Negotiators met twice in Minsk—in
September 2014 and February 2015—to broker a settlement to the Russian-inspired
separatist fighting in the Donbas. The
second time, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois
Hollande joined Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Russian President
Vladimir Putin to mediate.
Minsk is not working. The first three provisions of the Minsk II agreement
called for an “immediate and full ceasefire” by midnight on February 15, 2015,
the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the line of contact within fourteen days
of the February 11 conclusion of the Minsk II agreement, and free access for
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors to provide
“effective monitoring and verification” of the ceasefire and heavy weapons
withdrawal.
Today, more than fifteen months
after Minsk II was signed, Ukrainian soldiers continue to die as a result of hostile
fire. Separatists marked VE Day on May 9
in Donetsk by parading tanks and artillery whose presence flouted the heavy weapons
withdrawal requirement. OSCE monitors
routinely are denied access to areas in occupied Donbas.
Absent implementation of the basic
security provisions of Minsk II, the failure to bring into force the political
and economic elements comes as no surprise.
Ukrainians see the Minsk arrangements
as flawed and, in any case, unattainable.
Moscow has shown little interest in their implementation, by all
appearances instead preferring a frozen—or not-so-frozen—conflict. Voices inside and outside of Ukraine increasingly
say the Minsk process should be discarded.
That view is entirely
understandable. It is also wrong. Before throwing out Minsk, Ukrainians need to
ask what alternative path might lead to a settlement. They should also understand what they might
lose by moving precipitously.
Some suggest a return to the Geneva
format of negotiations, which met briefly in early 2014. That would bring the United States and
European Union to the table. But why
would Russia agree to that format instead of Minsk? Would the European Union provide a more
effective voice than Germany and France?
Would the presence of the United States ensure a more favorable outcome
for Kyiv?
The Ukrainian government should
have answers to these questions before casting aside Minsk in favor of Geneva. Similar questions should be asked before pursuing
any alternative negotiating format.
Some in Kyiv seem frustrated with the
role of Merkel, who has clearly led the German-French tandem. While the Germans have at times leaned on Kyiv,
Merkel sees an important principle at stake:
Moscow is using armed force to support a conflict on the territory of a
sovereign state, on top of its illegal seizure and annexation of Crimea, in
violation of the cardinal rule of the European security order going back to the
1975 Helsinki Final Act. The German
chancellor has proven steadfast in maintaining European Union unity regarding
sanctions on Russia, and she has made clear that full implementation of Minsk
II is necessary for the sanctions relief that Moscow desires.
Merkel has invested time, effort,
political weight and prestige in Minsk II.
If Ukraine were to decide to walk away, how would Kyiv keep Germany
involved? Having seen one process fail, Merkel
would have no incentive to engage in a new negotiating effort, particularly given
everything else on her agenda now.
The Germans would leave the
mediation role to someone else.
Who? There is no reason to expect
that the Obama administration, in its last eight months in office, would pick
it up. Whoever takes the presidential
oath in January, he or she will need time to get organized and may not have
Ukraine at the top of the in box in the Oval Office.
Moreover, if Kyiv abandons Minsk,
it would destroy the basis for European unity on sanctions. Merkel has maintained the European Union’s
support for sanctions—despite softness on the part of member states such as
Hungary and Italy—by linking them to Minsk II. Ending Minsk II would end that link.
That would lead to the collapse of European sanctions, eliminating a
significant element of Western pressure on Moscow.
Discarding the Minsk arrangements
raises a host of difficult questions. It
does not appear that those questions have good answers, in the sense of answers
that would make a settlement of the Donbas conflict more likely and ensure continued
Western support for Ukraine. A Ukrainian
decision to abandon Minsk would make a settlement less likely and weaken
Western unity.
The Minsk arrangements are flawed
and most probably will not work. At some
point, it may well be time to end Minsk.
But Kyiv should want that conclusion to be reached in Berlin and Paris
because they recognize Moscow’s intransigence, not because Ukraine itself killed
the process.
Steven Pifer, a senior
fellow at the Brookings Institution, is a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.
