Ukraine
has a talented, highly educated citizenry, yet fundamental flaws in
its political system prevent strong and responsive leadership from
emerging and assuming roles in the national government. These
systemic flaws can, and must, be fixed for Ukraine to become the free
democracy her people deserve.
Under
the current system, Ukraine’s local officials are appointed by a
centralized, national authority. This differs from healthy and
vibrant democracies such as Poland and the Czech Republic, where
local elections determine regional leadership. Ukraine’s local
leadership is often drawn from a politically homogeneous group of
politicians more attuned to each other’s interests than to the
interests of the population. As a result, the political establishment
cannot evolve, innovation is discouraged or inexistent, regional and
minority interest groups are afforded no voice nor safeguards, and
instead the country is saddled with a stagnant and incestuous
political “elite”.
As
a result, amid skirmishes for regional control and political
jockeying, political evolution can express itself only through mass
protests and Maidans. Such mass movements are expensive and
existentially disruptive, and do not yield the systemic changes
needed. They elevate popularly acclaimed leaders who inevitably
succumb to the entrenched political system riddled with corrupt
reactionaries, and some evolve into dictators themselves. The vicious
cycle continues.
Yanukovych
is to be held personally responsible his regime’s corruption and
for ordering police to shoot at and murder his own peaceful
citizenry, but he could not have committed his crimes without the
tacit consent of many other government officials. Too many in
government serve at the pleasure of the president. There is no
incentive for them to serve the people rather than the president. The
system needs to re-align the self-interests of regional politicians
more with the interests of the people they serve, and less with the
president.
The
most recent Constitution strikes a better balance of power between
the President and Parliament, but as in earlier versions, the
President still appoints all provincial governors. This virtually
assures that governors will be the president’s proteges or lackeys,
as any incumbent president is unlikely to appoint rivals who might
emerge as competitive candidates in national elections. Furthermore,
as long as the appointed provincial governors are perceived to be
loyal supporters of the president, they will be unable to develop any
credibility or rapport with the voters. This leads to an alienated
and disenchanted citizenry which takes to the streets, as there is no
other recourse to combat centrally-selected political appointees
disconnected from the population they are supposed to serve.
Thus
the critical issue is not one of achieving a balance of power between
the president and the parliament, but of achieving a balance of power
between the Ukrainian electorate and their national leadership. Until
that is addressed, Ukraine can expect a stagnant and unresponsive
political establishment, and periodic mass upheavals.
Until
locally elected officials are granted genuine authorities, Ukrainian
democracy will remain disappointing and fragile. At present national
elections offer the winners some prestige, but do nothing to develop
the broader pool of leaders on whom the success of Ukraine’s
democracy will ultimately depend. Local government offices should
serve as the lifeblood of a stream of candidates who earn the trust
and the right to hold a higher public office. In other countries,
trusted candidates for national leadership emerge regularly from
among governors and mayors who have proven themselves by serving
their oblasts or cities.
The
genuine delegation of authority to locally elected officials will
help assure that the policies of local governments will reflect the
preferences of the local residents instead of the preferences of the
presidential ruling party. Locally elected councils already exist in
each oblast of Ukraine. Constitutional reform granting local councils
the power to elect or appoint their own governors could be a critical
step towards easing regional tensions and building stronger democracy
in Ukraine.
It
appears that the political climate in Ukraine is ready for such a
reform. Leaders in both Eastern
[http://www.scmholding.com/en/media-centre/news/view/1487/]
and Western [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2cMWPAPSx8I#t=140]
Ukraine have already called for a significant expansion of the
authorities of local governments. Political decentralization and
local administrative reforms would sent a strong signal to local
communities their equities will be preserved through any major
political changes in Kyiv, which will not violate local rights and
governance.
Decentralization
of governance must be undertaken with great care, but the sooner it
takes place, the better. Having responsible and trustworthy
institutions of local government, people will have confidence that
their rights will be honored and preserved. They will not need to
seek a dictator, either domestic or foreign, for protection.
The
question of constitutional reform belongs to the people of Ukraine.
The international community hopes Ukraine will find a way to build a
strong sovereign democracy. More information is available at the
website of the
Ukraine
decentralization initiative.
Roger
Myerson is the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of
Economics at the University of Chicago. He was awarded the 2007 Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in recognition of his
contributions to mechanism design theory.
Tymofiy
Mylovanov is Assistant Professor of Economics at the University
of Pittsburgh. He has an MA from the EERC at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
program (currently, Kyiv School of Economics) and a PhD from the
University of Wisconsin Madison.
Dr. Oksana Lassowsky and Igor Buinyi contributed to the article.
