Avakov back in 2015, is unlikely to change anything for the almighty minister.
Another post that had been offered to Saakashvili is the head of the joint Tax and Customs Office, services that haven’t been reformed and have become a source of constant annoyance for Zelensky.
Then Saakashvili was offered the job of deputy prime minister in charge of reforms. But the Constitution rules that an appointment to this post must be approved by parliament. The administration tried to collect votes in his favor, but it led nowhere — influence groups were ready to pledge support only in exchange for a list of “favors.”
Then Saakashvili, who has a longstanding relationship with many factions, including those of Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna and Svyatoslav Vakarchuk’s Voice, tried to gather support in parliament on his own.
But having a member of government who is backed by a coalition of several factions instead of just Zelensky’s Servant of the People is risky — it changes the balance and can create tension in the Cabinet. So the administration decided not to push its lawmakers into voting for Saakashvili. Appointing him with the help of other factions wouldn’t just show that the Servant of the People party doesn’t have a consistent majority, but could also make Saakashvili unmanageable.
So the administration found another job for Saakashvili, one that doesn’t require parliamentary approval. Zelensky appointed Saakashvili head of the Executive Committee for Reforms, part of the National Council of Reforms, which is headed by the president himself. At the same time, Zelensky changed the functions of this body, broadening them. Now Saakashvili has the authority to represent the National Council of Reforms in its relations with other government bodies, political parties, civil organizations, and media.
In other words, Saakashvili becomes the ambassador of reforms and enshrines the President’s Office as the source of reforms, making the government the technical executor of the administration’s plans. Saakashvili’s role is to restore citizens’ trust in the current leadership, as well as to become one of its frontmen in the upcoming local elections, scheduled to take place in October.
In the backdrop of this appointment is the brewing conflict between the Servant of the People faction and the government. Some of the 248 members of parliament of the presidential faction are in silent opposition to the Cabinet. This confrontation manifested itself when the Servant of the People lawmakers refused to support the government’s proposed action program. Passing it would have given the Cabinet of Ministers a one-year immunity from being fired by parliament.
Eleven of the Rada’s committees rejected the government’s action program, citing its low quality, and recommended the Cabinet to give it more work.
These are committees on environmental policy, energy, organization of government, finance, tax and customs policy, economic development, legal policy, anti-corruption committee and defense committee, and so on. One of these committees — the economic development one — is the main committee in charge of considering the government’s program. Its veto matters the most.
It’s obvious that rejecting the government’s agenda is a political decision. After all, in all these committees, the leaders are the nominees of the Servant of the People party, and the majority of votes are in the hands of the party, too. It means that the “servants of the people” are going against the Cabinet for which they voted just two months ago. They don’t want to provide their own government with temporary immunity from firing.
There are visible conflicts between certain ministers and chairpeople of relevant parliament committees: the minister of finance feuds with the chairman of the finance committee, the economy minister with the chairman of the economic policy committee, and the energy committee is at full-blown war with Acting Energy Minister Olga Buslavets.
One of the first decisions Buslavets proposed was to shut down the nuclear power units of state-owned nuclear power plants in order to save profits for billionaire oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, which caused a real explosion among the lawmakers of the Servant of the People. Those elected in single-member constituencies were especially unhappy. They say they will be ashamed to look people in the districts in the eyes because Akhmetov’s monopoly will inevitably lead to an increase in electricity tariffs for the population — if not now, then after the local elections in October.
There are still a few vacancies left in the current government, and filling them won’t be easy. Zelensky’s lawmakers won’t vote for ministers they’ve never seen before, as they did two months ago when they appointed Denys Shmyhal and his Cabinet. Only someone the faction really approves will have a chance to join the government — either one of the lawmakers or a public figure.
The current setting is reminiscent of another situation, when the Rada was in opposition to the Cabinet of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, blaming it for failing reforms and eventually forcing Yatsenyuk to resign as prime minister in April 2016.
In Ukraine, the ruling power always needs to have a scapegoat, a target of public criticism — especially when an election is looming on the horizon. And a government that has no parliamentary support is a very convenient target, even if it delivers reforms.
In this context, Saakashvili can prove to be a source of positive news and the initiator of long-awaited reforms, which may ultimately make him the main contender for the post of prime minister.
But another scenario is also possible: that Saakashvili’s second coming to power in Ukraine will end just like the first try — with scandals and political accusations.
Saakashvili’s fate is in Saakashvili’s hands today.
Sergii Leshchenko is a Kyiv Post columnist, investigative journalist, and former member of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament.
