So we’d do better to look at some of the lessons Brexit teaches Ukraine, as there’s much to learn. First, some background.
Serious discussion of the possibility of Britain leaving the EU first emerged after the 2008 economic crisis, which dealt a heavy blow to Europe.
The migrant crisis in the European Union intensified the anti-European sentiments of British voters still further. In this context, the popularity of the right-wing UK Independence Party (UKIP) started to grow, and it became a major voice in the campaign to leave the EU.
But the extreme right-wing forces feeding off Britain’s anti-migrant sentiments cannot alone be blamed for the results of the referendum.
The Conservatives in 2015 paved the way for the holding of the EU referendum; it was one of their election promises, helping them to victory in the general election. So ironically, Prime Minister David Cameron’s victory in the elections just a year ago has now cost him his job as head of Her Majesty’s Government today.
Good news, bad news
The good news following the Brexit vote is that the EU’s leaders will now want to prevent further disintegration, which means that the authorities of France and Germany will demonstrate unity and stability on crucial matters.
For instance, they will prolong the sanctions against Russia, for if they are not unanimous here, it could result in an even bigger collapse in Europe.
In this regard, I do believe there will be no negative developments.
The bad news is that parties in some European countries, such as France and the Netherlands, have called for the holding of similar referendums, which is exactly what Kremlin wants.
So, from a political standpoint, Russia approves of the British vote to leave the EU, though it will lose economically, as markets, especially the commodity markets, are now suffering a price shock. The weakened European economy will strongly affect Russia, which is already financially squeezed at the moment.
Brexit’s consequences for Ukraine
Britain’s leaving the EU is unlikely to have any positive impact on Ukraine, and the negative consequences of Brexit will manifest themselves in two different ways.
First, Kyiv will lose one of its strongest supporters in the EU, as Britain’s strong position on countering Russian aggression has often countered the more moderate Franco-German stand.
Britain has been a key player supporting the European ambitions of our country for a long time. Post-Brexit, its voice of support for Ukraine within the EU will unfortunately become much weaker.
Nevertheless, Britain still has not left the EU in the legal sense, so this weakening will not be immediate. Besides, it’s difficult to forecast how successful Ukraine will be after Brexit in our attempts to involve a non-EU Britain as a mediator in resolving the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine.
However, Kyiv has to try, for the notion of honor and dignity are basic values for British politicians, and they have been keeping the promises they gave to Ukraine in Budapest.
Second, there could be a threat to the support for Euro integration in the Ukrainian parliament.
With the present course of events, Euro optimists will have a hard time trying to garner votes in support of legislation aimed at European integration.
Joining the EU is a promise made by every single Ukrainian politician. It’s something people on the Maidan sacrificed their lives for, but now it runs counter to the recent developments in Europe. As a consequence, European integration opponents may grow stronger in Ukraine, and start saying: “Why bother joining a union that is collapsing anyway?”
Introducing the promised visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens and finalizing the ratification of the association agreement will become a crucial test, as European integration remains a cornerstone of Ukraine’s foreign policy.
Thus, the overall political consequences of the Brexit vote will be negative for Ukraine, rather than positive.
Britain will be preoccupied with its domestic problems. The EU will also focus on dealing with the difficulties presented by the exiting of a major economy from the union. Ukraine will indisputably remain a priority for Europe, but some of the intellectual resources, finances and energy that could have been put into helping Ukraine will be redirected to other objectives.
On the plus side
However, there is still a positive side to be found in the current developments.
Ukraine now has a historic chance to suggest a new relationship policy. While more and more countries are being infected with the virus of European skepticism, the Ukrainian people are fighting for European values every day. Moreover, the political disequilibrium within the EU may result in its searching for interesting new alliances and unconventional approaches.
To keep the entrance door to Europe open for us, we can give the EU and Britain new markets, offer our own high-quality goods, and secure the possibility of an inflow of investment.
Britain’s leaving the EU may provoke a capital outflow from the UK, so Ukraine must strive to become economically attractive to foreign businesses, including British ones.
The foreign businessmen that invest in our country may become strong advocates of Ukraine in their own capital cities, which could offer even better security than NATO membership (although the one does not exclude the other).
What lessons Ukraine can learn?
First and foremost, the result of the British referendum should be a red flag for the Ukrainian government as well.
If the authorities disregard internal problems in their country for a long time, ignoring popular discontent – be it with lowered social standards, losses of jobs, migration, the problems of IDPs, increased tariffs, or corruption – this could result in unexpected and dangerous consequences.
Ukraine’s authorities have to learn this lesson. They need to pay attention to the problems of individuals, and not simply talk about European values and long-term reforms, while at the same time not taking any significant action in this regard.
The sentiments seen among the British people are similar to those that are growing stronger among Ukrainians at present.
The British were unhappy with “the dictates of Brussels”; Ukrainians feel the same about “the dictates of the IMF” and its loan requirements.
Nevertheless, the Brexit vote can be an argument for the Ukrainian government in debt renegotiations with the IMF — as the British referendum showed, the discontent of socially vulnerable groups can result in a damaging reaction.
So Kyiv will have to be careful about approving measures that affect the most vulnerable social groups, and the middle class. In turn, the IMF must understand that social protests by people in Greece and people on the streets of Kyiv, amidst a war, are two different things.
In my opinion, there are two key observations to be made for Ukraine:
— a democratic vote, and its result, must be respected, as it is the will of the people;
— the authorities must listen to the voice of the people, as they have the final say — regardless of what the government wants. Fighting the consequences of public discontent is more difficult than preventing it in the first place.
PS: It is worth mentioning some peculiarities of British political life that are unusual for our young democracy.
The Conservatives’ example proves that:
— some members of a party can have fundamentally different views about the direction of the country, but not be expelled from that party for sticking to these views;
— the leader of the country resigns from his post of his own volition when his political course fails to match the will of society;
— the British counterpart of Ukraine’s Central Election Commission worked well, and in a matter of hours produced a result from the counting of 33.6 million ballots.
Nevertheless, these observations will have to be the topic for another article, on UK lessons in democracy for Ukraine.
Oleksiy Ryabchyn is a member of the opposition Batkivshchyna Party faction in the Ukrainian parliament and a co-chair of a group for interparliamentary relations with the United Kingdom. The op-ed was originally published in Ukrainian in Yevropeyska Pravda, and is republished with permission.
