Since April, the Syrian regime forces on the ground and Russia from the air have been mounting an assault on the province of Idlib – the last remaining rebel stronghold – with much headway already achieved. The military campaign has become particularly vigorous over the recent weeks, bringing the regime and Turkish-supported rebel forces in direct confrontation. Even a few Turkish soldiers were killed and a few regime helicopters shot down.
While Turkey and Russia argue about the boundaries and the nature of the recent events within and outside the Idlib Turkish-controlled de-escalation zone that had been agreed between them back in 2018 in Sochi, it has always been clear that the agreement would not last long.
For Turkey and Russia – partners in need as they are – were always at cross purposes regarding the Bashar al-Assad regime and the outcome of the Syrian civil war. The logic of Russia’s campaign to prop up the Assad regime compelled it to move on regaining more grounds from the rebels as Russia’s stance in Syria for all the pretenses of power may be compared to riding a bicycle, which falls when it stops.
Whenever it loses military momentum, it would start losing influence inside the country and, hence, the political clout on international diplomatic fronts, which is the whole point of its Syrian escapade for Russia. This exactly is what happened before to Iran, which interfered with the Syrian conflict – through proxies – earlier than Russia and now has largely been outmaneuvered by the Kremlin. Now it does not even feature as junior party to the current Idlib campaign.
Now while Russia-supported regime-led onslaught – notwithstanding the Turkish diplomacy and military threats (ostensibly against the regime, not Russia) – continues to eviscerate the war-torn Arab nation – a fresh wave of refugees – numbering, according to United Nations estimates, 900,000 have already accumulated at the Turkish border and more are expected to come. Many of these people are fleeing the war not for the first time. The situation is potentially endangering also Europe, which has not fully recovered from the political repercussions of refugee crisis of 2015.
Turkey, too, is facing serious domestic difficulties in view of the expected influx. Opposition voices are rising, blaming the government. Even within the ruling party, some are unhappy too. Yet Recep Tayyip Erdogan is determined not to cede grounds both militarily and diplomatically. Turkish media is unanimous in describing the situation in Idlib as the humanitarian crisis of the century. With the regime atrocities and the rampant abuse of power on the reconquered lands, these refugees, together the 3.7 million already inside Turkey and even more elsewhere abroad, are unlikely to come back home any time soon, unless in a military gear as proxies of foreign powers, which is happening increasingly more often to the younger ones among them.
To continue the bicycle metaphor – Russia’s choices in addressing the Turkish demands are limited too. For if it stops the campaign – which of course will be framed as “having influenced, or put pressure” on the Assad regime – it will lose the strategic advantage it gained so far and will have to sit to the negotiation table, where the future of Syria will perhaps finally be discussed in earnest. Another more modest choice for Turkey as the antagonist in this battle of wills is on the table as well – i.e. the situation around Idlib may be frozen again and Turkey will simply keep its hard-won borderline buffer zone intact and continue to strengthen it at the expense of the Kurds, which is, of course, the priority for the Turks. This will not help avoid the humanitarian disaster, however.
There are reasons to believe, however, that Turkey is eyeing a greater win. In order to achieve this Turkey is threatening serious military campaign against the regime and shoring up the allies’ support. It is clear to all that Turkey cannot go it all alone. While the Turkish media calls for the EU to interfere it is slow but steady progress that Erdogan has managed to achieve with securing the U.S. backing that matters more for tipping the scale.
The American special envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, has announced U.S. support. The National Security Adviser, Robert O’Brien, however, was quick to point out that this does not include sending troops. By acting in such manner the U.S. is showing caution, but also indicating that – depending on how it goes – it may in fact come to fully endorse an assertive Turkish move. And it is precisely this – not the troops – that Turkey now needs the most while it has embarked on an intense diplomatic pressure campaign against Russia. Most recently Turkey also appealed to the U.S. to help re-enforce its air defense by providing a few Patriot missiles against a likely Syrian and Russian air attack, which may come if Turkey would bring more troops into Syria.
With engaging the U.S. support by Turkey, a new strategic situation may emerge that will serve the interests of both Turkey, the U.S. and ultimately, Syrians. Also, with the US policy of sanctions against Iran heading effectively toward a regime change (the “behavior change” that is expected from Iran by Trump administration and its Middle Eastern allies amounts to little short of that outcome) the U.S. needs to get Turkey back on its side. Now seems to be the right time for it. In the meantime, the U.S. shows considerable caution – hedging both against the domestic political repercussions and the unpredictability of war itself, while Russia remains assertive as usual.
Oleksandr Bogomolov is director of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Kyiv. He speaks Arabic, Persian, Russian, Ukrainian and English fluently. He graduated from St. Petersburg State University with a master’s degree in Arab and Middle East studies and from the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies with a Ph.D. in Arab linguistics.
