The self-proclaimed President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, under whose leadership Belarus participated in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by providing territory for an offensive on Kyiv, and who justified the Russian attack as a preemptive strike against the “Kyiv regime,” has now declared the need for peace talks between Ukraine and Russia.
“Neither the Ukrainian people, nor the Russians, nor the Belarusians need this fight,” the Belarusian dictator said, surprising everyone around him.
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Firstly, this was unexpected because just a few days earlier, Russia had rejected any possibility of negotiations with Ukraine following a series of defeats in the Kursk region.
Secondly, Lukashenko himself had recently accused Ukraine of allegedly attacking Belarus with drones, announced the advance of Belarusian troops to the border areas with Ukraine, and promised that what happened would not go unanswered.
However, there was no “retribution,” nor any active actions from Belarus, which has been trying to stay neutral since Russia’s defeat near Kyiv in the spring of 2022.
Meanwhile, the Belarusian opposition media reported that Russia had requested military equipment from Belarus, and the Lukashenko regime began transferring equipment to the Russian Federation, not from warehouses but from active army units.
What does this mean, and what is behind the recent maneuvers of Belarus?
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Invisible Drones and a Stationary Army
On Aug. 10, Lukashenko claimed that 10 Ukrainian drones had allegedly attacked the country the previous evening, on Aug. 9. Moreover, he claimed that they flew toward the place where he was located. Belarusian state media even published the remains of one of the drones, but it is unclear if it was shot down. The next day, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced the advance of troops to the Ukrainian border, and official Minsk accused Ukraine of aggression.
“An incredible story. It seems like an attempt to equate the victim and the aggressor in the eyes of the West—Ukraine and Russia. You can’t achieve this through an attack in the Kursk region, because after all the Russian war crimes and strikes across Ukraine, a full-scale invasion, you can’t portray Russia as a victim. But through Belarus, you can try,” said Belarusian opposition journalist Tatyana Martynova.
At the same time, Kyiv Post sources among Ukrainian border forces reported no activity from the opposite side of the border. Our Belarusian interlocutors said the same.
“We constantly monitor the situation. According to our sources, the troops did not move toward Ukraine. If there had been a drone attack and a promise to send troops, they would have had to move. But nothing like that happened. Two battalions of mobile forces of the Republic of Belarus are constantly stationed near the Ukrainian border; they regularly rotate, but nothing more.
Also, no one reported drone flights or air defense operations anywhere in the Telegram channels of Belarusian cities and regions. By all indications, the story of the drones is a fake provocation by Lukashenko that did not work,” Aliaksandr Azarau, head of an organization of former Belarusian security forces who left the country after 2020, told Kyiv Post.
According to him, their sources constantly monitor changes in the movement of the Belarusian military. The attempt to play out the drone story, in his opinion, is connected with the Kursk operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
“Belarus is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, a NATO-like alliance created by Russia from several post-Soviet republics), and according to the new CSTO doctrine, when one member is attacked, others should help, as far as possible. It is quite realistic that Lukashenko, by imitating a threat from Ukraine, is trying to ‘ward off’ the need to send his troops to help the Russians in the Kursk region, especially given the attitude of the Belarusian army towards the Russian-Ukrainian war,” Azarau said.
However, according to Belarusian media, Lukashenko found another way to help Russia – a batch of Belarusian armored vehicles was sent to Russia.
Lukashenko himself is afraid to send the army to the Kursk region because he sees the catastrophe happening there for the Russian army.
Disarmament or Rearmament?
The issue of transferring equipment from Belarus to the Russian Federation has been discussed for a long time. The fact that Russian soldiers are being trained in Belarus and that many Belarusian factories work to produce Russian military equipment has long been no secret. For them, this is an opportunity to improve their situation due to Western sanctions.
“Belarusian factories now account for almost 15 percent of the Russian military-industrial complex, according to some reports,” Martynova said. “That’s a lot. Almost all plants related to the defense industry, even the metallurgical plant, work for Russian needs. And this process has not stopped.”
At the same time, the transfer of equipment from the Belarusian military to the Russian forces is gradual and in small batches, Azarau said.
“We monitor the movement of trains, but these are not mass deliveries,” Azarau said. “Lukashenko handed over tanks when Russia needed them after the losses of T-72s. We see that Russia has delivered a number of air defense systems and even Iskander ballistic missile systems to Belarus. However, we do not see any transfer of Iskander documents to the Belarusian forces, so we cannot say they were transferred. Perhaps they remain under Russian control, although they are located on Belarusian territory.”
How much equipment does Belarus have to transfer to Russia? According to the analytical portal Military Balance, Belarus has a total of up to 500 T-72 tanks in the oldest version and up to 1,000 armored vehicles, mostly outdated BMP-2s and similar models, as well as up to 500 artillery pieces and MLRS. Some of which are in storage.
“The combat-ready unit of the Belarusian army, which has about 50,000 personnel in total, consists of 13,000 ground forces. There are four mechanized brigades, two brigades of highly mobile troops, and two artillery brigades. If there is a transfer from existing units, this reduces their combat capability. After all, if a mechanized battalion should have up to 100 armored vehicles but only has 50, it loses its combat effectiveness,” Oleh Katkov, an analyst at the information and consulting company Defense Express, told Kyiv Post.
This leads to two conclusions, both of which have significant implications for Ukraine, in his opinion.
“First, reducing the combat capability of the Belarusian army is a plus for Ukraine, which can reduce its troop presence on the border with Belarus and deploy more units in the East, for example. Also, such involvement of Belarusian equipment indicates problems with resources and equipment supplies in Russia itself,” Katkov observed.
In addition, Azarau notes that this form of assistance is currently the only thing Russia can demand from Belarus. Despite both countries being members of the so-called “Union State,” Russia does not yet have the authority over the Belarusian army to direct it against Ukraine or involve it in battles on the side of the Russian Federation.
“So far, a joint headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus has not been established,” Azarau said. “Just as there is no joint grouping of troops with a joint command yet. Despite the presence of Russian troops in Belarus, Russian generals cannot yet give orders to the Belarusian army. And Lukashenko himself is afraid to send the army to the Kursk region because he sees the catastrophe happening there for the Russian army. He will do everything to avoid further participation in the war.”
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