Ukraine’s Friend of the Week: Alexander Hug
Alexander Hug has one of the most difficult jobs in the country.
As well as the day-to-day task of observing the situation in the war zone, the deputy head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine frequently takes flak from both sides – Ukraine and the Kremlin’s occupation authorities in the eastern Donbas – for the reports his mission issues about the situation.
That’s because Hug and the OSCE have to walk a scrupulously non-partisan line between the warring sides in Ukraine. The mandate of the mission is not to ascribe blame, but to objectively record what it observes in Ukraine.
So there was some irritation at Hug on the Ukrainian side on Jan. 23, when he gave a press conference and claimed that “both sides” in the war-torn Donbas were preparing for an escalation of the conflict. He didn’t say if one side looked like it was making preparations to attack, and the other to defend, or vice versa, or whether both sides looked like they were making preparations to both attack and defend.
In defense of Ukrainians – given that the Russia is clearly an aggressor, invading and occupying the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, and fomenting a war in the Donbas – even Ukrainian preparations to recover the Russian-occupied parts of the Donbas could be interpreted as a move to defend Ukraine as a whole, within its internationally recognized borders.
Hug cannot be more explicit, however, for fear of appearing to favor one side or the other.
To combat the disinformation that frequently comes from the Kremlin’s proxy authorities in the Russian-occupied part of the Donbas, and the occasional untruth coming from the Ukrainian authorities and media, the OSCE SMM in Ukraine started to use the #factsmatter hashtag on social media.
But such is the nature of the war in Ukraine, in which the Kremlin refuses to admit it is the aggressor or even a party to the war, Hug and the OSCE themselves are unable to clearly state some very important facts, such as:
- The hostilities in eastern Ukraine are not a civil war or “conflict” but a covert war by Russia on Ukraine;
- The occupation authorities in non-government-controlled parts of are directly controlled by the Kremlin, via “curators” such as representatives of Russia’s FSB security service, GRU foreign military intelligence officers, senior officers from Russia’s regular military, senior Kremlin officials, and operatives from Kremlin-controlled political and media organizations;
- It is Russian-led forces that are responsible for most of the ceasefire violations, threats against OSCE monitors, restrictions on the movement of OSCE monitors, damage to and destruction of OSCE UAVs and monitoring cameras, and violations of other provisions of the Minsk peace agreements, including on the deployment of banned heavy weapons in the withdrawal zone.
Yet without acknowledging these facts, it is impossible to correctly describe or understand the nature of the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine in the Donbas.
In most cases, the OSCE can only report a cease-fire violation in terms of the number of projectiles fired, or bursts of machine-gun fired or explosions heard, and the direction of fire – if known. It cannot report, for instance, that Russian-led forces caused a violation of the ceasefire by launching an unprovoked attack on a Ukrainian position, and that the Ukrainian side only violated the ceasefire because it returned fire in self-defense – or vice versa.
The OSCE has be careful with its language so as not to appear to ascribe blame to either side. It cannot afford to fall out of favor with the Kremlin-controlled occupation authorities, which would endanger monitors working in the Russian-occupied areas of the Donbas and threaten its ability to bring aid to civilians in the war zone, especially in the part of mainland Ukraine occupied by Russia.
The Kremlin understands this well, and uses it to its advantage.
It’s a journalistic rule of thumb that when two sides in conflict give contradictory accounts, the truth usually lies roughly midway between. However, unfortunately for Hug and the OSCE, that’s not the case in Ukraine – the Kremlin lies a lot more than the authorities in Kyiv do.
That puts Hug in a very difficult, unenviable position. He and the OSCE mission are, however, putting their lives at risk on a daily basis to help end Russia’s war on Ukraine, and for that, Ukrainians should be grateful. Hug also deserves the title of Ukraine’s Friend of the Week and an Order of Yaroslav the Wise for again bringing to the world’s attention the continuing conflict in Ukraine. While Hug can’t say it, it is in the Kremlin’s interest to keep a low-level war going in Ukraine, and in Kyiv’s interest to see it end. Hug’s warning about the continuation or escalation of the conflict, and both sides preparing for it, should be understood in this context.
When the Kremlin does finally end its war on Ukraine in the Donbas, and the OSCE mission can at last go home, maybe Hug will be able to comment more freely about what has happened here, and say who ultimately was to blame for the bloodshed.
In the meantime, on balance, it is in everyone’s interest that he continues to be careful with his words, so that his mission can continue to do its vital work in the Russian-occupied part of the Donbas.
Ukraine’s Foe of the Week: Thorbjorn Jagland
Thorbjorn Jagland, the former Norwegian prime minister and since 2009 the secretary general of the Council of Europe, the continent’s leading pro-democracy body, has lately been calling for the council to drop the sanctions it imposed on Russia following the Kremlin’s invasion and occupation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine.
Because of its war against Ukraine, Russia was denied voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Its delegation started to boycott meetings of the body. It stopped paying its dues last summer (it contributes about 33 million euros to the council’s 450-million-euro annual budget, and it said it might not respect all the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.
The parliamentary assembly is due this month to take a decision on whether to extend sanctions against Russia, and the Kremlin is growling threats about the consequences of it doing so. If Russia withdraws from the council altogether, its 140 million citizens will not have access to the European Court of Human Rights (Russians at present bring about a third of the court’s cases).
Jagland argues that that would be a very bad thing, as indeed it would. Russia, under the dictator Vladimir Putin, is fast on the way to becoming a rogue state, and any protections from the regime of Kremlin kleptocrats that can be rendered to its citizens should be valued and retained if at all possible.
However, Jagland, and others from Europe’s left who tend to take an overindulgent position on Russia because of its Soviet socialist past, should not be fooled: Russia is not a member of the Council of Europe, or Interpol, or any other institution of the democratic and liberal West, for the good of its own citizens: It participates in such bodies in order to undermine and discredit them.
The Kremlin is fuming over the denial of its voting rights because it means it cannot vote on the appointments of officials and judges, and put in place Kremlin-friendly candidates who will help it chip away at the authority and reputation of this European institution.
And removing sanctions against Russia before it ends its military intervention in eastern Ukraine and occupation of Crimea would be an even worse thing than Russia making good on its threat to quit the council. It would send the signal to the Kremlin and the wider world that Europe is not prepared to stand by its principles, and that it is susceptible to bullying by a powerful authoritarian state.
Jagland is Ukraine’s Foe of the Week and gets an Order of Lenin for making the same mistake that so many other Western officials and politicians have made – trying to deal with Russian aggression by “engaging” with the Kremlin.
Such “engagement” (which is better described as appeasement), is perceived by Putin and his Kremlin cronies as weakness. If the Council of Europe caves in to Russian bullying on this issue, it won’t be long before another problem comes up, and Jagland will be forced into another humiliating retreat.
The only way to “engage” Putin’s Russia is to stay firm, stick to principles, and refuse to be intimidated into making concessions. And Jagland should remember what happened the last time European leaders tried to appease a bullying, authoritarian regime.
