Odesa has never been easy to govern. The largest region in Ukraine geographically, it is dominated by a large port city notoriously rife with entrenched political interests and sophisticated networks of patronage and corruption. The last politician to attempt governing Odesa, former Georgian president and self-styled anti-corruption champion Mikheil Saakashvili, resigned his post in November, citing ubiquitous corruption and a lack of political will in Kyiv. For a time, Saakashvili’s celebrity attracted an unusually high degree of attention to the region, both nationally and internationally.
For a time, Saakashvili’s celebrity attracted an unusually high degree of attention to the region, both nationally and internationally. His legacy in Odesa is complex – either of energetic attempts at reform or fumbled policies and outrageous public appearances, depending on whom you ask.
The opinion of his successor, Maksym Stepanov, is quite clear, however.
“On the one hand, there is complete incompetence, and on the other hand, there were cuts that were made without any logic,” Stepanov told local reporters in a press conference on Feb. 27. “The general impression is rather depressing. We have areas where there is outright anarchy,” Stepanov said, making reference to the lack of chief administrators in 18 of Odesa’s 26 regional administrations.
His exasperation is likely deepened by the fact that half of the three-month “trial” period allotted to him by President Petro Poroshenko has already elapsed. Stepanov was appointed by Poroshenko recently, on Jan. 12. As Poroshenko announced his appointment publicly, he also promised to visit Stepanov in April in order to assess his progress in areas such as “the airport, customs and tenders on roads.” With March just around the corner, a month and a half of Stepanov’s tenure has already passed.
Stepanov has found his endeavors to compel change frustrated due to what he claims is the institutional chaos left by his predecessor. On Feb. 27, he also expressed frustration with his inability to select his own deputy, who is instead selected through competition. The second stage of that competition began this week — though an hour later than scheduled — assessing four finalists. Frustrated by the process, and the application of some candidates to multiple positions, Stepanov told reporters “it’s funny, but also sad. It speaks about the imperfection of the procedures that exist.”
The irony in Stepanov’s statement being that he himself won the position of governor through competition. Many believe that Stepanov benefited from favoritism and procedural impropriety during the process.
The former deputy chairman of the state tax authority, Stepanov also served as first deputy head of the Odessa Regional Administration from 2008 to 2010, before being subjected to an essentially retributive post as director of Ukraine’s state printing plant in 2011 under ousted President Viktor Yanukovych. He is a seasoned bureaucrat, with friends in high places: Stepanov can count politicians such as Serhiy Berezenko and businessmen such as Ihor Kolomoisky among his supporters. As a loyal member of the Poroshenko Bloc, Stepanov is more likely to answer to Kyiv than to rock the boat, a quality which no doubt made him more appealing in the eyes of Poroshenko and others.
He is a seasoned bureaucrat, with friends in high places: Stepanov can count politicians such as Serhiy Berezenko and businessmen such as Ihor Kolomoisky among his supporters. As a loyal member of the Poroshenko Bloc, Stepanov is more likely to answer to Kyiv than to rock the boat, a quality which no doubt made him more appealing in the eyes of Poroshenko and others.
That is not to say that Stepanov has not been hard at work since his arrival in Odesa. Aside from working to restructure the administrative system in the wake of Saakashvili, Stepanov has laid out his plans for substantive infrastructural endeavors (particularly on the Odesa-Reni highway), visited the outlying regions of Odesa, presented a new fleet of ambulances to several towns, promised increased police presence in the city, and alongside Odesa’s Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov, opened a new administrative center.
Though Stepanov may not be as drawn to creating a spectacle as his predecessor, he has already demonstrated his populist savvy, publically threatening to fire several officials for obstructing the delivery of medication to cancer patients this month. It is clear that Stepanov benefits from his familiarity with the region, gleaned during his stint as deputy head of the Regional Administration.
Stepanov represents a more disciplined and predictable approach than Saakashvili, more reliant on institutional channels than personality and fiery rhetoric.
Among some Odesans, this is seen as a return to the old guard, and not necessarily in a positive sense. Activists and local media are suspicious that some of the corruption subdued by Saakashvili’s public denouncements is returning to Odesa’s police force and customs.
Aside from this, although a member of the Poroshenko Bloc, Stepanov is still likely to be far more tolerant of pro-Russian sentiment than the vehement Putin-critic Saakashvili. Whether this will bring latent tensions to the fore or allow for compromise among disparate local interests remains to be seen — while Stepanov may be relatively predictable, Odesa seldom is.
