Apparently, this next phase of the war may prove decisive: If the Ukrainian forces are seriously weakened by the Russians, the Kremlin will have its “Victory Day” celebration on May 9 – whether in Moscow, Donetsk or Mariupol matters little. On the other hand, if the Russian army loses in the Donbas, then Moscow’s next move is less clear, or rather – clear, but unthinkable, and so most choose to ignore it.
A Ukrainian victory is undoubtedly what most of us are hoping for. But when Ukrainian troops finally trounce the Russian invader, when will the war end? Do we actually believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin will accept defeat and/or will sue for peace when his troops are stopped (again) dead in their tracks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces?
When Putin finally realizes that Russia’s “special military operation” has failed, he will escalate. When exactly this “escalation moment” will come is difficult to predict since the Russian military command seems convinced that a miraculous ground victory may yet be achieved in Ukraine. Russia has seemingly endless amounts of military equipment on offer. But those tanks, armored personnel carriers, truck-mounted rocket launchers, etc. need qualified and motivated troops to operate them. And lately, finding competent Russians willing to fight in Ukraine has proved problematic.
Nevertheless, according to the latest dispatches, the battle for the Donbas is imminent, or may have already begun. The Russians are keen to show some semblance of victory by May 7 – Putin’s inauguration day – so that a full-scale celebration of their “might” can be organized on May 9 (Soviet-era “Victory Day”).
The only problem with this plan is that the capitulation of Ukraine within the next three weeks is obviously unachievable, and even securing an expansion of Russian-occupied territory in the Donbas and establishment of a Russian-controlled land corridor to Crimea (i.e. occupation of Mariupol, southern Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts) is going to be highly problematic.
What then?
Then Vladimir Putin will turn to the only weapon left in his arsenal that can secure him a “victory” – the nuclear option.
Several commentators have countered this prediction, arguing that the chain of command required to launch a nuclear strike is complex, and so it is unlikely that any order to launch emanating from the Kremlin would be carried out by field commanders. Others (including me) have suggested that Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal is old, dilapidated, and unlikely to be functional. All of these are valid points, but they are only relevant if one is considering a full-scale Russian nuclear attack.
What about a single tactical strike with a small nuclear weapon on a single Ukrainian city? The resultant level of destruction would be comparable to that seen in Mariupol during the past four weeks – tragic, but not global. However, the effect would be highly symbolic: it would represent the first time that nuclear weapons had been used in battle since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and would necessitate a response from the world’s other nuclear powers.
However, what if, after the attack, Moscow immediately transmitted a public message to the West: “Stop supporting Ukraine, or the next bomb will fall on one of your cities!” How would the people of Poland, Germany, France and other EU states respond? More importantly, how would the leaders of the three NATO member states who possess nuclear weapons respond? Would they act in congruence, or each to his own?
Even if Russia’s target were to be a Ukrainian city, the moment Russia launches a tactical nuclear weapon, the initiative of leadership will pass from President Zelensky to the leadership of NATO. At that moment, Russia’s war in Ukraine would become a (fully) global problem. So, how will the West react? Have the leaders of the U.K., France and the U.S. established plans for this contingency or is it too unthinkable?
I’m told that once they have reached the pinnacle of their careers, the priorities of elected leaders change: Prime Ministers and Presidents become less concerned with their popularity (electability) and think more of their historical legacy. It is at that point that a leader’s “moral compass” and/or “character” proves decisive.
In June 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had a choice. After the evacuation of the British and allied forces from Dunkirk, he could have responded to the multiple private messages sent to him by Adolf Hitler and agreed to a new division of Europe. Hitler had by that time taken Belgium, the Netherlands and half of France, and had divided Poland with Stalin. That could have been the end of it. The Battle of Britain could have been avoided. The London bombings might never have happened. Continental Europe would have been sacrificed, but Britain would have had peace. Most importantly, millions of British lives would have been saved.
If Churchill had been guided by a different moral compass, World War II could have been forestalled – likely to be fought later, but that is another story.
Churchill chose war. His legacy is that of a righteous leader with an iron character. I suspect today, 80 years later, the French, the Dutch, the Belgians, the Poles, and indeed the Germans (not to mention the Jews of Europe) are grateful for his choice. That war, despite the millions who died, left a legacy of peace, prosperity, and unprecedented human development.
In October 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy had a choice. After making it publicly clear to the Soviet government and to the world that the U.S. would not accept the stationing of nuclear missiles in Cuba, he used back channels to make a deal: the US withdrew its missiles from Turkey in exchange for the USSR withdrawing theirs from Cuba. Peace was “purchased” for the price of Cuba: the island remained communist but disarmed.
Kennedy was shot in Dallas a year later and will always be remembered by Americans as a heroic leader. But what about Cuba? That country has been an economic, political, and social basket-case for the past 60 years. And not just because of the Castros. The country was abandoned and its people deemed expendable.
I am not suggesting that Kennedy’s choice during the Cuban Missile Crisis was wrong. Indeed, the standoff against Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev led to the demise of the latter. Mind you, Khrushchev was replaced by Leonid Brezhnev, and that was not a better result for Soviet citizens: dissidents jailed, economy stagnated, freedom stifled…
Had Kennedy stood firm against the Soviet threat without a backchannel deal, I might not be writing these words at all because global thermonuclear war would have prevented my existence. On the other hand, the USSR may not have survived a morally principled American President and would have collapsed decades earlier than it did. These are all “what ifs” and probably not helpful.
The choice to be made by leaders in crucial moments always boils down to the following:
Do we all sacrifice some in the short term for the sake of what is right for all in the long term (as Churchill did)? Or do we make a deal now, delaying the eventual inevitable sacrifice, for the sake of the living (the Kennedy option)?
I don’t have a singular answer, but I certainly don’t envy Misters Biden, Johnson and Macron. Only these three men have the ability to counter Putin’s nuclear blackmail. I think this is what President Zelensky meant when he recently stated to a CNN reporter that “the world should be prepared for the possibility that Putin could use nuclear weapons”.
When Russia’s “escalation moment” comes, their characters and moral compasses will be tested like never before.
